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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Outline 
Studying Dynamics of Power & Managerial Control in 
Contemporary Service Sector Business Models from a Socio-
Political Perspective 
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Setting the Stage: Power, Profits, and Precarity in the 21st Centuries’ Service Sector 
The contemporary service sector is undergoing a significant transformation (e.g. Maglio et 
al., 2018; Roberts, 2018; Roland & Huang, 2014). From a managerial perspective, the advent 
of digital technologies, together with the social, political, and regulatory transformations of 
the global economy, has bolstered the emergence of new ventures and business models (e.g., 
Peitz & Waldfogel, 2012; Teece, 2010; Turner & Holten, 2015; Wirtz et al., 2016). As a 
consequence, competitive pressure has accelerated in many service-sector branches, 
particularly in the field of low- to medium-qualified services (Burr & Stephan, 2019; 
Kalleberg, 2009; Maglio et al., 2018; Osterwalder et al., 2011).  
Bolstered by these transformations, corporate business models (defined as managerial logics 
‘connect[ing] technical potential with the realisation of economic value’ (Chesbrough & 
Rosenblohm, 2002:38) and the setup of corresponding organisational structures) within and 
beyond the service sector, have become increasingly diversified (e.g., Osterwalder al., 2011; 
Wirtz et al., 2016). The same is true for workforce management approaches, meaning 
organisational practices routines established to safeguard efficient processes based on 
specific control- and monitoring-mechanisms as well as performance- and human resource-
management routines (e.g., Armstrong, 2011; Roland & Huang, 2014). This development is 
driven by the increased sensitivity of both business scholars and practitioners to the strategic 
importance of different business models and workforce management approaches that are 
increasingly considered as core factors influencing corporate success (e.g., Armstrong, 2011). 
However, industrial relations and labour relations scholars have emphasised that these 
transformations have been accompanied by sometimes problematic outcomes for work and 
employment within and beyond conventional service sector corporations (e.g., Artus, 2008; 
Blyton et al., 2008; Böhle et al., 2010; Bosch & Weinkopf, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009). Bolstered 
by technological, regulatory, and economic dynamics, low- to medium-qualified service-
sector employment has become increasingly non-standardised and commodified in many 
Western societies, including both liberal and coordinated market economies (e.g., Alberti et 
al., 2018; Dörre, 2016, 2018 2019; Hyman, 2018; Kalleberg, 2009, 2011). Contemporary 
service sector is hence characterised by an increasing share of so-called precarious labour 
relations (e.g.; European Comission, 2018; IndustriALL Global Union, n.d.; WoRC, n.d.). 
This involves unprotected, insecure work and employment relations where workers lack 
access to basic employment rights and face uncertainty concerning the duration of 
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employment. In addition, workers lack access to social protection and benefits, and face 
substantial legal and practical obstacles to organising and participating in the decisions that 
affect their working lives (e.g., Böhle et al., 2010; Hyman, 2018, 2019; Kalleberg, 2009, 
2011).  
Scholars from various fields have associated these labour-related issues with the 
transformation of existing service-sector business models (e.g., Castel & Dörre, 2009; 
Hyman, 2018, 2019; Rehder, 2016; Wortmann, 2004; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). 
Transforming corporate policies geared towards safeguarding corporate efficiency and 
competitiveness in light of increased market pressure entail various agendas driven by 
corporate attempts to optimise labour costs in relation to labour output. Due to the crucial 
role of labour expenses in the low- to medium-qualified service sector industries (e.g., Artus, 
2008; Broadbridge, 2002; Brozkurt, 2015). Service sector managers are hence increasingly 
concerned with the question of ‘How to Squeeze More Out of a Penny’ (Rosen, 2006:243) 
when it comes to the setup of corporate workforce management and employment relations. 
Consequently, many managerial efforts aimed at increasing the profitability and efficiency of 
service sector operations are closely linked to practices geared towards minimising labour 
cost. Regarding their social and labour-related consequences, critical scholars argue that 
these efforts of minimising labour costs leads to the increase of commodification and 
precarity in work and employment conditions (e.g., Artus, 2008; Brozkurt, 2015; Rosen, 
2006; Vidal, 2012). Put together, research indicates that specific managerial business models, 
which are aligned with distinct organisational structures, workforce management approaches, 
and control- and monitoring-mechanisms can be seen as important aspect bolstering the 
emergence labour-related issues in certain segments of the contemporary labour market. 
Against this background, the cumulative dissertation at hand aims to provide a clear-cut 
understanding of this relationship between business models, managerial control and influence 
mechanisms, corresponding organisational workforce management systems, and the resulting 
work and employment conditions based on the investigation of such ‘problematic’ cases. 
Specifically, the three chapters assembled investigate so-called hard discounters such as the 
German food retailer Lidl, and platform-based service providers, such as the American 
ridesharing company Uber. Thereby, the chapters focus on specific contemporary business 
models in the field of low- to medium-qualified services which have been critisised for 
establishing problematic work and employment conditions to safeguard corporate efficiency. 
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Theoretical Outline 
To address its overarching research goal, the thesis departs from critical approaches in the 
sociology of work and organisation and socio-political concepts of power in management and 
organisational theory (see e.g. Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; Fleming & Spicer, 2014 for an 
overview).‘Socio-political approaches’ (e.g. Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2014) investigate 
power as a generic phenomenon inherent to all coordinated and organised activities (Clegg, 
1989; Clegg et al., 2006). Going beyond narrow, common-place understandings of power as 
(potentially illegitimate) exercise of punitive force and early scholarly perspectives where 
‘power and conflict were either only implicitly addressed (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989) or 
they were treated as aberrations that were at worst dysfunctional and at best controllable 
through appropriate organisational design’ (Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016:4), socio-political 
theory considers power as an inevitable, necessary and ‘endemic part of organizational life’ 
(Fleming & Spicer, 2014:237).  
This genuine understanding of power points towards the key rationale for taking this 
theoretical stance for the analyses at hand. Socio-political scholars emphasise the ‘Janus-
faced’, two-sided nature of power both as ‘punitive’ and ‘facilitative’ phenomena probably 
best depicted by Clegg (1989, Clegg et al. 2006). Synthesising ideas from Michel Foucault 
(1977, 1980) and Talcott Parsons (1951), he points out that the existence of power within and 
beyond organised settings has both ‘punitive’ and disciplining effects: On the one hand, the 
exercise of power limits individual agency, can include sanctions and thus can harm 
individuals. However, Clegg also emphasises the facilitative character of power as the core 
force keeping social systems coherent by enabling the exercise of (legitimate) control and 
integrate and coordinate collaborative activities in an efficient, goal-attaining manner. 
Thereby, the socio-political notion of power can fruitfully be applied to conceptually link 
managerial policies and practices of control with both their ‘facilitative’ impetus and effects 
(in terms of corporate profitability) as well as with their restrictive and sometimes ‘punitive’ 
outcomes (e.g. concerning the conditions of work and employment) for those being exposed 
to them.  
Similarly, socio-political scholarship highlights that power is relational property embedded in 
specific contexts. This means that certain actors not inherently ‘possess power’ but the power 
‘held’ by certain actors is based on the relative distribution of their capacity to influence 
other actors in organisational settings based on (legitimate or non-legitimate, formal, or 
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informal) resources (Clegg, 1989). These capacities and resources are rooted in the socio-
normative and socio-technical structures of these organisations and their environments. This 
point towards an important analytical distinction regarding this relationship of actors’ 
capacities and socio-normative and socio-technical structures: Concerning the levels of 
analysis, socio-political scholarship highlights that observable, identifiable acts of 
micropolitical behaviour (such as e.g. actors’ attempts to exercise formal authority, engage in 
impression management or strategically provide selective information) related to the direct 
exercise of power (‘episodic power’), needs to be analysed in relation to the organisational 
and societal contexts it takes place in. Thus, socio-political power theory highlights a ‘second 
layer’ of analysis referred to as ‘systemic power’, addressing the organisational structures and 
wider institutional contexts power is congealed in (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982, Burns, 1961, 
Fleming & Spicer, 2007). 
For the purpose of the analysis at hand, this analytic distinction allows to systematically 
relate managerial control practices (which can be conceptualised as exercise of power at the 
systemic level) and problematic working conditions (which can be conceptualised as 
individual outcomes of episodic processes for low-power actors in certain organisational 
settings) with specific organisational structures and workforce management approaches 
(which can be understood as elements of the setup of systemic power). 
Besides this ‘socio-spatial dimension’ (Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski, 2016) of systemic 
and episodic power, theorists in the field have emphasised the ‘temporal dimension’ of power 
(e.g. ibid.) to conceptually capture the fact that power relations in organisational settings can 
be dynamic. In general, socio-normative and socio-technical structures (such as specific 
organisational structures, organisational culture, technologies applied for process 
management and workforce control, formal and informal rules, broader societal norms and 
discourses) create institutionalised, relatively stable, systemic arrangements and standing 
conditions shaping ongoing episodes of power in given instances (Clegg 1989; Oliveira & 
Clegg 2015). Nevertheless, stakeholders in organisational settings can attempt to transform 
these power configurations by micro-political activity and resistance.  
However, powerful key actors in organisational settings (such as e.g.  top-level management 
teams) can attempt to suppress or counter these efforts by political strategising and setting up 
systemic structures in a way safeguarding their interests and limiting the room for agency of 
other stakeholders. Consequently, while some organisational arrangements provide 
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conditions that are more supportive for dynamic permutations of power relations, other types 
of organisations are cauterised by rather persistent power configurations which are often 
based on significant power asymmetries between powerful key actors and low-power 
actors/stakeholders. Therefore, the holistic analysis of power in organisational settings allows 
to link the ongoing micro-political dynamics of episodic power to the study of systemic 
power configurations to explain permutation and/or persistence of power relations and power 
asymmetries in given organisational settings.  
For the overarching research purpose of this dissertation, this conceptualisation of 
organisational change and/or ‘inertia’ is valuable as it allows to capture the efficiency of 
specific service sector business models even in cases where apparent, ongoing success of 
certain companies is accompanied by public criticism and problematic outcomes for workers 
and other stakeholders. In organisational configurations where stakeholders and workers 
possess limited individual or collective agency (e.g. based on a weak labour market position 
or the absence of protective regulation and legal rights for codetermination) and where, 
simultaneously, significant power asymmetries and mechanisms suppressing resistant 
micropolitical activity at the episodic level are institutionalised in the systemic setup of 
power relations, the emergence and persistence of both power imbalances and ‘oppressive’ 
labour regimes is highly likely. 
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Introducing the Assembled Papers 
Against this theoretical background, the common empirical focus of the assembled 
contributions is on companies in the field of low- to medium-qualified services. The thesis 
addresses both companies that operate within the traditional boundaries of formalised, 
bureaucratic-hierarchical corporate organisation as well as novel business models for service 
sector value which are receiving increasing public and academic attention under the label of 
the ‘sharing economy.’ Specifically, the three chapters investigate so-called hard discounters 
such as the German food retailer Lidl (chapter 2), and platform-based service providers, such 
as the American ridesharing company Uber (chapters 3 and 4).  
These organisations share particular characteristics regarding the organisation of employment 
and the control of work processes: In different ways, the business models, management 
practices, and employment systems of these companies differ remarkably from the ideal type 
of industrial organisation characterised by Fordist process management; bureaucratic control; 
Taylorist management; and relatively stable contract-based regular employment relations 
within the nexus of the ‘Coasion’ firm (e.g., Davis, 2016a, b; Kalleberg, 2011). This model 
of corporate value creation as the ‘normal state’ of business organisation not only has shaped 
the economic reality but also determined economic and social science theory formation over 
long stretches of the 20th century (e.g., Davis, 2015, 2016a, b). Hence, the selection of the 
investigated corporate contexts accounts for the empirical heterogeneity of contemporary 
service sector business models and thereby aims to provide valuable insights on the dynamics 
in the contemporary, post-industrial business arrangements.  
Moreover, as outlined above, research has pointed to the existence of power asymmetries in 
these settings as well as both hard discount retailing- and platform-based on-demand business 
models have been critisised in public and scholarly debates due to labour-related issue that 
are associated with their business policies. Therefore, the selected empirical settings also 
provide opportunities for analyses of power and politics from a socio-political perspective. 
Building upon the outline of the empirical context and theoretical foundation of the 
dissertation I subsequently provide a brief overview of the three chapters assembled in this 
dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
The first paper (‘Total institutions revisited: What can Goffman's approach tell us about 
“oppressive” control and “problematic” conditions of work and employment in contemporary 
business organizations?, published in Competition & Change 2017, Vol. 21 [4] 253–273, 
SAGE) offers an analysis of hard-discount food retailers, characterized by applying a rigid 
cost-leadership strategy based on the optimization of logistics, utilising bargaining power 
with sup-pliers (Vidal, 2012), and implementing strict measures of cost minimisation. 
To analyse power configurations and potentially oppressive forms of work and employment 
in this type of contemporary service sector organisation, the paper uses a framework based on 
Erving Goffman’s reflections on ‘total institutions’ (Goffman, 1961). While many other key 
ideas of Goffman have fruitfully contributed to critical scholarship regarding management, 
organisation, and industrial relations (e.g. Clegg, 2009; Farrington, 1992; Tracy, 2000), 
efforts to apply Goffman’s concept of total institutions to the analysis of business 
organisations are rare. This scarcity is problematic, as Goffman’s description of specific 
‘extreme cases’ (Geppert, 2015) of organisational arrangements, such as work camps, 
suggests similarities to media reports of oppressive work and employment practices in certain 
problematic cases involving contemporary service sector companies. In line with Stewart 
Clegg (2006:4), the paper argues that ‘Goffman’s depiction of total institutions demonstrates 
in heightened and condensed form the underlying organisational processes that can be found, 
albeit in much less extreme cases, in more normal organisations’ and thus provides a suitable 
theoretical foundation to study hard discounters from a critical angle. This argument is also 
aligned with propositions made in methodological literature (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1997) 
emphasising the importance of comparing cases that appear dissimilar at first glance to gain a 
sharper understanding of common dimensions and thus to develop new perspectives on 
phenomena.  
Following this logic, the paper analyses the so-called Lidl scandal of 2008 (Conelly, 2008) in 
comparison to several elements of the total institution that Goffman has labelled ‘staff-inmate 
divides’, practices of ‘efﬁciently handling people’ by strict ‘systems of surveillance and 
constant supervision’, distinct systems of ‘internal privileges and sanction’, and the ‘tight 
scheduling of daily routines’. The analysis is based on interview data collected from Lidl 
shop ﬂoor employees, middle managers, and union ofﬁcials in ﬁve European countries in 
previous research by Geppert et al. (2015) as well as company documents and additional 
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media coverage of the case gathered for the further investigation of the case conducted in the 
paper. 
The analysis shows how organisational characteristics and managerial practices such as a 
strict neo-Taylorist work organisation and constant surveillance bolster various labour issues 
for some hard-discount retailers. It also illustrates that widespread practices of intensiﬁed 
surveillance and a strong emphasis on disciplinary measures in the sector are bolstered by 
specific institutional and socio-economic conditions. By applying an analytic heuristic 
derived from Goffman’s concept, the analysis also highlights that suppressive forms of 
control in business organisations do not just display deviance, aberration, or managerial 
misconduct: While functionalist research on organisational control would interpret these 
phenomena as ‘dysfunctionalities’ (e.g. Child, 1984), which need to be carefully managed in 
efﬁcient organisations, from a total institutions perspective they constitute elements 
bolstering organisational efﬁciency that are rooted in wider organisational and structural 
conditions.  
The paper contributes to research on hard-discount food retailers, which – although often 
triggering public criticism – have hardly been studied systematically. Moreover, the 
framework also explains contemporary employment practices which have been labelled 
‘abusive’ and ‘precarious’ (e.g. Artus, 2008; Brozkurt, 2015; Conelly, 2008; Rosen, 2006; 
Wortmann, 2004) in public and academic debates; these practices are even present in 
institutional settings usually known for robust employee protection arrangements. The paper 
illustrates that these practices cannot be explained in isolation from company-specific 
business models and the resulting formal and informal practices of work organisation, 
process coordination, and specific organisational power configurations.  
The following two papers also address the connection between organisational structures, 
power configurations, and work and employment conditions. However, they shift the focus 
towards companies in the so-called ‘platform or - sharing economy’ (e.g. Belk, 2014). In 
particular, they focus on commercially oriented service-on-demand platforms. These 
platforms provide a wide range of services via web-based online architectures in, for 
example, the fields of passenger transport, building cleaning, translation, design and layout, 
and copywriting. As a common characteristic, work is allocated by platforms formally 
serving as mere intermediaries for workers formally classified as freelancers. These 
freelancers ‘sell’ their services to other users requesting tasks to be carried out either digitally 
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or physically (e.g. Sutherland & Jarrahi, 2018). 
Similar to the hard-discount model studied in the first paper, corporate platform business 
models include elements and practices beyond the traditional mechanisms and organizational 
structures for coordinating and controlling business processes in traditional industrial 
settings. Research has pointed to power asymmetries in these settings, and platform 
companies have frequently been criticised for labour-related issues (e.g. De Stefano, 2015; 
Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). However, the underlying business models, coordination 
mechanisms, and employment systems – as well as the employment-related problems – 
significantly differ from those previously studied drawing on the case of Lidl. Thus, both 
studies of these novel organisational arrangements capture the heterogeneity of power-
related phenomena and resulting employment conditions in the broad spectrum of business 
models and analyse them in conjunction with specific organisational features to develop a 
mire clear-cut understanding of the broad variety of contemporary service sector business 
models. 
 
Chapter 3 
To provide a foundation for this analysis, the second paper (‘The Dynamics of Power and 
Resistance in Platform-based On-demand Labour Arrangements: A Literature Review 
through the Lens of Socio-political Theory’) investigates the current state of knowledge on 
the role of power relations between different stakeholders in commercially oriented service-
on-demand platforms.  
The increasing volume of academic works on sharing economy business models points 
towards the role of power asymmetries between the platform operators and platform workers 
in these settings, associating them with both managerial profit-seeking and digital business 
model characteristics (e.g. Bucher & Fieseler, 2017; Codagnone et al., 2016; Curchod et al., 
2019; Gandini, 2018; Graham et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2015). Similarly, these power 
imbalances are associated with problematic labour conditions in certain cases (e.g. Alberti et 
al., 2018; Calo & Rosenblat, 2017; Manolchev, 2019; Peticca-Harris & Ravishankar, 2018; 
Rosenblat & Stark, 2015; Van Doorn, 2017; Wood et al., 2019 a, b).  While existing research 
provides manifold descriptions and initial analyses of power-related phenomena, what are 
missing are holistic reviews of power-related phenomena grounded on theoretical concepts of 
power from organisation and management research.  
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Addressing this gap, the paper explores findings regarding the core themes in platform 
research and phenomena relevant to understanding power in on-demand work platforms 
based on a systematic review. The findings are organised along the seminal taxonomy of 
episodic and systemic ‘faces of power’, namely, coercion, manipulation, domination, and 
subjectification, and ‘sites of power’. This approach captures not only management practices 
and process organisation ‘by’ platforms, but also platform workers’ and external 
stakeholders’ mechanisms for exercising power ‘against’ platforms (Geppert & 
Dörrenbächer, 2014; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; Fleming & Spicer, 2007, 2014). 
The review indicates that the exercise of power by platforms is based on intertwined 
technology-based and discursive mechanisms, along with specific conditions in their 
institutional environment, which, together provide the foundation for the systemic power (in 
terms of domination and subjectivation) is inscribed in platform arrangements based on 
‘algorithmic management’ (e.g. Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015; Wood et al., 
2019a). By implementing elements of algorithmic management such as bureaucratic 
mechanisms (e.g. setting rules of membership, prescribing process patterns), establishing 
information channels in a specific way, and implementing by technology-based surveillance 
mechanisms platform operators can continuous monitor users' communications and actions 
and utilise access to information in order to safeguard frictionless operations and control 
platform workers' activities. In addition, ‘gaps and cracks’ in surrounding industrial relations 
and employment legislation systems allow platforms to classify workers as freelance 
subcontractors, thereby both safeguarding their economic efficiency by avoiding overheads 
and cost associated with regular employment and excluding platform workers from protective 
regulations and formal rights for codetermination, collective voice and interest articulation. 
This systemic setup enables platform providers to exercise episodic power based on various 
mechanisms. In contrast to the findings on hard discounters, coercive elements of episodic 
power such as direct managerial supervision and control power play a comparatively minor 
role in these settings. Instead, platforms replace direct managerial supervision with customer 
involvement via algorithmic evaluation mechanisms embedded in the platform infrastructure. 
In addition, platforms utilise various techniques to exercise episodic power via manipulation 
(e.g. interventions in match-making, the purposeful setup and continuous refinement of 
incentive structures, the provision of selective information, in-app nudges, and in-app 
rhetoric manoeuvres) to ensure that platform processes proceed within desired boundaries 
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and with desired economic outcomes. 
Beyond this, platforms also harness systemic environmental conditions (e.g. norms and 
narratives of the sharing economy) to engage in discursive manoeuvres to hinder the 
emergence of calls for more favourable working conditions and to legitimise the business 
model in the eyes of customers, shareholders, the public, and political regulators. 
On the other hand, research highlights both individual and collective activities via which 
workers and other stakeholders exercise power against platforms in light of these managerial 
policies (e.g. Curchod et al., 2019; Gupta et al., 2014; Irani & Silberman, 2013; Lehdonvirta, 
2016). These ‘counter-activities’ include individual coping strategies, such as the 
manipulation of algorithmic process coordination and collaborative forms of episodic action 
which build on specific systemic structures, such as self-organised communication networks 
or digital complementary of-app structures (such as Turkopticon third party platform 
allowing workers to give feedback on their customers to help other users to avoid 
problematic jobs or recommend superior ones, or FairCrowd.work, where platform workers 
can evaluate apps they work) for overcoming alienation, bolstering solidarity, and 
establishing counter-publics to increase worker agency, decrease systemic information 
asymmetries, and provide platforms for coalition-building with external third-party 
stakeholders. What is more, both workers and external stakeholders engage in activities 
aimed at altering – or even replacing – the sometimes-oppressive systemic arrangements 
established by commercial on-demand service platforms. For example, they engage in legal 
strategising to force platforms to alter these structures to favour workers, or to provide or 
establish cooperative platform structures offering less restrictive alternatives for organising 
platform-mediated service provision (e.g. Schor, 2014; Davis, 2016a, b). 
Put together, the systematic review based on the analysis of more than 300 seminal 
contributions form platform scholarship contributes to existing research by providing a 
comprehensive overview of power-related phenomena in the digital economy. Departing 
from the synopsis of literature structured along the taxonomy of ‘faces’ and ‘sites’ of power, 
it moreover discusses apparent gaps in existing research and unveils avenues for further on-
demand platform scholarship through the conceptual lens of power theory. For instance, the 
paper discusses how research in the field could benefit from a stronger consideration of 
discursive approaches and sense-making perspectives on power in business and organisation 
studies (e.g. Vaara et al., 2005; Clark & Geppert, 2011). Similarly, the paper provides 
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suggestions regarding how studying platform arrangements paves the way for studies seeking 
to enhance power theory, for instance, by investigating innovative forms of mobilisation both 
by and against platforms when episodic processes of power, such as public campaigns or 
coordinated strike action, are organised based on novel technological structures.  
The findings also indicate that developing conceptual frameworks grounded in existing 
power scholarship for studying processes and permutations of power configurations in 
platform is important: While studies have provided some descriptive analyses of change 
processes in platform settings, such frameworks could provide an analytical blueprint for 
comparing these cases and could shed light on the prerequisites, pathways, and patterns of 
change of power relations in specific settings. Such models could also guide comparative 
analyses of power in heterogeneous gig work settings, which are still scare. 
 
Chapter 4 
The third paper (‘A “Circuits of Power”-Based Perspective on Algorithmic Management 
and Labour in the Gig Economy’, current version ‘conditionally accepted’ for publication in 
Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management/ The German 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Special issue: ‘Arbeitswelten und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der 
Plattformökonomie’, 2020, Vol. 27 [2], Budrich) picks up on this diagnosis and attempts to 
close this conceptual gap, departing from Stewart Clegg’s framework of ‘circuits of power’ 
(Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006). The framework traces the ‘explicit mechanism for […] the 
exercise of power’ (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010) from a longitudinal perspective as it 
conceptualises the dialectics of systemic power structures and the episodic exercise of power. 
On the one hand, it elaborates the mechanisms by which systemic structures embedded in 
relatively durable societal and organisational arrangements affect processes and interactions 
in a top-down manner by providing the ‘standing conditions’ (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 
2006) of episodic power. On the other hand, the concept provides a detailed 
conceptualisation of mechanisms via which “bottom-up” organisational interactions – 
whereby actors seek to maintain, gain, or deny a strategic advantage by controlling or 
contesting systemic structures (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015) – can lead to changes in 
organisational power configurations. Hence, the framework ‘allows researchers to identify 
and understand both how power shifts across actor networks and how power generates such 
networks’ (Oliveira & Clegg, 2016:426).  
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Based on Clegg’s model, the paper develops an analytic template to analyse these dynamics 
in on-demand service platform settings. To illustrate the application of this template, the 
paper draws on the case of the U.S. ridesharing platform Uber, which has caused vivid 
debates (e.g. Allen-Robertson, 2017; Collier et al., 2018; Davis, 2015; Fleming, 2017; 
Wentrup et al., 2019). The case study is based on seminal contributions and media coverage. 
Following the proposed analytical template, the analysis proceeds in four stages.  
First, it describes Uber’s initial ‘socio-political setup’ in terms of actors, interests, the scope 
of agency, and the ‘technologies of production and discipline’ (Clegg, 1989) available to the 
company to steer its operations. Based on legal and technological foundations, platforms can 
build a systemic infrastructure that supports the establishment of distinct power-related 
control and influence mechanisms in the platform’s algorithmic management approach.  
In a second step, the paper considers the ‘diversified portfolio’ of control and influence 
mechanisms used by Uber to steer processes. This portfolio combines algorithmic 
bureaucracy, direct control by customers based on user evaluation systems, incentivising 
dynamic pricing mechanisms, and the use of in-app communication channels for subtly 
manipulating and nudging platform workers.  
The third stage of the analysis illustrates how these mechanisms “top-down” constitute 
processes, interactions, and episodes of power in day-to-day processes of the platform 
organisation. In this step, the text describes both the facilitative effects of these practices – 
the ways these practices bolster platform efficiency – as well as their restrictive or even 
‘punitive’ outcomes in terms of labour conditions and subjective issues faced by platform 
workers.  
Finally, the circuits of power approach, combined with ideas from micro-political scholars, 
demonstrates how these control and influence mechanisms curtail gig workers’ power, thus 
limiting bottom-up processes that could induce shifts in Uber’s power configuration. Hence, 
the paper demonstrates how specific power-related processes in the problematic case of Uber 
tend to reify and stabilise initial power asymmetries between providers and workers at a 
structural level.  
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Conclusion and Contribution 
By providing insights on the interrelations of control and influence mechanisms, 
organisational workforce management, and work and employment conditions in rather 
different empirical settings, the assembled papers provide valuable insights on dynamics of 
power and managerial policies in contemporary service sector business models operating 
beyond the well-known patterns of conventional industrial workplace organisation. 
Besides the case- and field-specific findings and various specific contributions to socio-
political scholarship highlighted above (and in the papers themselves), I want to conclude by 
highlighting the overall potential of socio-political perspectives to appropriately address 
important issues in current scholarly debates in various disciplines focusing on the 
interrelations of business models, control and influence mechanisms, workforce management 
systems, and work and employment conditions.  
The assembled contributions illustrate, that the study of these interrelations crucially relies on 
holistic research perspectives which can be provided by the core theoretical concepts of 
socio-political scholarship. As emphasised, and illustrated by the analyses assembled in this 
dissertation, such holistic analyses of power in organisational settings require and allow to 
integrate episodic, systemic, and longitudinal perspectives. Next to the advantages of 
considering theoretical and empirical insights from the field, future studies of ‘questionable’ 
business models and organisational arrangements in different contexts could therefore benefit 
from this core insight from socio-political scholarship methodologically: In particular, 
research future research could benefit from combining the analytical templates developed in 
course of this dissertation with the holistic ‘stratified framework’ for the analysis of 
micropolitical processes recently proposed by Becker-Ritterspach & Blazejewski (2016). 
The framework provides a holistic approach to methodically capture (1) ‘the episodic 
perspective [on power] disclos[ing] when and how an actor has a stake in the current political 
events’, (2) the wider systemic embeddedness or ‘spatial dimension’ of power ‘disclos[ing] 
how actors, interests and resources are constituted by local, organisational, regional, national 
or transnational contexts’ as well as (3) the temporal dimension of power allowing to 
understand ‘how political action […] is linked to past events and future prospects’ (ibid.:204-
205). Against this background I think that the theoretical insights and methodological 
innovations provided by the three contributions assembled in the dissertation could be 
valuable to enhance the methodological and conceptual foundations of socio-political 
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scholarship required to engage in holistic analyses of power in various organisational settings 
in the following ways: 
For one, the Goffman-based analysis of hard discount food retailing presented in chapter 2 
analysing episodic and systemic power in the corporate setting of Lidl illustrates how 
Becker-Ritterspach's and Blazejewski's concept, originally developed for the study of 
micropolitics in the realm of complex multinational corporations, can also be applied to 
systematically analyse power relations in local corporate contexts. Based on the in-depth 
case-study analysing the entanglement of systemic and episodic power in a concrete 
organisational setting, the paper illuminates the impact of the ‘extra-organisational situation’ 
of power related processes by analysing in detail how institutional, environmental standing 
conditions (such as the weak labour market position of employees and the specificity of the 
codetermination laws in the researched German context) contribute to the creation of 
‘totalitarian’, authoritarian corporate structures. Thereby, the analysis exemplifies how the 
impact of the ‘extra-organisational situation’ emphasised by Becker-Ritterspach and 
Blazejewski can captured in analyses analysis of power in concrete organisational settings. 
Moreover, the analysis on accounts for the ‘personal situation’ of low-power actors 
considered important by Becker-Ritterspach and Blazejewski not only regarding their 
micropolitical power but also with a focus on the subjective experiences of individuals in 
totalitarian-authoritarian company settings. The paper thereby demonstrates how a Goffman-
based perspective can serve to analyse problematic employment practices with regard to their 
power-theoretical foundations as well as their problematic subjective implications 
simultaneously. In doing so, the theoretical contribution of the paper might ultimately help to 
establish theoretical connections between socio-political scholarship in organisation and 
management and analyzes of problematic labour and employment in critical sociology.  
For two, the analysis provides a blueprint for  investigations of the ‘socio-spatial dimension’ 
of power in studies focusing on micro-political processes on the shop floor level of existing 
organisations .In the light of recent calls by organisational sociologists emphasising that 'we 
require more case studies in order to understand power relations [...] with a particular focus 
on political episodes at [the] operational or store level rather than headquarters-subsidiary 
power relations.' (Geppert et al., 2014:3), the paper thereby also makes a methodical 
contribution as the proposed 'Analytical Framework for Studying Functions and Forms of 
Potentially Opposing Forms of Workplace Control' (see table 2, p.31 below) could be used to 
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provide future investigations of shop-floor micropolitics in (particularly in strictly 
hierarchical settings) with a solid methodological foundation. 
For three, the systematic review of power related phenomena in platform-based on-demand 
work settings departing from Fleming and Spicer's taxonomy of 'sites and faces of power' 
presented in chapter 3 illustrates how socio-political concepts can be utilised to 
systematically provide comprehensive analyses socio-spatial and temporal dynamics of 
power beyond the investigation of isolated cases in course of systematic reviews geared 
towards unpacking overarching similarities and patterns of power-related processes in  
certain types of business models and specific branches. 
Finally, the analytic template developed for the analysis of Uber in chapter 4 has proven 
valuable for the in-depth longitudinal analysis of both persistence and permutations of power 
relations. Thereby, it provides methodological blueprint that might support future analyses 
which aim to develop a more clear-cut understanding of the temporal dimension of 
micropolitical processes in various organisational settings. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Total institutions revisited: What can Goffman’s approach 
tell us about ‘oppressive’ control and ‘problematic’ 
conditions of work and employment in contemporary 
business organizations? 
 
 
Abstract  
In this paper we shed light on the subjective, organizational and societal conditions which 
support the emergence and persistence of oppressive labor regimes in some sectors of 
developed market economies. Based on our analysis we develop a Goffman-based 
framework for analyzing asymmetric organizational power configurations and potentially 
problematic forms of work and employment in the context of business organizations. Our 
framework conceptualizes purposes and effects of organizational control, beyond 
functionalist approaches that focus narrowly on efficiency and the effectiveness of 
management. Our article aims to provide answers to the question of why work and 
employment practices – which have been labelled ‘abusive’ and ‘precarious’ in public and 
academic debates – have become highly persistent in some firms, even in ‘coordinated 
market economies’ like Germany where possibilities for employee voice are usually strong. 
We apply first- and second-hand data, based on the case of the internationally operating 
German food retailer Lidl, in order to highlight and illustrate key elements of our framework. 
 
Keywords: Oppressive organizational configurations, work and employment, retailing, 
total institutions, Erving Goffman, managerial control, organizational inclusion, precarious 
employment 
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Introduction 
Media stories on German hard discount food retailing (HDFR) tend to emphasize the 
apparent economic success of this business model. Since the 1960s, hard discounters 
such as Lidl and Aldi have become the dominant players among German supermarkets, 
holding more than 40% of the current market share (Dierig, 2014). The HDFR 
business model is based on a limited assortment of fast-moving items sold in large 
quantities at low prices in small- to medium-sized stores (Geppert et al., 2015). This 
model has spread rapidly across Europe. For example, Lidl, the second-largest food 
retailer in Germany, currently employs 335,000 people in Europe and has recently 
been named ‘grocer of the year’ in the United Kingdom (Alexander, 2015). 
The success of HDFR can be explained by reference to mainstream business studies: 
Next to economies of scale, a major factor in the success of this business model is a 
rigid cost leadership strategy achieved by implementing strict measures of cost 
minimization. Next to Waltonist cost-cutting strategies aimed at optimizing 
purchasing and logistics as well as utilizing bargaining power with suppliers (Vidal, 
2012) German hard discounters are particularly successful at minimizing labor costs 
(Wortmann, 2004), which are the second-largest cost factor in retailing (Broadbridge, 
2002). In contrast to the low-wage Waltonist model, German HDFRs minimize labor 
costs by rigidly applying neo-Taylorist methods of rationalization. This includes rigid 
standardization, highly centralized authority relations, strict benchmarking and high 
formalization in order to maximize work output (Geppert et al., 2015; Wortmann, 
2004). Additionally, HDFRs also mandate a signiﬁcant degree of employee working 
time ﬂexibility and apply techniques of ‘lean stafﬁng’ to avoid high overheads and sunk 
costs (Artus, 2008; Geppert et al., 2015). The measures outlined above make perfect 
sense from a cost-leadership oriented managerial perspective. However, they bring 
along a ‘dark side’ that is easily overlooked when analyzing the business model through 
functionalist lenses, as the scandal of Lidl – one of the leading German hard discounters 
– indicates. In 2008, Lidl made headlines when it came to light that the company had 
systematically spied on its employees in the locker rooms and toilets of its stores. 
During the course of the scandal, Lidl was also accused of exploiting and suppressing 
employees, leading to a ‘climate of fear’ (Connolly, 2008) within the organization. 
These accusations were in line with earlier investigative union research that brought to 
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light problematic employment conditions such as harassment of ‘disobedient’ or 
underperforming employees, the denial of mandatory breaks, inadequate work–family 
balance and harsh forms of control in many of Lidl’s stores (Hamann & Giese, 2004; 
Hamann & Research Group, 2006). 
These issues have recently been addressed in research on ‘problematic’ employment 
conditions (Artus, 2008) and ‘extreme work’ (e.g. Bozkurt, 2015) in retailing. It has been 
shown that the intensiﬁcation of work within the retail sector often leads to physical 
and psychological exhaustion, accompanied by inadequate work–family balance (e.g. 
Henly & Lambert, 2013; Price, 2016; Wood, 2016). Additionally, several studies 
analyzed how German retail organizations utilize various techniques to suppress 
employee voice and avoid unionization and codetermination (e.g. Artus, 2008). Some 
of these ﬁndings also indicate that problematic forms of employment in retail are 
closely linked with the way retailers exert managerial control. Current work by Price 
(2016) has shown how lower level shop ﬂoor employees are exposed to info-normative, 
bureaucratic and direct personal control mechanisms and incentive systems. It also 
draws attention on control forms of shop ﬂoor employees in retail that can be 
labelled as strictly bureaucratic and highly output oriented (see also Child, 1984: 158–
159). 
To sum up, critical studies on retailing have focused on the operational and functional 
problems of speciﬁc forms of managerial control and related labor issues. They also 
point towards an increasing precariousness of work and employment and ethically 
questionable forms of organizational control. Some studies, especially in the tradition 
of the Labor Process Debate, arguably focused too narrowly on subjectivity and 
‘resistance for its own sake’ without considering cases where resistance is highly 
absent and neglecting why this might be the case in some cases (Edwards, 2007: 11). 
Our article contributes here by discussing potentially ‘totalistic’ aspects of managerial 
control practices and how they are linked with problematic forms of employee 
inclusion in cases where resistance often appears useless. For example, Royle (2002) 
has demonstrated that the possibilities for resistance in the context of fast-food retailing 
are very limited. Drawing on a similar case, our contribution investigates the question 
of how subjective experiences at work are linked with the speciﬁcs of organizational 
and societal context. In short, we analyze how and why speciﬁc subjective, 
organizational and societal mechanisms interact and thus underpin both the 
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emergence and persistence of potentially oppressive labor regimes, which can broadly 
be seen as the underbelly of the economic success of the hard discounter business 
model.  
Our focus is on the development of a multidimensional conceptual framework which 
distinguishes between three levels of analysis: the potentially ‘totalitarian’ or 
‘totalistic’ aspects of managerial control, the speciﬁcs of organizational power 
structures and the problematic forms of organizational inclusion of employees at store 
level. For this purpose, we draw closely on key ideas of Erving Goffman’s (1961) 
seminal work on ‘total institutions’. Although Goffman clearly did not develop the 
original concept of total institutions (TIs) with business organizations in mind, his 
description of ‘misanthropic’ institutions such as work camps, prisons and military 
organizations seems to bear some structural similarities to media reports of 
oppressive work and employment practices in companies like Lidl. Similar to 
HDFRs, higher-ranked members of TIs develop various forms of strict managerial 
measures for controlling lower-ranked members in order to ensure rigorous obedience 
and prevent any form of resistance. These measures are designed to allow the efﬁcient 
‘handling’ of people to guarantee organizational efﬁciency, with the latter involving 
problematic and oppressive forms of organizational inclusion. Our basic argument is 
that elements of TIs – similar to those described by Goffman for non-business type 
organizations – can also be found in some ‘normal’ businesses organizations in Western 
capitalist economies which apply harsh forms of control with a zealous disciplinary 
purpose.  
Our article unfolds as follows. After a short introduction to Goffman’s ideas on TIs we 
give a brief overview of our methods and data. We then systematically analyze Lidl’s 
‘system of total control’ utilizing categories derived from Goffman’s work. Structured 
along these categories, we ﬁrst look closely into the problematic aspects of 
employment and the often-precarious work situations of lower-ranked employees at 
Lidl. Second, we will refer in detail to the speciﬁc forms of managerial control, 
surveillance and punishment at Lidl. Third, we refer to the organizational power 
relations at Lidl and shed some light on the structural and societal underpinnings that 
support problematic forms of organizational membership. Based on the insights of this 
analysis we ﬁnally introduce our Goffman-based analytical framework which we believe 
can support future research on oppressive organizational conﬁgurations and can also be 
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applied beyond the speciﬁc case of Lidl for the study of problematic forms of work and 
employment in other business organizations. In the conclusion, we reﬂect on the 
contribution and implications of our analysis for further theory building and 
empirical application. 
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Goffman’s Concept of TIs: How and why it Matters in the Context of Business 
Organizations 
Several contributions across various ﬁelds have utilized the concept of total 
institutions TIs to analyze the relationship between individuals, organizations and social 
structures (see, for example, Clegg’s (2009) study of concentration camps, Tracy’s, 2000, 
study of cruise ship employment and Farrington’s, 1992, investigation of modern 
prisons). However, while many other key ideas of Goffman have fruitfully contributed 
to organization studies and industrial relations research1 efforts to apply Goffman’s 
concept of TIs for the analysis of business organizations are rare. Exceptions are 
Shenkar’s (1996) study of Chinese state enterprises and research by Ezzamel et al. 
(2001) on the ‘factory that time forgot’. This is unfortunate because Goffman’s ideas 
on TIs – as we will illustrate in greater detail in this paper – seem valuable for 
studying problematic forms of managerial control and organizational inclusion in 
contemporary business organizations. In line with Stewart Clegg (2006: 427) we argue 
that ‘Goffman’s argument is that total institutions demonstrate in heightened and 
condensed form the underlying organizational processes that can be found, albeit in 
much less extreme cases, in more normal organizations’. Applying the concept of TIs 
therefore provides a fertile ground for the analysis of work and employment practices 
which have been labelled as ‘precarious’ or ‘abusive’ in the context of ‘normal’ 
business organizations. 
The idea of TIs also ﬁts somewhat with Foucault’s (1975) writings on power, and 
especially with his idea of the ‘panopticon’, which has been widely used in the study 
of managerial and organizational control (see e.g. contributions in McKinlay and 
Starkey, 1998). However, in comparison, the idea of TIs puts a much stronger 
emphasis on the concrete social interactions which take place inside given 
organizational settings and how they are intertwined with speciﬁc forms of 
surveillance, control and punishment, at the subjective, organizational and societal 
                                                 
1 See for instance studies on impression management (Dillard et al, 2000) and emotional labour (Grandey, 
2000). 
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level.2 Accordingly, we believe that studying organizational processes in business 
organizations through the lens of the TI concept will support critical scholars interested 
in developing a better understanding of why problematic forms of power-related social 
interactions unfold in speciﬁc organizational and societal contexts. The emphasis 
here is on the question of how interactions are intertwined with speciﬁc forms of 
managerial surveillance, control and punishment in a concrete organizational setting. 
Such an approach pays – in comparison to Foucauldian inspired studies on the subject – 
closer attention to the ‘lives of the ordinary people’ (actors) and how ‘they are made part 
of the structures of institutions at work’ (Hacking, 2004: 278). Taking Goffman’s 
theoretical lens, we are going to apply the idea of TIs to the case of Lidl and ask the 
question why ‘oppressive’ and ‘totalistic’ organizational conﬁgurations might emerge in 
the ﬁrst place and, what is more, why they have become ‘normal’ and persistent forms of 
organizing and working in some ﬁrms. 
According to Goffman’s original concept, TIs can be characterized as ‘encompassing’ to 
a high degree. This means they have the potential to include members of an 
organization in a much stronger way than other types of institutions due to the amount 
of power they exercise on them and the amount of time individuals spend within the 
organization. The common characteristic of these strictly hierarchical institutions is the 
exertion of signiﬁcant control over members. Lower-ranked members in TIs are 
separated from the higher-ranked staff, meaning that there is almost no social 
mobility between these groups. This ‘staff-inmate divide’ is typical for TIs, thus 
creating two groups that lack a shared sense of community with each other. This 
causes a lack of solidarity and promotes a strong in-group/out-group mechanism. 
Such a divide can also be related to the requirement of ‘efﬁciently handling people’ 
(Goffman, 1961: 15) within TIs. In order for organizations such as military 
organizations and work camps to remain effective, lower-ranked members are handled by 
a relatively small group of supervisors with a close eye on maintaining strict control 
                                                 
2 In this respect, we agree with comparisons of the works of Foucault and Goffman of Hacking (2004). He 
points to the strength of Goffman’s interactionist approach, when it comes to the study of ‘making peo-ple’, in 
comparison to Foucault’s ‘archaeology’ by stressing that ‘Goffman’s work is essential for com-ing to 
understand how people ‘are made up day by day’ within an existing institutional and cultural structure’ (2004: 
299). We agree with his conclusion that ‘Foucault gave us ways to understand what is said, can be said, what is 
possible, what is meaningful – as well as how it lies apart from the unthinkable and indecipherable. [However,] 
he gave us no idea of how, in everyday life, one comes to incorporate those possibilities and impossibilities as 
part of oneself. We have to go to Goffman to begin to think about that’ (ibid: 300). 
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over organizational operations. Therefore, daily routines are often tightly scheduled and 
executed under constant supervision from higher ranks. In order to achieve the 
narrow organizational objectives, much effort is put on developing tight control 
measures for members’ behavior. Goffman describes different elements of control in TIs 
that can be labelled as surveillance, supervision, privilege and punishment. Surveillance 
is applied in various forms, including physical surveillance and output control. 
Different measures of supervision are aimed at inﬂuencing members’ socialization. 
Furthermore, TIs establish distinct systems of internal privileges and punishments, 
rewarding obedience and punishing disobedience. Privileges often appear in the form 
of temporary relief from the usual regime of conﬁnement. Similarly, they are 
predominantly ‘internally focused’, meaning that they are of limited consequence 
outside of the organization. These elements of totalistic control are intended to ‘trim’ 
the individual organizational members in order to prevent resistance and the 
emergence of counter-power. 
Goffman’s original, rather essayistic descriptions do not fully reﬂect in detail on the 
relationships of efﬁciency, structural power, problematic organizational inclusion and 
managerial control as interrelated facets. Nevertheless, his ideas on TIs provide a fertile 
ground for a systematic conceptualization of this kind of interplay. Most obviously, 
measures of control, surveillance and various forms of sanctions have a strong 
disciplinary purpose in TIs. At the same time, they solidify existing hierarchies by 
creating intimidated organizational members and thus serve to avoid resistant 
behavior. The other way around, it can also be argued that these asymmetric power 
relations, when accompanied by circumstances that bind members to the organization, 
make oppressive forms of control possible in the ﬁrst place. Asymmetric power relations 
and mechanisms of strict control not only cause a problematic inclusion of members. 
Both aspects of totalitarian organizations are also put in place to ensure a high degree of 
organizational efﬁciency. 
From a TI perspective suppressive forms of control in business organizations do not 
just display forms of deviance, aberration or managerial misconduct. Functionalist 
mainstream research on organizational control would interpret these phenomena as 
dysfunctionalities (see e.g. Child, 1984, for an overview), which need to be managed 
carefully in efﬁcient organizations. However, from a TIs point of view forms of 
oppression can be understood as crucial elements of managerial control strategies which 
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ensure organizational efﬁciency. Similar to classic contributions that study non-business 
organizations from a TI perspective, certain types of contemporary business 
organizations are characterized by conﬁgurations of significant power asymmetry and 
problematic inclusion of members, which often create triggers for the establishment of 
suppressive forms of control for a large number of its members. However, it is also 
important to note that these control forms are not permanently applied at all times 
within TIs. Thus, in the case of certain TIs, e.g. military organizations or work 
camps, harsh forms of control are strongly linked to situations where organizational 
efﬁciency is endangered. That is why organizational conﬁgurations characterized by 
power asymmetry and a high degree of organizational inclusion can be regarded as a 
prerequisite for the emergence of suppressive forms of control and oppressive work 
and employment, which once they are established, often turn into more or less 
persistent conditions. 
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Research Strategy, Data and Methods 
A key aim of the article is to develop a Goffman-based framework which enables us to 
better understand where and why oppressive forms of organizational control might 
emerge, and when and how they might persist. Our selection of the Lidl case for this 
paper is driven by three considerations: First, there is relatively broad media coverage 
plus some existing academic research which points to problematic employment 
conditions and strict control at Lidl. Second, we have access to a broad set of 
interview data collected from previous research on the company (Geppert et al., 
2015). This is important as German hard discounters are known for having highly 
secretive communication approaches and for their efforts to hinder empirical research 
on managerial control, work and employment (Artus, 2008; Geppert, 2015; Hamann & 
Giese, 2004; Hamann & Research Group, 2006; Willenbrock, 2009; Wortmann, 2004). 
Third, next to our primary aim of theory building, studying the Lidl case also enhances 
the body of so far scarce studies on the speciﬁcs of work and employment within the 
organizational context of hard discounters. 
We were able to access a set of secondary data on Lidl which consist of qualitative 
interview data (n = 78) with Lidl shop ﬂoor employees, middle managers and union 
ofﬁcials in ﬁve European countries collected through previous research, and company 
documents and reports, compiled in a former study by Geppert et al. (2015). Even 
when the originally collected set of data was not so much focused on problematic 
control and forms of employment, it provided rich insights into the overall working 
environment of Lidl. Interviewees and documents also frequently refer to the 2008 
surveillance incident at Lidl which received wide attention in media and politics in 
Germany and all over Europe. Additionally, the data set provides comparative 
information about the situation in other German retailing companies and retailing 
across Europe. These additional data helped us to triangulate our results with regard to 
the speciﬁc organizational, institutional and country-speciﬁc contexts which turned out 
to be crucial to make sense of the Lidl case. 
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In order to reﬁne and enrich the primary ﬁndings based on our initial data analysis, we 
hence subsequently collected additional secondary data, namely media reports and 
internet coverage. In total, 36 additional contributions to established (primarily German) 
print and broadcasting media,3 which paid speciﬁc attention to problematic work and 
employment conditions at Lidl were included in our analysis. Furthermore, we 
collected 55 reports of current and former Lidl employees, which are available openly 
on the internet. In line with other scholars in work and employment studies (e.g. 
Richards & Kosmala, 2013), we regard this kind of content analysis based on internet 
sources as a valuable method to get access to critical employee voices with regard to 
their working conditions. We especially used the internet platform ‘kununu’, Europe’s 
largest employer rating platform, where employees can anonymously share their 
experiences with certain companies.4 These data were sampled and coded according to 
references made about employment conditions perceived as problematic, particularly 
in relation to problems such as store management and employment relations at Lidl 
in order to deepen our understanding of the employee perspective and gather further 
contextual information. Table 1 provides an overview on the data utilized in the 
course of our analysis.
                                                 
3 These are Manager Magazin, Stern, Spiegel, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Die Zeit, 
Guardian, Deutschlandfunk and Rbb. 
4 Next to standardised ranking categories (such as work atmosphere, behaviour of superiors, wages, work-life 
balance) employees are also able to write own reviews on this platform. 
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Table 1. Data Sources 
 
Data Type Number Description & Role in Research Process 
Qualitative Interviews 78 Interviews held with 10 managers above store level, 16 store 
managers and deputy managers, 15 store employees and 37 union or 
employee representatives in course of former research process 
focussing on employment relations at Lidl and other retailers in five 
European countries (detailed description see (reference removed for 
blind review) used to capture employees and manager’s subjective 
perception of employment conditions and gather insights on forms of 
managerial action at Lidl. The interviews where used for explorative 
stages in the research process, to develop the categories and codes 
and develop initial assumptions on the interrelations between 
different categories. In a later stage of research, the interviews where 
used for cross-comparison between different retail formats and 
institutional contexts. 
 
Newspaper articles 36 Articles from renowned magazines and newspapers addressing the 
so-called ‘Lidl scandal.’ These sources are used as illustration of 
problematic employment at Lidl and to shed light on the company’s 
organizational structure and corporate culture.  
 
Internet sources 55 Reviews by Lidl employees (shop floor: 40, management: 11, other 
(e.g.IT): 4) on employer rating platforms. These reports describe 
problematic aspects of employment at Lidl, illustrate the problematic 
exit options of employees, the variability of employment conditions 
between administrative units, management and the shop floor and the 
corporate culture of Lidl. The data set was used for the triangulation 
of the analysis of interviews and newspapers. 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
When investigating the Lidl case in terms of structural reasons for suppressive 
managerial behavior, we developed an initial heuristic framework containing questions 
derived from Goffman’s TI concept and examined interrelations between problematic 
inclusion of organizational members, managerial control and power structures. Table 2 
gives an overview on this heuristic framework. 
Our subsequent analysis of the ‘system of total control’ at Lidl is structured according 
to the outlined analytical categories in the table. After developing this framework 
based on Goffman’s concept and initial explorative data analysis, we coded our data 
according to these central categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As mentioned above, 
similarities between Lidl and Goffman’s classic concept of TIs were triangulated with 
data collected in other internationally operating food retailers which do not apply 
the hard discounter format (i.e. the hypermarket format). The speciﬁc cost-leadership 
business model of Lidl and the speciﬁc socio-institutional context of Germany were 
seen as crucial contextual factors when we made sense of the problematic conditions 
found at Lidl.
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Table 3 provides an overview on the outcome of our data analysis. The ﬁndings 
presented in the subsequent sections are based on these data. The ﬁrst column 
displays the central categories along which we organized our data analysis. The 
frequency of quotes from our data assigned to each category is listed in the second 
column. Each category is related to several speciﬁc aspects which are represented by 
different sub-codes assigned to this category. The sub-codes which address these aspects 
are indexed in the third column. 
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Table 2. Analytical Framework for Studying Functions and Forms of Potentially Oppressive Forms of 
Workplace Control 
 
Level of analysis Concepts derived from total 
institutions 
Analytical questions 
Problematic 
inclusion  
Precarious working conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
Encompassing character 
 
 
 
 
Involuntariness/ 
‘stickiness’ of membership 
 
 
Employee voice 
 
Can working conditions be labelled precarious 
because of factors including high work 
intensification, high demand for flexibility, 
problematic work-family-balance, high workforce 
fluctuation and instability of employment relations 
(temporary employment)? 
 
Does the organization demonstrate encompassing 
tendencies, high demands for flexibility or 
engagement during spare time? Are other private 
commitments affected by organizational 
membership? 
 
Is membership “sticky” or (gradually) involuntary 
due to poor exit options, the low labor market 
position of employees or normative or economic 
pressures? 
 
Can the position of members in the lower ranks of 
the organization be characterized as lacking power? 
 
Managerial control  Surveillance 
 
 
Coercive control  
Is a large emphasis placed on the close surveillance 
of employees? 
 
Are measures of coercion used, e.g., (internal) 
punishment, looping, trimming or establishing fear? 
Is control used for the purposes of intimidation, 
getting rid of employees or preventing unionization? 
 
Organizational 
power structures  
Reification of asymmetric power 
 
 
 
 
 
Strict hierarchy/staff-inmate 
divide  
 
 
 
 
 
Efficient handling of 
people/general need for efficient 
control 
 
Are there management activities aimed at impeding 
participation and resistance, employee voice, and 
coalition-building? 
 
 
 
Is there a strict organizational hierarchy? Is inter-
organizational social mobility limited? Is there a lack 
of empathy between different ranks and groups of 
employees? 
 
 
Is there a high demand for efficient control of 
members in order to successfully implement a 
certain business model? 
 
Source: Own compilation derived from Goffman (1961). 
Chapter 2 
32  
Problematic Inclusion 
As already indicated, Lidl pursues a strategy of strict cost leadership based on neo-
Taylorist forms of work and employment organization in order to radically minimize 
personnel costs. Numerous rules and regulations prescribe that work tasks are carried 
out as quickly as 
 
Table 3. Overview of Results of Data Analysis: Categories, Coded Quotes and Assigned Sub-Codes 
 
Category No of coded quotes 
for category  
Sub-codes assigned to category 
Problematic inclusion & 
employment conditions 
84 Being on call, forms of work contracts, work-family 
balance, intensification of work, scheduling, rules, 
denial of breaks, physical and psychological 
exhaustion. 
 
Managerial control and 
punishment 
79 Surveillance, rewards & punishments, preventing 
solidarization & unionization, looping-strategies. 
 
Organizational power structures 89 Shop-floor-management relations, inner-organizational 
mobility, organizational hierarchies, fluctuation, forms 
of employee representation, power asymmetry. 
 
Business model 67 Rationalization, formalization & standardization, lean 
staffing. 
 
Socio-institutional context 71 (Re-)commodification, exit options, labor law and 
codetermination rights, socio-demographic 
characteristics of workforce. 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
possible and in exact detail. This tight scheduling of activities is similar to processes 
described originally in the context of Tis and leads to extreme intensiﬁcation of work 
at Lidl stores. Lidl engages in both rationalization and bureaucratic control to a high 
degree. For example, cashiers at Lidl stores in Germany are required to scan 40 items 
per minute (Hamann & Giese, 2004), a target which is signiﬁcantly higher than that of 
other retailers (for comparison see e.g. Price, 2016: 11, who reports about targets of 
19–20 items per minute). This has led to descriptions of Lidl’s employment conditions 
as ‘permanent work overload accompanied by tight timing’ (Grumbach, 2008, 
translation by authors). 
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This is in line with many statements in our data that highlight the fact that it is 
extremely challenging for store managers and employees to meet the prescribed 
performance targets. For example, one employee reported that ‘the supposedly high 
salaries look not that high if you consider that you always have to give 100%. Thus, you 
are exhausted quickly. Burnout!’ (Grumbach, 2008, translation by authors) Another 
employee complained: 
‘we always get tight time requirements, always pressure, like slavery. The sickness rates at our 
store increase. Some employees, including me, are afraid of starting to work in the morning. I’m 
sick every morning. A colleague just told me she is trembling and has nausea.’(ibid.:76) 
As these statements illustrate, many employees also report about high levels of physical 
and psychological stress and a lack of autonomy in their daily work. Furthermore, 
employees have frequently been asked to skip mandatory breaks and stay longer than 
required to ﬁnish their daily tasks (Artus, 2008; Hamann & Giese, 2004; Hamann & 
Research Group, 2006). 
The goal of keeping personnel costs to a minimum is closely linked with highly 
ﬂexible work and organization patterns. Consequently, employees not only face high 
demands for ﬂexibility but also report problems in their work–life balance. The 
negative effects of high demands for employee ﬂexibility are intensiﬁed because many 
part-time employees have to work additional shifts to receive sufﬁcient incomes. This 
also represents an outcome of Lidl’s strict HR policies. Most Lidl store employees are 
employed part-time with just a few guaranteed shifts; meanwhile, additional 
employment at other companies has been prohibited in certain cases, which is well 
documented in our data. Thus, dismissal is highly likely when Lidl management ﬁnds 
out about employees who work elsewhere. Additionally, managerial processes of 
allocating a limited amount of guaranteed working hours to part-timers often created 
‘double-bind’ situations, where some employees had little choice as to accept the 
additional shift assignments even at short notice, because they need the income. In 
order to get these extra shifts, several reports document that employees constantly 
have to be ‘on call’. If they are not ‘always available’ they either do not get extra 
shifts or face harsh disciplinary measures which can quickly end up in dismissals. 
Whereas Goffman’s ‘classic’ TIs were encompassing because the ‘inmates’ were 
permanent ‘residents’ within the ‘walls’ of the organization, recent research noted that 
modern communication technologies together with ﬂexible short-term scheduling can 
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also lead to problematic situations of hyper-inclusion for many employees in business 
organization (i.e. Sullivan, 2014; Wood, 2016). This can be observed in the case of Lidl, 
where constant demands for availability, extra hours and other requirements to be 
highly ﬂexible create an encompassing character of organizational membership. 
At the same time, we see structural and societal inﬂuences which have a kind of 
moderating role for keeping the Lidl system alive, especially its TI like features. 
Many of the employees who are affected by the outlined problematic and potentially 
oppressive employment conditions stress that they are strongly bound to their 
employer. A key reason for this situation is economic pressure. The wages at Lidl are 
above average in the industry across Europe and are also perceived as ‘enormous’ and 
‘the only good thing [at Lidl]’ by many employees, even when they are critical about 
work and employment conditions. These comparatively higher wages are used 
extensively by the company to attract new employees and monetarily compensate 
current employees in cases where they suffer from problematic work and employment 
conditions. A former Lidl manager describes this approach as a crude economic 
incentive in an interview with the German newspaper Spiegel (Amann & Tietz, 2012: 
122): ‘This [payment system in combination with high task densiﬁcation] makes 
sense — you pay 30% more and get 100% more performance’. 
Additionally, socio-demographic characteristics of Lidl employees explain why 
resistant behavior hardly appears and oppressive control is accepted. Most Lidl 
employees are female, low-skilled and (in urban locations) often with migrant 
background (Artus, 2008). These employees have weak labor market positions and 
limited ‘exit options’ (Carre´  et al., 2010; Van Klaveren & Voss-Dahm, 2011). 
Additionally, they often exhibit an attitude of ‘better any job than none at all’ (Hamann 
& Giese, 2004). This diagnosis is mirrored in our data; a wide range of statements 
highlight that many employees feel negatively affected by Lidl’s employment 
conditions and would consider leaving if they would see alternative employment 
prospects with similar payment rates. Thus, membership can be characterized as 
‘sticky’ as a result of these socio-economic circumstances. Thus, limited exit options  
explain why many employees often decide not to leave despite problematic 
employment conditions. 
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Managerial Control 
As already indicated, Lidl places a great deal of emphasis on detailed instructions, 
rigid benchmarking, performance indicators and highly formalized rules which are 
rooted in neo-Taylorist forms of employment organization. The 2008 surveillance 
scandal revealed that the corresponding set of strict but legitimate control practices was 
accompanied by more severe forms of questionable and, in some cases, illegal practices. 
A cover story by the German magazine Stern (Grill and Arnsberger, 2008) brought to 
light that Lidl had spied on employees with hidden cameras and microphones in some 
of their stores, a measure which went far beyond ‘normal’ (and legal) surveillance 
measures. Based on audio material and observations, private investigators also drafted 
reports about employees’ private lives, relationships with co-workers and their general 
attitude towards their employer. Similarly, employees stated that their pockets, bags and 
cars were frequently checked by their superiors. These drastic measures were justiﬁed as 
prevention against theft. Likewise, the atmosphere in many Lidl stores has been 
described as ‘militaristic’ (Hirn et al., 2007), based on strict top-down orders and full of 
mistrust, resulting in cases of harassment and rigid hire-and-ﬁre policies (see also 
Hamann & Giese, 2004; Hamann & Research Group, 2006). Closer investigations 
indicated later that, contrary to initial headquarters’ statements after the scandal, 
these activities were conducted in a systematic manner with knowledge of upper 
management. This led to descriptions of Lidl as a ‘paranoid system’ of ‘surveillance 
mania’ in several newspapers (Amann & Tietz, 2012), as well as in some of our 
interviews. 
These rather extreme controlling measures point clearly to the existence of a ‘system 
of rewards and punishments’, which looks quite similar to those described in Goffman’s 
(1961) classic concept of TIs. Similar to the cases reported by Price (2016) for other 
retailers, we also found that Lidl employees who complied with short-term demands 
for ﬂexibility and intensiﬁed timing of work tasks can beneﬁt by being assigned to 
‘attractive’ additional paid shifts and by not being scheduled during ‘unsocial times’, 
such as evenings or weekends. Beyond that, Lidl store managers’ authority to assign 
shifts was also said to be used as an instrument to punish ‘disobedient’ staff members 
or employees. For example, extra shifts requested by those employees were denied and 
their regular shifts were systematically placed at unpleasant times or rescheduled at 
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short notice.5 Moreover, punishment by denial of mandatory breaks and control of 
access to toilet keys by superiors were reported (Hamann & Giese, 2004). Such highly 
personalized controlling practices also exemplify the deprivation of individual rights 
which are usually taken for granted in developed capitalist societies. These sanctions 
have an ‘internal’ nature similar to those in Goffman’s TIs. They can also be interpreted 
as measures of ‘trimming’, where individuals ‘allow [themselves] to be shaped and 
coded into an object that can be fed into the administrative machinery of the 
establishment [… ]’ (Goffman, 1961: 25). 
Lidl’s control practices are not just limited to such ‘reactive’ forms of punishments. 
Instead, some practices actually seem to be intended to induce misbehavior only to 
punish it afterwards. Employees ‘in the doghouse’ are sometimes assigned to 
impossible tasks and then punished for not being able to complete them. As one 
employee explained, ‘the tasks are designed in a way that they cannot be 
accomplished. And if you cannot accomplish them [… ] they tell you that you are 
incapable’. Similarly, employees that the company wants to ﬁre have been lured into a 
‘trap’ by purposeful test purchases, which are ofﬁcially intended to ensure service 
quality and prevent customer theft: 
Test purchases are frequently used as grounds for dismissal. If they want someone to fail, they 
have many opportunities to trick us cashiers. For example, two big boxes of milk are put in the 
shopping trolley and a package of coffee is hidden in the lower one. [...]. If we check every 
customer to see if he is hiding something this way, we would never meet the requirement of 40 
scans per minute. (Amann & Tietz, 2012: 133, translation by authors) 
These controlling techniques are similar to Goffman’s notion of ‘looping’, where the 
individual’s protective response to one assault is used as the basis for another 
punishment (Goffman, 1961). As a result, several employees described working 
conditions at Lidl as embedded in a general ‘climate of fear’. The aforementioned 
‘stickiness’ of organizational membership seems to be an important factor in this 
environment because it increases the probability that such practices are ‘tolerated’ by 
employees, because they see no exit options (e.g. better paid employment elsewhere). 
 
                                                 
5 As the (perceived) influence on shift assignment has proven to be a strong factor moderating the negative 
effect of flexible over-hours (Henly and Lampert, 2013), the enforced assignment can be seen as a kind of 
punishment from an employee perspective. 
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Lidl also uses mechanisms to hinder the emergence of social relationship building 
between their employees. For example, performance indicators are made public in 
many stores to establish a climate of ﬁerce individual competition between employees. 
We have also learned of cases where managers and employees who started to develop 
closer social contacts during and after work were strategically posted in other stores or 
assigned to different shifts. In the view of several interviewed employees, these 
measures are aimed at hindering the development of solidaristic relations among the 
workforce because they could potentially lead to the formation of formal and informal 
collective actions including open forms of collective resistance or even the formation of 
works councils. Works councils are extremely rare in the case of Lidl. The key reason 
for this situation is an open anti-union policy which actively focuses on discouragement 
of any union and employee representation activities at store level which includes 
harassment of employees who did manage to establish works councils against managerial 
efforts of blocking such initiatives (Hamann & Giese, 2004). To quote an employee, it is 
‘dangerous if everybody has the same opinion! In the worst case they could establish 
a works council’. The role of anti-unionism in many of the German hard discounters has 
been covered in several studies which also point to the methods by which ﬁrms are 
able to successfully prevent the foundation of works councils and any forms of 
unionization (e.g. Artus, 2008; Tilly & Carre´ , 2011; Wortmann, 2004), despite the 
rather strong legal framework aimed at protecting employee rights and voice in 
Germany. 
In sum, three questionable forms of managerial control have been identiﬁed: First, Lidl 
appears to engage in measures designed to intimidate employees and render them 
obedient to all kinds of organizational efﬁciency demands. Second, there are various 
social techniques in place to discipline and remove potential ‘troublemakers’ and those 
considered as unproductive. Third, there are policies and measures that are intended to 
actively prevent social relationship building among employees, coalition building and 
collective actions leading to any forms of organized labor. 
There seems to be a clear strategy in place which both directly and indirectly focuses 
on wiping out resistant behavior and independent decision-making. These 
mechanisms resemble to those described by Goffman, and they cannot be captured 
in studies focusing on functionalist or ‘operational’ notions of organizational control. 
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Organizational Power Structures 
As we have seen the controlling and problematic inclusion patterns described above 
are bolstered by both speciﬁc organizational and societal institutional characteristics. 
This leads to strict and severe power asymmetries between management and labor, 
within the managerial hierarchy and at store level, especially in the German context. 
In order to understand how these power asymmetries are established and maintained, 
we consider four points as particularly important: 
First, it is important to shed light on the strict organizational hierarchy and the 
corresponding role of middle managers in the Lidl system. It has been noted that 
retail store managers face the near-impossible task of balancing employees’ needs of 
having decent working conditions with the overwhelming organizational demands for 
continuously improving efﬁciency of store operations (Lehndorff & Voss-Dahm, 
2005). Research has also revealed that managers are highly constrained by centrally 
set performance measures and budgets that heavily dictate allocation of work and 
leave little room for autonomous decision-making especially at store level and beyond 
(Grugulis & Bozkurt, 2011; Price, 2016). When explaining the problematic inclusion of 
lower-ranked employees, it is important to note that Lidl’s store managers themselves 
are put under immense and continuous pressure to keep costs under control and meet 
strict performance measures. A former Lidl manager expressed this vividly in an 
internet review: 
The system is constructed in such a way that each superior closely watches his inferior and puts 
him under immense pressure. Store managers, district managers, regional managers. Even if 
you have a ‘good guy’ as store or district manager - they will sooner or later abandon their ideals 
because they will otherwise become victims of harassment themselves. Either they abide by the 
Lidl system or they will be ﬁred. (Translation by authors) 
These practices have led to high turnover of low- and middle-management employees at 
Lidl especially in the early career stages before they have become socialized into the Lidl 
system. In our view, they are also a key reason why many managers, if they have been 
socialized into system, ‘go beyond the limits’ (Straub, 2012: 315, translation by 
authors), ‘pass the buck down’ to lower-ranked employees and start to engage in not 
just passively passing down harsh disciplinary measures but also actively supporting 
and implanting them. 
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Second, the acceptance of questionable and sometimes openly oppressive behavior on 
the part of managers is indirectly and directly encouraged by a management system 
and a ‘culture of fear’ which discourages lasting emphatic and team-oriented behavior 
and thus hinders mutual understanding and close collaboration between higher and 
lower managerial ranks. These effects are also present in Lidl’s recruitment and 
employment policies. Interviews as well as publicly available newspaper coverage 
indicate that staff who want to move up the Lidl hierarchy need to show total 
acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’ of the Lidl system. The top managerial team is 
also reportedly required to develop fairly close social relationships with the owner 
family which remains involved in formulating overall strategy and occasionally even 
in parts of the daily business of the ﬁrm (Kühn & Salden, 2017). Middle- and lower-
ranked managers who want to move up the hierarchy are expected to ‘be (extremely) 
loyal’ and get quickly sacked when they become too independent or critical thinkers 
(Hirn et al., 2007). Additionally, middle and increasingly also store managers now are 
recruited from business schools and departments and only ‘survive’ when they very 
quickly adapt to the Lidl system and its top down ‘militaristic’ (Hirn et al., 2007) style 
of management. Moreover, underperforming store and middle managers, like district 
and regional managers, are supposed to meet strict performance measures and compete 
with one another, which again leads to the result that only the ‘ﬁttest’ for the Lidl 
system will have a chance to stay and climb the hierarchy. Additionally, store-level 
managers are frequently reassigned to other stores, not just in emergency cases such as 
a shortage of personnel but also when they are seen as being disobedient or ‘too soft’ 
when managing their stores. These common practices are aimed at preventing the 
emergence of friendly relations between store managers and employees but also with 
store managers and their superiors. Such circumstances, which Goffman would have 
called a ‘staff-inmate divide’, can clearly be related to Lidl’s narrow emphasis on 
meeting benchmarks and performance indicators and discourage any efforts of team 
building and collective action. 
Third, the absence of formal employee representation at hard discounters such as Lidl 
(Artus, 2008) is a key reason explaining why resistance against questionable 
employment practices often remains limited to cases of individual action. Thus, any 
collective action and resistance appear not just to be ‘useless’ (Royle, 2002) but is also 
seen as rather dangerous by employees. We already described the measures taken to 
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prevent the emergence of social ties at store level. Similarly, harsh techniques employed 
to get rid of employees have been mentioned. It has been noted (Artus 2008; Geppert, 
2015; Geppert et al., 2015) that employees campaigning for the establishment of works 
councils, which is supported legally, are one of the primary targets of such actions. 
Lidl’s strategy for preventing unionization consists of several additional elements. As 
wage levels at Lidl adhere to the sector’s collective agreement and are sometimes even 
higher, one important trigger for collective action is eliminated (Störkel & Steger, 
2013). Additionally, the oppressive atmosphere captured in the metaphor of a ‘culture 
of fear’ discourages many employees to take on any ‘risky business’ especially when 
it comes to setting up a works council, which requires ofﬁcial elections.6 
Fourth, Lidl’s speciﬁc formal structure is seen as an arrangement to bypass employee 
representation (Artus, 2008; Hamann & Giese, 2004). Each Lidl store formally 
represents an independent company within the umbrella holding company with a small 
number of employees. As a minimum of ﬁve adult employees, who have been employed 
for six months, is legally required7 to set up a works council, the establishment of this 
representation body is generally not possible in some establishments. Furthermore, the 
high number of part-timers and a high turnover of workers prevent efforts to establish 
employee representation (Artus, 2008; Wortmann, 2004). In short, as German broadcaster 
Deutschlandfunk noted, ‘these retailers [… ] are highly hostile towards unions and 
works councils. They make large efforts to make sure the ‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’ 
[German Works Constitution Act], which provides employees with notable rights, is not 
applied in their stores’ (Grumbach, 2008, translation by authors). In the most drastic case, 
Lidl shut down a well-performing store in the city of Calw in 2005 because a works 
council had been established there (Seith, 2005). The company reopened another store 
nearby a few months later. The absence of employee representation and the employment 
conditions described can therefore be seen as a product of regulation gaps within the 
German industrial relations system, which helps Lidl to actively follow and maintain its 
anti-workers’ representation policies. Comparative international research has shown that 
Lidl’s employment conditions in other European countries are less ‘problematic’ if host 
                                                 
6 These rules work usually fine for medium-sized and large firms in industrial sectors which are strongly 
unionised in Germany. However, they have severe limits in the contexts of small firms and non-unionised and 
weakly-unionised firms, like Lidl. 
7 See English version of the Works Constitution Act published by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs (2009). 
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country regulations do not provide opportunities to bypass legal obligations (Geppert et 
al., 2015; Geppert, 2015). Lidl’s success in bypassing German legal obligations 
combined with the weak labor market position of the local workforce is an important 
factor for both the stability and stabilization of significant power asymmetries between 
management and labor. Ultimately there are rather meagre power resources for 
employee strategizing approaches in order to gain inﬂuence to change unfavorable and 
often harsh conditions at work at Lidl. This is in direct comparison to other 
industrial sectors and organizational contexts in Germany, a country which is usually 
understood to be comparatively employee favoring because the industrial relations 
system provides robust possibilities for employees to negotiate with local management 
(Geppert et al., 2015). 
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Towards a Goffman-Based Framework for Studying Potentially Oppressive 
Organizational Configurations 
Our analysis has suggested that there are several similarities between the German Lidl 
case and Goffman’s classic concept of the TI. Similar to Goffman’s TIs, organizational 
membership at Lidl can be labelled as ‘sticky’ in many cases. High ﬂexibility 
demands create an encompassing system of organizational inclusion. The strict 
hierarchical relationships characterized by a ‘staff-inmate divide’ and significant power 
asymmetries at various levels and especially between employees and management are 
solidiﬁed by various techniques of coercive control. Forms of managerial control at 
Lidl are aimed at enforcing obedience, sorting out ‘troublemakers’ and preventing the 
emergence of social relationship building among employees horizontally and vertically 
across hierarchical levels. From such a perspective, we can conclude that they 
resemble the ‘totalitarian techniques’ of surveillance, internal punishment, looping 
and trimming described by Goffman. While Lidl cannot be compared to some ideal-
typical examples of TIs with regard to the degree of harm done to employees, the 
number of structural similarities concerning the role of managerial control practices in 
relation to organizational structures and conditions of inclusion between Lidl and other 
TIs is surprising given that the original concept was not intended to apply to any 
kind of Western-style business organizations. 
This study of Lidl is not only valuable as it sheds some light on the barely studied ﬁeld 
of hard discount retailing in and beyond Germany. The paper has also developed a 
new and alternative conceptual angle, because the case study provides a useful example 
of the close interplay between organizational power structures and questionable forms 
of organizational control which are triggered by narrow managerial quests for 
maximum efﬁciency, undermining the prospects for ‘good work’ and decent 
employment conditions. We believe that our framework might be useful for the study 
of such ‘totalitarian tendencies’ in managerial control in other types of business 
organization. A speciﬁc combination of an efﬁciency-seeking business model, strict 
hierarchy and rigid neo-Taylorist management practices may not lead to ‘abusive’ 
employment conditions in all of these cases. However, the emergence and persistence 
of such totalitarian tendencies is highly likely in cases where we ﬁnd speciﬁc 
organizational conﬁgurations in place, as we have illustrated in reference to the case of 
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Lidl. 
Therefore, we would like to highlight that a Goffman-based framework allows us to 
conceptualize and thus better understand how the different elements of ‘oppressive’ 
organizational conﬁgurations interplay and thereby have the potential to mutually 
reinforce and stabilize each other. Managerial control, for example, is exerted to 
reinforce hierarchical relationships and avoid solidarization on a structural level of 
systemic power. These asymmetric power structures then provide the foundation and 
tools for establishing harsh forms of managerial control. Similarly, both strict 
hierarchical structures and tight managerial control have a negative impact on the 
conditions of organizational inclusion. This often leads to an intimidated and trimmed 
workforce that regards resistance as ‘useless’ that, in turn, allows the reiﬁcation of 
existing structures and control practices. Thus, our analysis could inform future 
critical studies on ‘totalitarian tendencies’ in contemporary business organizations by 
providing an analytical framework that allows for systematic consideration of speciﬁc 
organizational conﬁgurations of structural characteristics and managerial practices 
leading to problematic employment practices. Such a framework should focus on the 
shape of and interrelationship between ‘Efﬁciency demands’, ‘Control practices’, 
‘Inclusion of the workforce’ and ‘Structures of power’ (which could, in short, be 
addressed as ‘ECIS-relations framework’). Figure 1 represents an attempt to visualize 
such a theoretically and empirically informed ECIS-relations framework. Our ﬁgure 
points to key ﬁndings of our analysis but also show how our framework could be 
applied to similar cases in the context of business organizations. 
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Contributions and Conclusions 
Our article highlights ﬁve important aspects of how our Goffman-based analysis and 
framework might be fruitful for further research on potentially oppressive 
organizational conﬁgurations in the context of business and management. 
First, the ECIS framework helps to conceptualize the effects and purposes of 
organizational control beyond functionalist notions that merely consider the role of 
control for the better regulation and management of organizational work processes. Our 
framework allows us to unveil how certain measures of control reify existing 
asymmetrical power structures in organizations by preventing the formation of 
resistance and employee voice because they serve ‘well’ for ensuring employee 
compliance, even in situations when the employment conditions are perceived as 
unfavorable. It thereby highlights the disciplinary and power-related ‘secondary facet’ 
of control that needs to be further studied in future research on managerial control in 
the context of retailing and other business contexts. 
Second, our study suggests that a research focus on the conditions for the emergence 
of oppressive labor regimes in relation to the speciﬁcs of single corporate establishments 
might be quite useful. Harsh forms of managerial control and abusive punishments do 
not manifest in every Lidl store in the same way and at any time. The emergence of 
harsh control mechanisms is likely in times when performance indicators are not met, 
and store managers are consequently put under severe pressure by upper management. As 
a former manager stated, ‘as long as everything goes well, it is okay. As soon as 
something goes wrong, the employee has no escape’. This can be explained by 
considering the speciﬁc ECIS relations shown in Figure 1. All ‘ingredients’ for abusive 
practices (i.e. a staff–inmate divide, a militaristic culture, the lack of robust tool kits for 
resistance) are ‘ready for use’ in Lidl establishments, and the story of abusive 
managerial practices is likely to unfold in situations where managers perceive a 
danger of missing narrow performance targets. This adds an important aspect to 
Lehndorff’s and Voss-Dahm’s (2005: 301) diagnosis that the middle management and 
store managers are constantly challenged to ‘reconcile service quality with cost 
efﬁciency’. In company settings where managerial mindsets, the threat of (internal or 
external) sanctions and non-existent employee representation mechanisms make it 
possible not to take any legitimate employees’ interests into account, the likelihood 
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of the emergence of abusive practices is highly likely. In contrast, we also suggest that 
our framework helps to explain why problematic employment practices do not emerge in 
other organizational contexts where important building blocks for the emergence of 
‘totalitarian tendencies’ are weak or absent. Third, a Goffman-informed analytical lens 
helps to explain why oppressive employment regimes can become highly persistent in 
some cases. Lidl as an example ﬁrst received broader public attention and critique when 
the ﬁrm’s strict anti-union practices were revealed in the ‘Black Book’ on Lidl (Hamann 
& Giese, 2004). 
 
Figure 1. ECIS-Relations Framework 
 
 
Source: Own compilation derived from Goffman (1961), adapted for the study of the Lidl case. 
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But even after major public critique following the 2008 surveillance scandal, not much 
seem to have changed in the Lidl system. More recent media coverage continues to point 
to problematic conditions at Lidl and other hard discount retailers (Kopplin, 2012). 
There is also some evidence that since 2008 some efforts have been made, especially 
attempts to improve Lidl’s public image, ‘professionalizing’ parts of the ﬁrm’s human 
resource and public relations management system and by slightly increasing stafﬁng 
levels at some stores (Kühn & Salden, 2017; Preuss, 2015). Nevertheless, it can also be 
assumed that these ‘episodic’ changes had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ‘systemic’ 
power structure (Clegg et al., 2006) of the ﬁrm and the established managerial control 
practices which are based on a deep-rooted and taken-for-granted managerial belief 
system. 
Fourth, our analysis and framework points to the importance of paying closer attention 
to the speciﬁcs of the institutional preconditions, which support the occurrence of 
oppressive organizational conﬁgurations. However, further research is needed on the 
question of why we see the emergence and persistence of oppressive labor regimes even 
in societal contexts such as Germany, where many scholars of comparative industrial 
relations would not expect them. As shown Lidl has proven quite successful in resisting 
institutional and societal pressures for the establishment of any forms of codetermination 
and employee voice mechanisms all over Germany, by strategically ‘operate[ing] at the 
periphery of the national employment relations system’ (Geppert et al., 2015: 243) and 
using ‘gaps and cracks’ in the German industrial relations system (Artus, 2008). 
Finally, we would like to stress that our paper also goes beyond classic studies on the 
new role of managerial surveillance and disciplining the workforce, triggered by 
increased rationalization and efﬁciency seeking in the manufacturing sector (e.g. 
Sewell & Wilkinson, 1992). A major focus of these studies was on the role of new 
Japanese production concepts, like Total Quality Management and Just-in-Time 
production, on the quality of work and employment at the shop ﬂoor and for middle 
managers. Our contribution highlights that intensiﬁed surveillance and strong emphasis 
on disciplinary measures have also become quite common and sophisticated techniques 
of managerial control in non-manufacturing industries and here especially in the so-
called low-skilled service sectors. Furthermore, our framework highlights the cultural, 
institutional and economic embeddedness of these practices both at the organizational 
and societal level. We therefore believe that our proposed ECIS-relations model can 
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inform further empirical research in other organizations and industrial sectors where 
employment practices have turned out to be ‘oppressive’. This might include research 
on problematic employment practices and the politics of production in non- Western 
parts of global production networks and supply chains in retailing as well as in other 
service and manufacturing sector workplaces in the West. Recent media coverage has 
shown a wider spread of highly problematic employment conditions in Germany and 
also in other so-called coordinated market economies. Thus, reports, for example, on 
ﬁrms operating in Germany like Amazon (Ernst, 2015; Fiedler et al., 2013) and mail-
delivery subcontractors (Holst, 2012) have demonstrated that similar developments 
elsewhere are not just possible, but also seem to expand across the German 
economy and society. Therefore, further research is important from a socio-political 
angle because it could contribute to further theory building that seeks to explain the 
interrelationship among organizational characteristics, divisions of labor, modes of 
control and spheres of institutional and societal regulation.
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Chapter 3 
The Dynamics of Power and Resistance in Platform-Based 
On-Demand Labour Arrangements: A Literature Review 
Through the Lens of Socio-Political Theory 
 
 
Abstract  
The role of power in platform-based on-demand labour has been emphasised in the emerging 
field of research on the so-called ‘sharing economy’. Various contributions document how 
power is exercised by platforms based on different mechanisms and techniques to ensure 
fluent operations in the digital economy. Similarly, existing studies highlight both individual 
and collective political activities by which workers and other stakeholders attempt to resist 
certain platform policies. Against this background, the existence of power asymmetries 
between platform providers and platform workers is emphasised based on various empirical 
observations. However, we hitherto lack a systematic overview on the role of power in 
platform settings that links these empirical insights on the socio-political dynamics in 
platform arrangements to existent theories and concepts of power in management and 
organisational theory. Addressing this gap is important as existent findings indicate that 
power is a crucial aspect to understand platform-based organisation, which however, is not 
fully conceptualised in existent scholarship. Particularly, platform research so far lacks 
theoretical conceptualisations for comparative studies of heterogenous platform settings and 
analytical blueprints to investigate prerequisites, pathways, and patterns of change of power 
relations in these settings which could be provided based on elaborated theoretical insights 
from socio-political scholarship in organisation and management. This paper addresses this 
gap by exploring findings on the role of power in platform arrangements as well as the core 
phenomena relevant to understand power in such settings based on a systematic review 
procedure. The findings are organised based on the seminal taxonomy of episodic and 
systemic ‘faces of power’, namely coercion, manipulation, domination and subjectification. 
Based on this synopsis I discuss avenues for enhancing further platform research through the 
conceptual lens of power theory as well as how findings from the empirical field of platform-
based organisation provide inroads for future socio-political theory development. 
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Introduction 
The rise of platforms such as Uber, AirBnB, Amazon Mechanical Turk, Deliveroo, Fiverr, 
and ZipCar has triggered increasing academic attention within the past decade. These novel 
forms of internet-based exchange are subsumed under the term of sharing economy, 
‘collaborative consumption’, ‘access-based-consumption,’ or ‘peer-to-peer economy’ 
(Sutherland & Jarrahi, 2018). These umbrella terms address diverse exchange activities based 
on similar technological infrastructures ranging from non-commercial peer-to-peer-lending, 
reselling and trading, and crowdfunding to the provision of on-demand services such as 
cleaning, food delivery, and transportation services by commercial platform providers.  
This paper focusses on a specific part of the sharing economy providing individuals with work 
opportunities circumscribed as ‘gig work’, ‘on-demand labour’, crowdsourcing’ and ‘micro-
tasking’ mediated by for-profit platforms. Current opportunities for this type of platform-
based on-demand work (which I hereafter will briefly refer to as ‘platform work’ in the 
remainder) is available for various service tasks ranging from ridesharing (Uber, Lyft), home-
cleaning, and low-skilled micro-tasking (e.g., tagging photos on social media platforms, 
typing information from a photos, and digitising receipts and invoices) to more complex 
digital freelance tasks such as programming and design (Frenken & Schor, 2017; Friedman, 
2014; Srnicek, 2017). As a common characteristic, the work is allocated by platforms that 
formally serve as mere intermediates to workers formally classified as freelancer who ‘sell’ 
digital or physical services to be conducted either digitally (digital on-demand work) or 
physically (local on-demand work) to customers online.  
The volume of academic contributions on this mode of on-demand labour has increased 
significantly since the mid-2010s (Sutherland & Jarrahi, 2018) and covers various disciplines 
ranging from technology studies, labour law, information systems research, management 
studies, organisational theory, labour relations scholarship, industrial relations, and sociology 
of work to regional development studies. Numerous studies discuss the specific technological 
foundations, process management, and economic impact of platform-based organisation (e.g. 
Andersson Schwarz, 2017; Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014; Howcroft & Bergvall-Kåreborn., 
2019; Kenney & Zysman, 2015; Langley & Leyshon, 2017; Srnicek, 2016; 
Sundararajan,2016). Similarly, the ‘pros and cons’ of platform-based arrangement in terms of 
their societal impact have moved to the centre stage of scholarly controversies. Platforms’ 
impact on labour markets and employment (e.g. Meijerink & Keegan, 2019; Rogers, 2015; 
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Schor, 2017). Critics have voiced concerns that on-demand work will accelerate the erosion of 
social protections by replacing conventional employment with precarious, contingent work 
(e.g. Cherry, 2009; Dobusch, 2017; Malin & Chandler, 2017). 
These controversies also regard dynamics within the ‘tripartite relationship’ (Collier et al., 
2017) of platform organisers, buyers of platform services and platform workers, and the 
political relations of platforms and other social stakeholders such as unions, competitors, 
political regulators and communities (Bajwa et al. 2018a). Past research shows that platform 
operators engage in various strategic activities to purse their economic interest within and 
beyond their online-based infrastructures (e.g. Lee et al., 2015; Shapiro, 2017; Donini, 2017; 
Laamanen et al., 2018; Tassinari & Maccarone, 2017; Wood et al., 2019a, b). Similarly, both 
workers and external stakeholders have engaged in political activities to tackle social and 
labour-related issues considered as a result of platform activities (Shapiro, 2017; Donini, 
2017; Laamanen et al., 2018; Tassinari & Maccarone, 2017; Wood et al., 2019b). Put 
together, stakeholder relations in and around on-demand platform settings have proven to be 
highly politicised. Similarly, political and market power of platforms has been identified as 
key tension within the emerging sharing economy (Acquier et al., 2017). In line with this, 
research in the field has acknowledged that “(o)ne of the challenges in understanding the gig 
economy is identifying (…) the power dynamics between the different (stakeholder) groups” 
(Bajwa et al., 2018a:9).  This points towards the crucial role of socio-political and power-
related dynamics in the realm of platform-based work arrangements. 
However, systematic analyses of power and power relations are not the key focus in much of 
existent platform scholarship up to now.  Yet some researchers have begun to take a closer 
look at power asymmetries between the platform operators and those working under it (e.g. 
Bucher & Fieseler, 2017; Codagnone et al., 2016; Curchod et al., 2019; Gandini, 2019; 
Graham et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015; Wood et al., 2019a, b), 
theoretically informed analyses on power and power related dynamics in current platform 
scholarship remain comparatively scare,  theoretically fragmented, empirically piecemeal and 
scattered among various disciplines. 
It is therefore startling that links between scholarship on platform work and elaborated bodies 
of power theory that could provide integrative theoretical foundations of power-related 
phenomena in platform settings so far only been sparsely outlined. I argue that this could be 
addressed by a stronger consideration of research from the camp of socio-political scholarship 
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in Organisation and Management Theory (OMT). This strand of research scrutinising the role 
of power in business organisations has a long-standing tradition and produced a rich 
conceptual and empirical insights (for an overview see Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; 
Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014). However, findings and concepts 
from this body of research have so far only sporadically found an inroad in platform literature 
indicating that bridges between both fields have not yet been fully established. 
This systematic review is structured based on the core concepts of power from OMT and aims 
to address this issue by providing the first systematic review of power-related phenomena in 
relations between platform providers’ digital workers and other stakeholders in the on-demand 
economy. Addressing both platform and power scholars, this work’s purpose is twofold: One 
the one hand it aims to provide a comprehensive overview of power-related issues in platform 
studies to OMT scholars that could provide starting points to engage in analysis within this 
field. On the other hand, it provides brief overview of core concepts of power in OMT as well 
as it provides suggestions how scholars of platform work could use these insights to detail 
their analysis based on solid conceptual foundations to address current issues in the field such 
as the lack of theoretical frameworks for the comparative and/or longitudinal analyses of 
power in heterogenous types of platform arrangements. 
This review is structured as follows: In the subsequent theory section I briefly introduce core 
concepts used in research on power in management and organisation based on seminal 
contributions on ‘faces’ of systemic and episodic power (Clegg et al., 2006; Becker-
Ritterspach et al., 2016; Fleming & Spicer, 2014) which provide a taxonomy to structure this 
review. Afterward, the methods section provides an overview of the review procedure and 
brief overview on the body of current platform scholarship assembled during the sampling 
process. In the results section we observe how power is exercised by platforms to affect 
workers and other stakeholders as well as how workers and other stakeholders attempt to 
influence or resist platforms’ political and power-related activities based on the core themes in 
platform scholarship derived from the literature analysis. The findings gathered here are 
subsequently summarised and discussed along the introduced concepts of power theory. 
Finally, I discuss possible avenues for further research from the perspective of platform 
research and power theory. 
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‘Faces’ and ‘Sites’ of Power: Towards a Theory-Based Taxonomy for Reviewing Platform 
Arrangements  
The camp of ‘socio-political approaches’ (Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2014) in OMT 
investigate political activity as an ‘endemic part of organizational life’ (Fleming Spicer, 
2014:237) where power is understood as a generic phenomenon inherent to all coordinated 
and organised activities (Clegg, 1989; Clegg et al., 2006). It is seen as a relational 
phenomenon, meaning that certain actors not inherently ‘possess power’ but the power ‘held’ 
by certain actors is based on the specific, relative distribution of their relative capacity to 
influence other actors based on different (legitimate or non-legitimate, formal or informal) 
resources (Clegg, 1989) which are rooted in the  socio-normative and socio-technical 
structures of organisations and their environments such as the specific organisational culture, 
technologies applied in organisations for process management and workforce control, formal 
and informal rules, and broader societal norms and discourses .  
Episodic and Systemic ‘Faces’ of Power 
Power occurs in an ‘episodic’ and ‘systemic’ form (e.g. Allen & Panian,1982, Burns, 1961, 
Fleming and Spicer, 2007). Episodic, or agentic power refers to observable, identifiable acts 
related to the direct exercise of power (e.g. Allen et al., 1979; Buchanan & Badham, 1999; 
Mintzberg, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981). Episodes of interest-driven, strategic interactions includes 
two ‘faces of power’ (Fleming and Spicer, 2007,2014), namely acts of coercion and 
manipulation. Coercion (Fleming & Spicer, 2007) refers to the basic, direct mobilisation of 
power, e.g. the exercise of formal authority in organisations (Weber, 1947) or activism by 
social movements to influence firm behaviour (McCarthy &  Zald, 1977) were actors utilise 
available power resources to get others to ‘do something they otherwise would not do’ 
(Fleming and Spicer, 2014:247 paraphrasing Dahl, 1957; see also Clegg and Hardy, 1996). 
Manipulation refers to more subtle techniques of exercising power such as strategic agenda 
setting, selective provision of information (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980), strategic sense-making 
(Clark, 2004; Clark & Geppert, 2011) and impression management (Maitlis, 2004) ‘whereby 
actors seek to either limit the issues that are discussed or ﬁt issues within (what are perceived 
to be) acceptable boundaries’ (Fleming & Spicer, 2014:242). Manipulation thus echoes what 
Luces (2004) called the second ‘face of power’, that is, a kind of power that denotes a certain 
actor’s ability to prevent decision making or to limit the choices available (Becker-Ritterspach 
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et al., 2016). 
As a second level of analysis, the notion of systemic power, reaching beyond these manifest 
forms of episodic power highlights that power is congealed in social-normative and socio-
technical, material structures both at the meso-level of organisations as well as the macro-
level of wider institutional contexts (Clegg, 1989; Fleming & Spicer, 2014; Lawrence et al., 
2012). Thus, socio-normative and socio-technical structures together create institutionalised, 
relatively stable, systemic arrangements and standing conditions shaping ongoing episodes of 
power in given instance (Clegg 1989; Oliveira & Clegg 2015). Even if power is not employed 
in a given episode, decisions might be influenced by institutional settings, ideologies, and 
disciplinary technologies (ibid.). Two intertwined forms of this kind of systemic power are 
highlighted. First, building upon Lukes’ ‘radical view’ of power (2004), domination refers to 
‘attempts to make relations of power appear inevitable and natural’ (Fleming & Spicer, 
2014:241; similarly Knights & McCabe, 1997), for instance, by articulating ideology 
(Alvesson 1987), or representing external forces as immutable pressure (Morgan & Sturdy, 
2000). Second, subjectification refers to the construction of identities, meanings, and 
membership by seeking to determine an actor’s very sense of self, including their emotions 
and identity (Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016). In contrast to manipulation and domination 
“(h)ere, the focus is not on decision-making or non-decision making, or the ideological suppression of 
conflict, but the constitution of the very person who makes decisions. According to Foucault, power is 
achieved through defining the conditions of possibility underlying how we experience ourselves as 
people. Power, therefore, produces the kind of people we feel we naturally are’ (Fleming & Spicer, 
2007:23). 
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‘Sites’ of Power 
This review also considers that power occurs at different ‘sites’ or ‘locations’ in and around 
organisations and is exercised by different stakeholders in and around on-demand-work 
settings. On the one hand, existent research highlights various forms of ‘power through’ and 
‘power in’ organisations (Fleming & Spicer, 2014) where key actors such as platform 
operators exercise ‘power over’ different stakeholders. On the other hand, these stakeholders 
also engage in counteractivities in order to exercise ‘power against’ organisations such as 
platforms (ibid.) via individual resistance and collective activism.  
Drawing on Fleming and Spicer (2014), the distinction of ‘faces’ and ‘sites’ of power 
provides a two-dimensional taxonomy (see Table 4 below) for the analysis of power in 
platform work in order to distinguish sites (power ‘by’ vs. power ‘against’ platforms) and 
forms (episodic vs. systemic power) to structure this review. 
 
Table 4. Analytic Taxonomy of Faces and Sites of Power for the Analysis of On-Demand Platforms. 
 
Level of analysis:  
‘Face’ of Power  
Power ‘by’ platforms 
 
Power ‘against’ platforms 
 
 
Episodic power:  
 
Coercion & Manipulation 
In processes and interaction in and 
around platform settings 
 
 
 
 
 
E.g. efforts of platform organizers to 
induce desired behaviour of on-
demand workers in daily work 
processes by direct mobilization of 
power, agenda setting, or subtle 
influence.  
 
 
 
E.g. situational resistance and 
strategic behaviour of on-demand 
workers in daily activities, 
stakeholder campaigning against 
platform policies 
Systemic power:  
 
Domination & Subjectification 
embedded in socio-normative and 
socio-technical structures of 
platforms and platform environments 
 
 
E.g. utilization of discourse and 
technological devices to inscribe 
power relations in organizational 
arrangements to legitimize business 
models and facilitate fluent 
operations  
 
 
 
E.g. efforts by affected stakeholders 
to regulate platforms, counter-
discourse, establishment of 
alternative systemic arrangements. 
Source: Own compilation based on Becker-Ritterspach et al, 2016, Clegg, 1989, Clegg et al., 2006, Fleming & Spicer, 2014. 
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Sampling Procedure, Data Analysis, and Overview on Identified Literature 
I conduct a concept-centric review focusing on research outcomes (Cooper, 1988; Webster & 
Watson, 2002) in order to unpack the core themes and phenomena relevant to understand 
power in platform work settings and provide a theoretically informed discussion of these 
novel arrangements through the conceptual lens of power theory. 
The emerging fields of platform research hitherto lacks a joint terminology (Sutherland & 
Jarrahi, 2018). Thus, a simple keyword-based database search turned out problematic to 
identify a representative sample of literature. More general terms such as ‘sharing economy‘ 
or ‘collaborative consumption‘ encompass far-distant and heterogenous forms of internet 
based economic exchange (Acquier et al, 2019) and thus provided too unprecise results. In 
contrast, narrow terms such as ‘gig economy‘, ‘on-demand economy‘, ‘crowd work‘, and 
‘micro-tasking‘ provided too narrow and incomplete search outcomes. Moreover, as a young 
interdisciplinary field, relevant literature is scattered among sources from diverse disciplines, 
and it was thus a challenge to identify key outlets that could serve as a starting point for a 
systematic literature search. 
To manage these ‘definitional issues’ (Frenken & Schor, 2017) and blurred field boundaries, I 
followed existing literature (e.g. Levy and Ellis 2006; Webster and Watson 2002) and 
conducted a staged sampling procedure which began with an explorative database search 
followed by iterative forward and backward searches. The procedure included 5 stages (see 
Table 5 below for an overview): 
First, I compiled an initial start sample (stage 1). This sample was derived departing from a 
database search scanning titles, abstracts and references in Web of Science and Google 
Scholar. I combined keywords indicating topical relevance such as ‘gig work’, ‘crowd work’ 
and ‘on-demand-services’ with keywords indicating theoretical importance such as ‘power 
relations’, ‘power asymmetry’, ‘commodification’, ‘labour conditions’ and ‘resistance’. 
Following recommendations for such ‘start samples’ (Torraco, 2005; Webster & Watson, 
2002; Wohlin, 2014), I included various disciplines apparently relevant to the research 
objective, seminal journals from these strands of scholarship addressing, and contributions 
frequently cited in seminal articles. This search procedure led to including 65 journal articles 
and conference proceedings to capture ‘a broad conception of what is known about the topic’ 
(Torraco, 2005:359).  
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Second (stage 2&3), a systematic ‘snowballing’ procedure was conducted. Snowballing refers 
to (a) using the reference list of the starting set of seminal papers to identify additional 
contributions (stage 2: ‘backward snowballing’) and (b) subsequently analysing where the 
identified papers themselves have been cited in more recent publications (stage 3: ‘forward 
snowballing’) (Wohlin, 2014). Accordingly, in the first iteration of backward- and forward-
snowballing, 209 additional papers were included. The papers were identified by using the 
reference lists of all contributions in the start sample to identify further publications indicating 
possible relevance due to their titles and abstracts (backward snowballing (stage 2): 144 
contributions, forward snowballing (stage 3): 65 contributions, in total 209 additional 
contributions).  
Third (stage 4&5), this refined sample of 274 papers was analysed by full-text reading to 
identify further relevant papers which resulted in the inclusion of 23 additional papers in the 
sample (backward snowballing 2, stage 4). Additionally, 9 papers published after the sampling 
procedure was finished where included (stage 5). The comparatively low number of 32 
additional sources found in stage 4 & 5 indicates that the previous search procedure was 
appropriate to gather a ‘saturated’ sample of contemporary literature representatively covering 
core findings in platform scholarship relevant to the study of power in platform work settings. 
 
Table 5. Overview of the Staged Sampling Procedure 
 
Step Procedure Result Selected 
publications 
Total size of 
sample 
Assembling start sample  
 
(Stage 1) 
Broad search using initial 
tentative keywords to identify 
interdisciplinary sample of 
seminal papers. 
 
65 papers  
selected 
65 65 
Snowballing  
 
(Stage 2 & 3) 
 
Iteration 1 (forward & 
backward) 
 
 
Backward snowballing and 
forward snowballing based on 
title, subsequent exclusion of 
non –relevant papers based on 
investigation of abstracts and 
scanning of full texts. 
144 papers 
selected  
(backward) 
 
65 papers selected 
(forward) 
209 274 
In-depth analysis 
 
Stage (4 &5) 
 
Iteration 2 (backward), 
inclusion of papers 
published after sampling 
Identification of seminal papers 
not yet included in sample based 
on full-text read and references 
and subsequent 2nd iteration of 
backward snowballing. 
Additional inclusion of papers 
published after systematic 
sampling procedure. 
23 papers selected 
(backward 2) 
 
9 papers selected 
(published after 
sampling) 
 
32 306 
Source: Own compilation. 
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Following recommendations by Bandara et al. (2011), the final sample of 306 papers (see 
appendix) was subsequently analysed using the QDA-software Atlas.ti. For data analysis an 
approach combining thematic coding as well as theory-based coding was conducted: First, 
following recommendations by Wolfswinkel et al. (2013) and based on a grounded-theory-
inspired procedure, thematic coding was used to identify the core issues in research. Second, 
this core issues were systematised by applying theory-based coding, that is, a coding scheme 
including theoretical concepts derived from seminal contributions on power in management 
and organisational theory (e.g., Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; Fleming & Spicer, 2014; see 
Table 4 above) according to the taxonomy of ‘sites’ and ‘faces’ of power presented above. 
The results of this analysis provide content and structure the subsequent findings section. 
After a descriptive overview of the full sample of publications core research themes that 
transpired from the inductive coding procedure are related to issues and conceptualisations of 
contemporary power theory based on the previously presented framework. 
The full sample includes various contributions dealing with the heterogenous forms of 
platform work in general (e.g. Acquier et al., 2019; Blaschke & Brosius, 2018; Cohen & 
Kietzmann, 2014; Constantiou et al., 2016; Puschmann & Alt, 2016; Schor, 2018), digital gig 
work crowd-work and micro-tasking (e.g. Bederson & Quinn, 2011; Berg, 2015; Bergvall-
Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; Cherry, 2009; De Groen & Maselli, 2016; Deng et al., 2016; 
Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; Cherry, 2009; Deng et al., 2016; Donini et al., 2017; 
Felstiner, 2011; Kingsley et al., 2014;  Raval & Dourish, 2016) as well as forms of local gig 
work that require local execution such as on-demand transportation, house-cleaning, and food 
delivery (e.g. Chen et al., 2015; De Groen et al., 2016; Esbenshade & Shifrin, 2018; Rosenblat 
& Stark, 2015; Wentrup et al., 2019 ). Not surprisingly, the bulk of studies focusses on the 
U.S-context. However, researchers have also scrutinised other national contexts such as sub-
Saharan Africa (e.g. Graham et al., 2017), India (e.g. Bregiannis et al., 2017; D’Cruz & 
Noronha, 2018), Great Britain (e.g. Adam, 2017), Germany (e.g. Ivanova et al., 2018) and the 
spatial fragmentation and delocalisation of digital work across countries in certain settings are 
emphasised as well (e.g. Heeks, 2017; Lehdonvirta et al., 2019; Vandaele, 2018).  
Similarly, the sample covers a range of academic disciplines and field-specific outlets (see 
Appendix) mirroring the interdisciplinary character of the field and several strands of research 
have proven particularly relevant to the investigation of power in the platform economy in the 
analysis.  
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In addition to contributions from information systems research and operations management 
addressing technical issues of platform organisation, for instance, how technological 
innovations can increase platforms efficiently, how matching problems can be addressed, and 
ratings systems be improved (e.g., Dellarocas, 2000; Mohlmann & Zalmanson, 2017). various 
contributions focus on the social implications of commercial platform organisation:  
A substantial share of publications from the field of law studies focusses on labour issues 
related to employee classification (e.g. Ahsan, 2018; Aloisi & Gramano, 2019; Carboni, 2016; 
Collier et al. 2018; Coyle, 2017; De Bruyne, 2017; Dubal 2017a, b, c; De Stefano, 2015; 
Prassl & Risak, 2015; Sprague, 2015 ) and, based on this, discuss the possibilities and 
challenges of regulating platform-mediated labour (e.g. Collier et al., 2018; De Stefano, 2015; 
Edelman & Garadin 2015; Eichhorst et al., 2017; Frenken & Schor, 2017; Means & Seiner, 
2015).  
Related to this, scholars of industrial relations and sociology of labour have strongly 
emphasised on issues regarding worker representation (e.g. Allen-Robertson, 2017; Birgillito 
& Birgillito, 2018; Drahokoupil & Piasna, 2017, 2019; Fabo et al., 2017; Minter, 2017; 
Newlands et al., 2018; Tassinari & Maccarrone, 2017) , and issues of commodification (e.g. 
Aloisi, 2015; Dobusch, 2019; Dolata, 2019; Friedman, 2014; Ljungholm, 2019; Malin & 
Chandler, 2016; Wood et al., 2019a, b).  
Similarly, a range of studies in sociological technology studies and technology forecasting 
have discussed issues such as digital governance (e.g. Ettlinger, 2018; Gaikwad et al., 2015) 
and platform surveillance (e.g. Anderson, 2016; Kirven, 2018; Van Dijck, 2014; West, 2019). 
Finally, critical scholarship from gender studies, business ethics and critical sociology have 
addressed issues of racial and gender discrimination (e.g. Edelman et al., 2017; Piasna & 
Drahokoupil, 2017; Rosenblat et al., 2017) and unfairness of platforms (e.g. Ahsan, 2018; 
Fieseler et al., 2017; Risak & Warter, 2015; Sannon & Cosley, 2019). 
In terms of theoretical integration, platform research is characterised as being in a ‘transitory 
stage between description and explanation’ (Netter et al., 2019:226) with a significant share of 
publications providing dense descriptions of platform activities without specifying explicit 
theoretical foundations. However, particularly newer publications have begun to establish 
links with existing strands of theory in various academic fields more systematically. Three 
recent developments are worth noting regarding the study of power. First, scholars have begun 
to scrutinise public and political debates on the platform economy through the lens of 
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discursive approaches (e.g. Anderson 2016; Cockayne 2016; Codagnone et al., 2018; 
Culpepper & Thelen, 2018; Fleming, 2017). Second, the relation between different 
stakeholders has begun to capture the attention of scholars from stakeholder and governance 
theory (e.g. Ahsan, 2018; Dreyer at al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). Third, recent papers provide 
valuable insights into platform workers labour conditions, room for agency, and the power 
distribution in and around platforms through the lens of labour process theory (e.g. Gandini, 
2018; Wood et al., 2019; Veen et al., 2019). The findings of these studies are discussed in 
greater detail below. 
In terms of its topical focus, debates within the analysed body of literature can be grouped into 
three core themes: First and foremost, concerning the fundamental mechanisms in terms of the 
‘how & why’ of platform organisation in terms of its technological foundations, business 
model and organisational procedures in this type of organisational arrangements are reflected 
in various studies in the sample. Second, the consequences of emerging platform models in 
terms of their impact on work processes and labour conditions, branches, sectors and societies 
are at the centre stage in various contributions. Third, scholars have documented and 
discussed the various reactions of affected stakeholders, for instance in terms of workers 
behaviour to adopt to the new forms of work arrangements, societal discourses triggered by 
emerging platforms, as well as measures of regulation and both individual and collective 
resistance considering platform activities. 
These core themes dovetail nicely with the differentiation of ‘sites’ and ‘faces’ of power 
established above. The fundamental mechanisms of platform organisation in terms of its 
technological foundations, business model and organisational procedures provide dense 
insights how power is exercised ‘by’ platforms based on systemic structures and episodic 
activities as well as the findings on the consequences of platform organisation can be 
conceptualised as outcomes of platform power on affected stakeholders. Similarly, the 
reactions of effected stakeholders, for instance in terms of workers behaviour to adopt and 
resist in light of these novel platform work arrangements can be analysed as political activities 
geared towards exercising power ‘against’ platforms based on episodic action and systemic 
structures. I will thus discuss these core findings along the concepts of ‘sites’ and ‘faces’ of 
systemic and episodic power in the subsequent results section. 
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Results: ‘Faces’ & ‘Sites’ of Power in Platform-Based On-Demand Settings 
Power ‘by’ Platforms – Mechanisms and Consequences of Platform-Based Organisation 
Studying power by platforms requires explaining the ‘how and why’ of platform organisation 
in terms of its technological foundations and workforce management approach reflected in 
various contributions (e.g. Andersson Schwarz, 2017; Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014; Howcroft 
& Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2019; Kenney & Zysman, 2015; Langley & Leyshon, 2017; Srnicek, 
2016; Sundararajan, 2016). Research highlights that platform work in recent manifestations is 
not a genuinely new phenomenon but features similarities with historical, non-digital 
contingent work arrangements that can be traced back to past work arrangements such as 
industrial piecework (Lehondovita 2018) and classic forms of medallion cab industry (Dubal, 
2017b). However current technology allows to organising various tasks according to a similar 
logic in a more sophisticated way. Mobile devices and web applications allow for novel forms 
of algorithm-based demand and supply coordination as well as monitoring task fulfilments, 
thus allowing cheaper and more efficient control and surveillance of such work processes. 
Compared to its historical forerunners, platform work thus is seen as more effective and 
allows to scale, centralise and bundle activities more easily. Consequently, platform work 
becomes increasingly employed in fields were contingent work has a long-standing tradition, 
such as the medallion cab industry, as well as it spreads to novel fields and industries such as 
restaurant food and consumer good delivery, design tasks, administrative support services, 
cleaning services formerly organised based on conventional models of employment and 
organisation (e.g. Dubal, 2017a, b; Lehondovita, 2018; Thelen, 2018). 
Following Sutherland & Jarrahi (2018), addressing the ‘how’ of platform organisation, 
platforms face specific affordances to ensure fluent, productive operations and induce desired 
behaviour of platform users to create and capture value. Generally, they emerge in fields were 
platform work allows to extent reach, meaning that platform increase users’ ability access to 
resources and services in terms of scale, distance, and heterogeneity of resources. To do this, 
‘generating flexibility’ is crucial. This implies that platforms need to coordinate short-term 
demand and supply simultaneously under volatile conditions on both sides of the exchange 
process (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018) on-demand and with minimum friction. This requires 
mechanisms ensuring ‘efficient match-making’ to safeguard timely provision of services with 
sufficient quality. Because a core competitive advantage of platforms regards their ability to 
provide comfortable, just-in-time access to services, providers need to embed appropriate, 
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cost efficient, trustworthy, and easy-to-use ‘transactions and payment systems’. Moreover, it 
is important to shape interactions between buyers and sellers in ways that ensure a sufficient 
degree of mutual trust between buyers and sellers, as well as platforms themselves need to 
appear sufficiently trustworthy to potential users. In addition, commercial platforms in 
particular rely on constant growth in order to ‘extend scale and scope’. Many start-ups in the 
field are far from profitable. However, the declared objective of many for-profit platform 
ventures is to achieve a size, coverage, and a dominant market position. This logic originated 
from the emergence of role-model tech firms such as Google and Facebook. The success of 
these companies has created an ‘investor narrative’ in the Silicon Valley venture capital 
economy based on the believe in so-called blitz-scaling, a growth strategy which focusses on 
rapid market entries and company growth to ultimately achieve a dominant market position 
(e.g. Acquier et al., 2019; Wentrup et al., 2019). The underlying rationale is that, in contrast to 
other businesses, platform-based tech companies can harness a quasi-monopolist position after 
successful growth beyond a certain threshold due to network effects, a phenomenon probably 
best exemplified by Facebook’s dominant position as social network platform (e.g. Dolata, 
2017, 2019) or Amazons’ market dominance in E-commerce (Culpepper & Thelen, 2019). 
Following this logic, many on-demand platforms strive to achieve positions in their specific 
fields of activity. Even if recent problems regarding Uber at the stock markets (e.g. Desai, 
2019; Finkenzeller, 2019) demonstrate that the ‘Silicon Valley mantra’ of blitz-scaling has 
begun to become questioned by shareholders and venture capital, this approach continues to 
fuel platform’s overall business strategies (e.g. Acquier et al. 2019, Wentrup et al. 2019)8. 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, recent media coverage regarding, for example, Uber indicates that some platform companies face 
significant challenges in course of their initial public offering (IPO) or stock market launch (e.g. Isaac, 2019). 
Uber, formerly financed by venture capital firms and informal ‘angel’ investors, faced substantial devaluation in 
the course of its stock market entry. This might indicate that while venture capitalists seem less concerned with 
current profitability and keen to invest based on convincing visions of platform start-ups, numbers and 
performance metrics become more important once these companies enter public markets. That shift often 
requires them to engage in more detailed reporting, and these firms thus increasingly become the subject of 
critical public investigations by stock market analysts. In the context of platform research, these challenges 
accompanying changing ownership structures have not yet been studied systematically. Hence, future 
investigations of platform IPOs through the lens of, for example, shareholder and investor relations scholarship 
would address a research gap. Such investigations could also scrutinise the rhetorical manoeuvres and public 
relations strategies of platform managers during IPOs, for example, by drawing on discursive approaches in 
OMT (e.g. Vaara & Tienari, 2011) and former contributions on rhetoric managerial ‘Tools of legitimacy’ (e.g. 
Barros, 2010). 
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To meet these strategic objectives, most platforms share the basic mechanisms of web-based 
coordination of demand and supply, rating and monitoring technology which allow for a 
specific management technique which has been subsumed under the label ‘algorithmic 
management’.  Various studies (e.g. Allen-Robertson, 2017; Bergvall‐Kåreborn & Howcroft, 
2014; Dreyer et al.,2017; Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015; Wood et al., 
2019a) focus on different elements of this approach. First, platforms inscribe rules and the 
sequence of processes in their algorithmic structures, a management technique which has been 
described as algorithmic bureaucracy (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018). This includes rights and 
duties of participants in form of terms and conditions and click wrap agreements ‘binding 
guidelines that, taken together, define the rules of the game. They are used to disclaim 
warranties, restrict liability, indicate the applicable law, and determine mechanisms for 
dispute resolution’ (Aloisi, 2015:671). Additionally, processes are inscribed in the digital 
infrastructure determining digital work processes sequences (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018). 
These process patterns mirrored in the software worker-faced and customer-faced user 
interfaces thereby become obligatory ‘performative performance programmes (ibid.) 
‘whereby the designer(s) (platform owner) codify(y) programs of action that are inscribed into 
the algorithm and that drive transactions among buyers, sellers, and the platform owner’ 
(Curchod, 2019:24). In addition, user evaluation systems where service providers can be rated 
by customers present a core mechanism of algorithmic management. It is noted that 
‘(w)hile similar systems exist in traditional industries (e.g. the star rating for hotels), by deﬁnition, the 
potential information and information processing power, as well as the ease and potential pace of 
change, are signiﬁcantly greater among technology enabled [platform, DP] business models’ (Dreyer, 
2017:89). 
Besides the inscription of such bureaucratic principles and evaluation systems, algorithmic 
management includes additional influence mechanisms. Platforms need to ‘encourage users’ 
to attract both buyers and sellers to the platform in order to create and capture value 
(Laamanen et al., 2016:214). Research has highlighted various mechanisms to do so. They 
include software-based nudges and elements of gamification used to align desired user 
behaviour with non-cash, psychological rewards (Calo & Rosenblat, 2017; Cherry, 2012;  
Leismeister & Blohm, 2013; Schmidt, 2016; Yang et al., 2018), rhetoric invocations such as 
inspirational appeals to users via pop-ups and other forms of app-based communication 
(Scheiber, 2017) and economic incentives and surges based on platform interference such as 
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temporary increase of  pay rates in case of undersupply in settings and situations where 
prompt supply of service is needed (Rosenblat, 2018). Research emphasises that most of these 
mechanisms crucially rely on data. The software infrastructure of platforms allows tracking 
tightly monitor operations and simultaneously generate data on user behaviour. Similarly, 
evaluation systems provide data on service quality. This data can be used to refine operational 
strategies, control mechanisms and measures taken to enact algorithm-based influence. This 
specific approach of algorithmic management also highlights that the elements of platform 
management task differs those known from conventional settings9. 
This assemblage of influence mechanisms is relevant in light of platforms’ specific labour 
organisation. Most platforms business models are built upon contingent work with platform 
workers formally representing freelance subcontractors or ‘business partners’ of the platform. 
In the absence of conventional employment relations and conventional mechanisms of 
organisational coordination such as direct supervision and formal authority the different 
elements of algorithmic management serve as functional equivalent to steer operation, match 
demand and supply and safeguard efficient operations (e.g. Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018). This 
freelance subcontracting approach is also related to platform profitability. It allows platforms 
to bypass various obligations such as minimum wages, protective labour regulation, and 
allows them to avoid fixed costs that come along with conventional employment (e.g. 
Friedman, 2014; Means & Seiner, 2015). Thus, this freelancing approach is seen as an 
important building block of on-demand service platforms’ competitive advantage. 
                                                 
9 The genuine business model of platforms thereby also seems to influence the fundamental tasks for managers in 
these settings. Yet, the situation of managers and managerial work have rarely been addressed explicitly in 
current platform scholarship and could therefore be addressed in future research. However, some initial insights 
can be derived from existing contributions on algorithmic management procedures (e.g. Cohen & Kietzmann, 
2014; Duggan et al., 2019, Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark 2016; Whiting et al., 2017). 
Platforms’ technology-based management techniques have largely replaced traditional lower-level management 
tasks such as supervision, motivation, direct feedback, and guidance with algorithmic mechanisms. Regarding 
traditional middle-management the focus seems to have shifted away from tasks such as team- and group-level 
performance monitoring and team conflict resolution towards tasks related to the establishment and continuous 
refinement of algorithmic infrastructures and information systems. Similarly, to conventional company settings, 
the top-level platform management remains responsible for the public representation of the company and sets the 
overall corporate agenda (e.g. decisions on public relations, market entry, and scaling strategies). However, 
traditional management tasks related to coordinating employees seems to have become less important due to 
algorithmic management structures while IT-related strategy development concerning the ‘digital core’ of 
platforms has become more important for C-suite platform managers than for managers at companies in more 
traditional industries. 
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The approach of algorithmic management can be viewed as a core mechanism relevant to 
understand how power is exercised by platforms based on systemic infrastructure. With 
organising work processes almost entirely based technology ‘management becomes 
automated, algorithms become employers, information asymmetries grow, and pre-existing 
power imbalances are exacerbated’ (Gearhart 2017:13, similar Heeks, 2017). Thus, the 
elements of algorithmic management require a closer examination regarding their episodic 
and systemic power implications. The basic setup of algorithm-based bureaucratic 
mechanisms fixes the basal patterns of roles and social relations of workers consumers and 
platform providers. Similarly, the establishment of semi-automated rating and matching 
systems represent an important evaluative and disciplinary tool for systemic platform power 
since poor ratings endanger a worker’s online credibility, impact their future job prospects, or 
can result in their removal from the platform entirely (Codagnone et al., 2018; De Stefano, 
2015). 
Moreover, systemic power stems from the technological infrastructure of platforms that 
allows for almost encompassing surveillance of platform users based on data (e.g. Bajwa et al. 
2018a:24, Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015. The power-related effects of 
data-access have been emphasised departing from the concept of dataveillance first proposed 
by Clarke (1988). The concept has been applied to the common practices of platforms to 
continuous monitor and collect (online) data and users' communications and actions (van 
Dijck, 2014). Drawing on Foucault (1977, 1980), it has been argued that dataveillance 
providing access to a plethora of data’ (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018) allows platforms to 
exercise ‘quasi-panoptic power’ (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018) based on asymmetrical access to 
information (e.g. Bajwa et al., 2018a, b; Horton & Tambe, 2015). Like Facebook and other 
tech companies, platforms harness this capacity of ‘panopticon monitoring’ (Aloisi, 2019; 
Anderson, 2016; Curchod et al., 2019; Doellgast, 2018; Gandini, 2019) to enhance operational 
efficiency based on big-data analytics applied to continuously improve algorithm- based 
management regarding e.g. app-based match-making, incentive mechanisms, and nudges 
(Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). 
In light of these diverse mechanism utilised by platform operators to influence platform 
workers, researchers in the field (e.g. Belk, 2014; Cockayne, 2016; Cherry, 2018; Codagnone 
et al. 2016) acknowledge that – contrary to the common self-portrayal by platforms as mere 
market intermediaries connecting freelance business-partners and consumers for ‘free 
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economic exchange’ – many platforms establish socio-technical structures allowing them to 
exercise power over workers to a remarkable degree based on specific mechanisms that 
replace mechanisms known from conventional work arrangements. Based on their 
investigation of ridesharing platforms, Codagnone et al. (2016) have expressed this aspect 
vividly by emphasising that this 
‘ensemble of surveillance instruments (.) substitute(s) direct managerial control and create(s) power 
asymmetries between the platform and the drivers. The pillars of this system are: assignment 
algorithms, surge price algorithms, and semi-automated evaluation (i.e. drivers’ acceptance rate plus 
the ratings received by the passengers). These match three aspects typical of human resources 
management: work allocation (i.e. passenger assignment, plus predictive scheduling), information 
(dynamic surge pricing), and evaluation (semi-automated evaluation)’ (ibid.:38) 
From a socio-political angle, algorithmic management practices thus refer to the key elements 
of systemic power described by socio-political scholar (e.g. Clegg, 1989; Fleming & Spicer 
2007). On the one hand, algorithmic management inscribes mechanisms of dispositional 
power to platforms organisational structures which imposes rules of meaning, membership, 
and ‘the necessity to accept these regulations impose(ing) the rationalism of norms, 
classifications, and rankings’ (Curchod et al, 2019:23) on platform workers and customers. On 
the other hand, this form of systemic integration serves to steer processes in platform 
organisation thereby exercising ‘facilitative power’ (Clegg, 1989) based on available 
technologies of production and discipline.  
This socio-technical, systemic setup determines power relations in platform arrangements 
with several important consequences concerning processes and dynamics of episodic power. 
First and foremost, the design of systemic platform structures determines actor relations 
which leads to a specific power imbalance. Curchod et al. (2019), for instance, note that these  
‘programs of action empower some groups of actors by granting them more rights (buyers can evaluate 
sellers), disempower some others by granting them fewer rights (sellers cannot reciprocate with 
negative evaluations), and set procedures that regulate interactions on the platform (by imposing 
evaluation criteria on buyers or downgrading sellers with low scores).’ (ibid.:24) 
In this context, it is important to note that placing customers in a more powerful position than 
workers serves the fundamental platform objective to maintain fluent operations and efficient 
worker control. By outsourcing such tasks of direct supervision to customers which are 
positioned ‘as agents in the management circuit’, (Wood et. al., 2018:7, similarly e.g. Aloisi, 
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2015; Anderson, 2016; Fieseler et al., 2017; Gandini, 2019). Due to platforms’ technological 
foundations and genuine business models, platform operators strongly rely this form of 
coalition building with customers (Curchod et al., 2019). In this sense platforms exercise no 
coercive power on workers in a conventional manner. Instead, in extension of ‘customer 
management’ strategies (Fuller & Smith, 1991) online customer evaluations create a new form 
of employee monitoring (Curchod, 2019; Wood et al., 2019a, b) where customers serve as 
middle managers exercise coercive power based on a ‘ensemble of surveillance instruments 
which substitute(s) direct managerial control’ (Codagnone et al., 2016:38). Thus, ‘coalitions 
of interests and reliance on automatic procedures allow the platform owner to exert power 
over a large population of individuals at the lowest possible cost’ (Curchod et al., 2019:23). 
Furthermore, platforms’ socio-technical setups create information asymmetry between 
different actors which favour platform providers. Based on platforms access to information 
and exclusive control over information channels, platform workers ‘live in a space of digital 
surveillance’ where ‘data is asymmetrically used to exercise power’ (Bajwa et al. 2018a:24, 
similarly e.g. Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). For instance, sources 
report that transportation and delivery service platforms withhold delivery addresses or rider 
destinations from workers when orders are offered, thereby ensuring that these ‘gigs’ are 
accepted even when uneconomical for workers, for instance, when these orders would lead 
drivers to remote, low-demand areas (e.g. Anderson, 2016; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015; Veen et 
al. 2019). This ‘obfuscated nature’ of platform systems ‘limits workers’ understanding of (...) 
bureaucratic controls, [thus] acting as another control lever and eliciting compliance with the 
work rules’ (Veen et al., 2019:14). This practice is found to constrain workers’ choices, curtail 
their ability to make informed decisions, and express agency (Ibid.).  
Beyond withholding information, platforms’ information-based politicking also includes the 
provision of selective information and the use of information channel control to engage in 
discursive manoeuvres geared towards influencing workers via company rhetoric based on 
email alerts, pop-ups and push notifications. As Cockayne (2016) emphasises referring to 
such rhetoric invocations focused on motivating workers to act according to the platform’s 
requirements are widespread. Offensive inspirational appeals include push-notifications such 
as ‘Are you sure you want to go offline? Demand is very high in your area. Make more 
money, don’t stop now!’ (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016:3768).  
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Besides these more obvious efforts of rhetoric encouragement, platform research documents 
there are more subtle mechanisms geared towards legitimising company practices, framing 
platform work in a desired way, and influencing worker identities based on the utilisation of 
the broader ‘sharing economy discourse’ (e.g., Cockayne, 2016; Codagnone et al., 2018; 
Murillo et al., 2017; Pasquale, 2016; Peticca-Harris et al., 2018; Pinsof, 2015; Ravenelle, 
2017; Richardson, 2015; Schor, 2017; Tomasetti, 2016; Van Doorn, 2017;  Uzunca & Ozcan, 
2018). As highlighted by Belk (2014), yet commercial platforms remain based on traditional 
models of sales and ownership and thus barely share characteristics of ‘true’ sharing economy 
platforms such as casual car pool forums and online volunteering (ibid.), where exchange is 
characterised by non-reciprocal and pro-social behaviour, platforms are found to put immense 
effort in reframing themselves as companies operating under the banner of the ‘Sharing 
Economy-manifesto’ (e.g. Murillo et al., 2017). They do so by constantly self-portraying 
themselves as innovative proponents of emancipative, entrepreneurial ventures, and pioneers 
in changing ancient economic regimes by providing non-commercial opportunities to share 
underutilised goods and by providing income opportunities for income opportunities for 
otherwise marginalised worker populations (e.g. ethical minorities) due to low entry barriers 
(e.g. Rosenblat & Calo, 2017:3). Thus, it is criticised that for-profit on-demand sharing 
platforms adopt this socially-progressive discursive narrative of ‘sharing’ to legitimise 
themselves to societies and regulators, while thereby simultaneously masking the realities of 
the commodified work they often provide (e.g. Aloisi & Gramano, 2019), a strategy which 
has consequently been criticised  as ‘pseudo-sharing’ (Belk, 2014) or ‘sharewashing’ (Bajwa 
et al., 2018a). Obviously, these manoeuvres can be conceptualised in resemblance to the 
concept of political sensemaking (e.g. Clark & Geppert, 2011) and ‘identity regulation as 
organizational control’ (e.g. Alvesson & Willmott, 2002) where meanings constructed by 
powerful actors influence the image and identity that stakeholders ascribe to these actors. For 
platform companies, these strategies seem to be crucial to legitimise the core of their business 
model and thereby immunise against fundamental threats, for instance, legislation classifying 
platform workers as employees which would severely limit platform profitability or endanger 
their general competitiveness. Consequently, platform scholarships documents strategies of 
this type geared towards influencing workers, customers and external stakeholder on behalf of 
the companies’ interests. 
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Concerning workforce relations, for instance, a 2017 Guardian report based on leaked 
documents from Deliveroo, a platform providing food delivery services, brought to light that 
the company is ‘creating vocabulary' to avoid calling couriers employees’ (Butler, 2017). The 
article unveiled detailed internal advice for middle-managers to ensure proper wording 
compatible with platforms’ self-portrayal as mere provider of work opportunities for 
freelancers. The company, for example, refers to Deliveroo couriers as ‘independent 
suppliers’ rather than employees, workers, or staff, ‘onboarding’ instead of hiring, and 
‘availability’ rather than work shifts. Anderson (2016) has conceptualised such rhetoric-based 
efforts to maintaining this ‘entrepreneurial frame’ as ‘affective framing’ where workers are 
addressed as “friends with cars, on demand” rather than “cabdrivers”’ (Anderson, 2016:240) 
to mask potential exploitation, commodification, and new forms of inequality as well as the 
polarisation of power and ownership in the digital economy (similar e.g. Ahsan, 2018; 
Robertson 2016). Such ‘language games’ (Alvesson et al., 2008; Clegg et al., 2006; 
Wittgenstein, 1953,) are seen as geared towards ‘cultivating holding environments for 
precarious and personalized work identities’ (Petriglieri et al 2019:1) supporting the 
discursive normalisation of ﬂexible labour (Cockayne 2016:80). Through the lens of power 
theory, these efforts can be conceptualised as subjectification where organisations engage in 
identity work (Hardy & Phillips, 1999; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and strategic sense-
giving (e.g., Berente et al., 2011; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011). 
Beyond exercising this ‘subjectivating’ influence on workers, meaning the purposeful 
corporate manoeuvres to construction of identities, meanings and membership to determine an 
actor’s sense of self, emotions and identity (Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2016; Fleming & 
Spicer, 2014) platform rhetoric can also support platforms coalition building with customers. 
For instance, Culpepper and Thelen (2019) argue that platforms’ ability to communicate to 
consumers facilitates a software-based impression management, which transports the positive 
ideology of sharing to customers. Thereby, platforms seek to establish a ‘permissive 
consensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009) with user which are ‘primed’ (Culpepper and Thelen, 
2019) as customers by these invocations - tend to tolerate platforms’ conduct because they 
benefit from free lunch delivery, lower costs, and easy access to goods and services.
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Technology-mediated rhetoric influence on users also relates platforms efforts to safeguard 
their political and legal interests by influencing external stakeholders. Representatives of 
platform operators, like other company representatives, engage in lobbying and forum-
shopping. However, recent research (e.g. Culpepper & Thelen 2019) emphasises that 
platforms sometimes have reason to favour incorporating the public since legislators are likely 
to react according to the public opinion. The authors provide an interesting example on this 
type of platform-based political campaigning where political mobilisation is bolstered by app-
based communication infrastructure:  
‘In the United States, Uber was able to frame the conflict on terms favourable to itself, portraying its 
own role as promoting innovation and consumer choice against inefficient, rent-seeking local taxi 
monopolies. Uber also pioneered and perfected the strategy of using its app to mobilize consumers and 
apply pressure on politicians through social media campaigns. Indeed, Uber in 2017 included in its 
terms and conditions the following language: “Uber   may also use the information [we collect] to 
inform you about elections, ballots, referenda and other political and policy processes that relate to our 
services.” When faced with the prospect of unwelcome regulation, the company often responded by 
adding a tab to its app through which users could   register their disapproval to the city government 
with the push of a button— so much easier than writing a letter or marching on city hall! (Thelen, 
2018, p. 7). As Collier et al. (2018) emphasize, Uber was thereby able to channel the way in which the 
preferences of “the public” were presented, “solving” consumers’ collective action problems while also 
controlling the message’ (Culpepper & Thelen, 2019:18) 
As these findings illustrate, platform operators possess a powerful position within the socio-
political nexus of platform stakeholder relations.  Hence, representing the key actors in 
shaping emerging platform economy, platform companies have used this capability to disrupt 
various economic fields. The resulting spread of platform-based business models in numerous 
industries has come along with significant consequences for work and employment which are 
vividly discussed within platform scholarship (e.g. Glöss et al., 2016; Mair & Reischauer, 
2017; Rogers, 2015; Schor, 2017). Yet research has pointed to the heterogeneity of platform-
based arrangements in terms of their specific approaches of human resource management 
(Duggan et al., 2019; Howcroft & Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2019) and the labour conditions they 
offer (also pointing towards some more ‘enlightening’ examples, see e.g. Kalleberg & Dunn, 
2009) a range of specific issues and problematic dynamics seem to be widespread in the 
emerging gig economy. Hence, many platforms have been criticised for generating ‘efficiency 
through commodiﬁcation’ (Fieseler et al., 2017:2) and using gaps in existent labour 
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regulations engaging in novel forms of human resource and workforce management that come 
along with significant social costs (Rogers, 2015).  
Regarding the individual labour conditions of platform workers, it is widely acknowledged 
that this mode of labour organisation often yields income insecurity and low average hourly 
earnings for workers (De Groen & Maselli, 2016a, b). This issue gains even more relevance 
because a significant share of platform workers economically depends on platform work as 
sole source of income due to lacking employment alternatives (Manyika et al., 2016, Schor, 
2017). The dependence on platform work, combined with the constant exposure to customer 
evaluation and the necessity to maintain favourable ‘platform reputation’ (e.g. Mikołajewska-
Zając, 2018; Sutherland, & Jarrahi, 2018; Wood et al., 2019b) has been found to induce high 
levels of psychological stress (Bajwa et al., 2018a). Similarly, the app-based approach of work 
hampers social interactions among platform workers and, consequently, induces serious 
psychosocial issues such as the feeling of isolation and alienation (ibid.; Marmot, 2015; 
Turkle, 2017). 
Research also highlights problematic outcomes beyond these issues at the individual level. It 
is emphasised that the increasing competition between platforms and traditional business leads 
to the transformation of branches and sectoral labour markets (e.g. De Groen & Maselli, 
2016; Duggan et al., 2019; Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). Possible labour market effects are, for 
instance, the transformation of regular lower-qualified occupations into contingent platform-
based freelance work (e.g. Davis, 2015; Schor, 2017). Scholars have thus raised concerns that 
the spread of platform-based organisation– particularly in fields where single platforms might 
achieve market dominance – might lead to sector-wide workforce commodification (e.g. 
Aloisi, 2015) by creating a new digital ‘cypertariat’ (Huws, 2009) and ‘reinforc(ing) post-
capitalist hyper-exploitation’ (Peticca-Harris et al. 2018:1). 
Against this background, research has highlighted various obstacles for individual and 
collective resistance geared towards taming the sometimes-problematic consequences of 
platform-based work organisation. Next to barriers to individual and collective resistance 
related to the technology-based configuration of in-app systemic structures outlined above, 
gaps in legislations prevent platform workers to mobilise formal rights and to access to 
‘robust tool kits’ of labour and industrial relations regulation that would enable bargaining and 
safeguarding their interests (Williams & Geppert, 2011). Moreover, research also highlighted 
that commodification hinders resistance in some gig work settings (e.g. Rosenblat & Stark, 
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2015). In addition,  research has emphasised that the ‘atomization’ of workers in platform 
arrangements (e.g. Bergvall‐Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; Collier et al., 2018; Graham et al., 
2017; Huws, 2014) and the socio-demographic, ethnic, and socio-economic heterogeneity of 
platform workers curtails their possibility to communicate with each other and hinders the 
emergence of shared ‘worker identities’ (e.g. Petriglieri et al., 2019). This issue combined 
with the fact that platform workers are formally not associated with pro-labour political 
institutions such as union also curtails platform workers ability to engage political lobbying.  
However, despite these obstacles, affected stakeholders have not remained idle but have 
engaged in various efforts to safeguard their interests in response to platform business policies 
which I will describe in greater detail in the subsequent section. 
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Power ‘Against’ Platforms – Stakeholder Reactions to Platform Business Policies 
Despite the difficulties to engage in both individual and collective actions to tackle issues 
related to the rise of the sharing economy, the scholars have documented various efforts by 
different stakeholder to establish counter-power in order to safeguard their interests in 
response to platform business policies.  
A first group of political activities documented in platform scholarship relates to efforts to 
overcome deficits in communication, identity building, and solidarisation. As Laamanen et al. 
(2018) emphasise, these efforts are vital to organise platform resistance while simultaneously 
pointing towards possible solutions for this problem:  
‘We assume that common identification can enable representation and more radical politics. There are 
different affordances to how actors build reciprocities, solidarities and joint structures, which we 
discuss in terms of discrete mobilizations, traditional labour organising, shared governance and 
common ownership. These affordances may explain why resistance does not seem to be sustainable or 
leading   to enduring change in the collaborative economy context’ (Laamanen et al., 2018:18) 
Next, in the context of worker solidarisation past research highlighted that individual 
strategies to improve individual economic outcomes of platform engagement appear to be 
curtailed by existing information asymmetries. For instance, taking the example of Uber 
Allen-Robertson (2017) emphasises that “(d)rivers frequently speculate on the rules and 
factors involved in the distribution of fares, fare pricing, and the construction and influence of 
driver ratings on these systems.” (Allen-Robertson 2017:3) since the underlying mechanisms 
and algorithms are not make transparent by platforms. Thus, “engage(ment) in ‘rule 
discovery’” (ibid.) has been described as major challenge for platform workers’ as the 
awareness of the mechanisms steering their daily activities is a precondition for strategic 
individual behaviour geared towards safeguarding their interests. 
However, despite of these challenges, research has pointed to a range of activities geared 
towards improving platform workers position based on individual coping strategies. For 
instance, to decrease their exposure to digital surveillance it has found that workers engage in 
‘self-protective behaviour’ (Sannon & Cosley, 2019). Taking the example of platform workers 
on Amazons’ ‘Mechanical Turk’ they found that 
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‘Turkers’ decisions to provide personal information during tasks were based on evaluations of the pay 
rate, the requester, the purpose, and the perceived sensitivity of the request. Participants also engaged 
in multiple privacy-protective behaviors, such as abandoning tasks or providing inaccurate data, though 
there were costs associated with these behaviors’ (ibid.:1). 
Additionally, Individual platform workers attempt to enhance their individual bargaining 
power vis-à-vis platforms and customers by using evaluation systems for quality signalling. 
For instance, research by Durwald et al. (2016) shows 
‘that quality signals of crowdworkers increase the bargaining power towards their principals, i.e. the 
crowdsourcers. As a result, the crowdworkers can reach a turning point of critical bargaining power at 
which the distribution of power shifts in their favor. We contribute to the literature by unravelling 
signalling behavior as mechanism influencing bargaining power and thus success in crowdsourcing’ 
(ibid.:1). 
Furthermore, platform workers can exploit the low entry and exit barriers of platforms to 
engage on various platforms (for instance, in the Chinese ride-sharing market about ten 
percent of taxi drivers reported to have registered on more than two platforms [Chen, 2018]). 
In resemblance to long-standing debates on workers’ ‘exit options’ (Hirschman 1970), 
workers thus hold a certain ‘mobility power’, which implies the ‘ability to utilise one’s weak 
attachment to a certain work place in order to exit ‘bad’ jobs and escape degrading terms and 
conditions (Manolchev 2019:10). However, mobility power is limited in some cases, such as 
in when workers are heavily dependent on a certain platform, for example, due to lacking 
employment alternatives or the necessity to remain high ratings on a certain platform to assure 
continuous task assignments (e.g. Rosenblat & Stark, 2015, Schor, 2017). 
Beyond these strategies of worker resistance well-known from scholarship on labour in 
conventional business organisations, platform workers also use more subtle ways of resistance 
in their daily activities. Interesting observations has been made concerning app-specific 
worker strategies to cope with the mechanisms of algorithmic control in their daily activities. 
Research has pointed towards different forms of reflexive behaviour and ‘workarounds’ (e.g. 
Lee et al., 2015) whereby workers try to understand the algorithmic ‘black boxes’ of 
platforms and, subsequently, use these knowledge and tacit assumptions about how platform 
algorithms function to make more informed decisions and thereby resist platform 
manipulation and safeguard their interests (e.g. Allen-Robertson, 2017; Shapiro, 2017). 
Similarly, Sannon & Cosley (2019) highlight that workers use strategies of digital impression 
management, for instance to deal with customer complaints (e.g. Abramova et al., 2016). Lee 
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et al. (2015) have illustrated this form of workarounds. Among other strategies, Uber drivers 
engage in efforts to trick the platforms’ algorithmic ride-assignment algorithms and get the 
types of requests and clients they preferred. For instance, drivers limit their work area by 
turning off the app to avoiding bad neighbourhoods. Similarly, they bypass platform matching 
algorithms by arranging rides offline (e.g., via phone), asking customers to request a ride in-
app once they are in the car to get matched. Furthermore, the understanding of general rules of 
algorithmic task assignment, for instance, that ‘the closest drivers get assigned’ helps drivers 
to strategically influence their work (Lee et al., 2015:4). For instance, drivers, who intent to 
benefit from hourly payment promotion granted for constant availability, park in between 
other ridesharing cars in order not to get matched. In line with earlier scholarship highlighting 
that tacit knowledge can provide a valuable source of episodic power (e.g. Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2015), recent scholarship has put these insights in line with existing power theory 
from a more theoretical angle. As noted by Curchod (2019), 
‘(p)aradoxically, subordinates’ knowledge of rules and sanctions enables deviation from the norm, thus 
creating scope for individual agency. Subordinates  express agency under conditions of power 
asymmetry by leveraging specific  skills to bend the established norms to their advantage (Mechanic, 
1962; Vallas, 2006), by exploiting zones of uncertainty to control actors with greater  power (Crozier 
and Friedberg, 1979) […] Thus algorithms restrain sellers’ [i.e. workers, DP] agency while at the same 
time giving them  the opportunity to learn from their use’ (Curchod et al., 2019:27). 
This novel forms of ‘technology-based politicking’ seem to be significant element of day-to-
day micropolitics in the platform economy that undoubtedly deserve further scholarly 
attention.  
In addition to these individual coping strategies, research paid attention to individual and 
class action lawsuits geared toward improving workers’ rights and protection (for an 
overview see e.g. Cherry 2016). Many of these attempts challenge platform worker’ 
classification as independent subcontractors in order to ‘bring gig and platform workers under 
the umbrella of existing statutes governing the employment relationship’ (Johnston & Land-
Kazlauskas, 2018:5). More specific legal proceedings, in turn, are aimed towards specific 
platform policies such as the issue of unilateral reduction of fare rates in ridesharing (e.g. 
Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). Even if such practices are contemporarily covered by platforms’ 
terms and conditions, they disproportionately penalise workers, who committed themselves 
significantly to the platform. For example, Uber drivers were forced to invested in new cars to 
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provide decent services. As a result, the drivers’ personal business plans became endangered 
due to lower average incomes (ibid.). Other lawsuits have geared towards granting platform 
workers the right to transfer their reputation from one platform to another which would 
increase their bargaining power, lower dependence on certain specific platforms, and thus 
increase competition between platform providers (e.g. Fabo et al., 2017). 
These law suits were initiated from both outside the traditional labour movement (Lane & 
Daus, 2012) and with union support. Even though platforms formally operate outside the area 
of union responsibility, trade unions have supported platform workers in various ways 
(Johnston & Land-Kazlauskas, 2018:5). For instance, it is reported that 
’(i)n the UK, GMB, the union for professional drivers, was successful in bringing forth, to date, one of 
the largest cases regarding worker misclassification against Uber. GMB argued that despite Uber’s 
classification of drivers as independent contractors, a more appropriate classification for drivers would 
be the United Kingdom’s ‘worker’ status. The ruling provided 30,000 drivers across the United 
Kingdom access to basic employment provisions including holiday pay, minimum wage, and breaks 
(GMB, 2016)’ (Johnston & Land-Kazlauskas, 2018:5). 
Aside from challenging platforms at the legal level, unions have also engaged in public 
campaigning in favour of platform workers. For instance, in Germany, several unions have 
started campaigns to increase the public awareness of platform work related issues and to call 
for political regulations (e.g. Collier et al., 2018; Vandaele, 2018). These different forms of 
‘surrogate representation’ (Collier et al. 2018) have proven to be important due to the weak 
initial position of ‘atomised’ platform workers as ‘strike actions or the informal expression of 
dissent […] is more likely to take place when there is a union presence (Korczynski, 2014; 
Rubin, 1986)’ (Curchod, 2019:4). 
Besides coalition-building with unions, platform workers have also engaged in various efforts 
towards self-organised resistance. Most of this collective worker activism is interestingly 
based on the same technological foundations used by platforms to create existing patterns of 
platform organisation. Some of these efforts geared towards ‘turning technology to support 
regulation’ (Berg, 2015:3) rely on pre-existing, IT-based online infrastructures such as social 
media platforms or online forums which are used by drivers to organise communication 
channels and mutual support (e.g. Lehdonvirta, 2016). For instance, Lyft and Uber drivers 
share information, for instance, about drunk riders to warn other drivers (Lee et al., 2015). 
Similarly, as reported by various sources (e.g. Codagnone 2016; Martin et al., 2016) digital 
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micro-workers have created a dense network (Yin et al, 2016) ‘formed of overlapping forums, 
websites characterised by public or semi-public discussions’ to ‘share information about 
lucrative tasks and discuss best practices for dealing with clients (Gray et al., 2016; 
Lehdonvirta et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2014;Wood et al., 2019)’ (Codagnone, 2016:97).  
In addition, this type of self-organised online communication has also been used to coordinate 
episodic strike actions (e.g. Curchod, 2019:4). The existence dense communication networks 
for workers also opportunities for collaborative forms resistance, workarounds and algorithm 
manipulation. For instance, workers driving for ride-hailing platforms can collaborate in order 
to engage in ‘surge pumping’ (Klein, 2019). This is geared towards influencing platforms’ 
pricing algorithms that are designed to manage a mismatch between supply and demand by 
temporarily increasing driver fares to attract drivers to work in undersupplied areas (Rosenblat 
& Stark, 2015). Recent news reports illustrate the functioning of this micropolitical strategy of 
manipulation: 
‘Recently, ABC 7 News out of West Virginia ran a story about Uber and Lyft drivers manipulating the 
ridesharing apps to create artificial surge pricing. The practice works by a group of drivers agreeing to 
all turn off their hailing apps thereby reducing the number of working drivers. Then, after the fares 
reach an agreed upon number given the lackluster availability, they go back to work with higher than 
before fares.’ (ibid.) 
Aside from utilising pre-existing infrastructure for web-based communication such as forums, 
chats and social media, it is interesting that research also documents efforts where platform 
workers, often supported by unions and researchers in the field of information systems, aim at 
establishing new ‘systemic’ structures for coordination. Based on the insight that it is ‘crucial 
for workers to have opportunities to connect with each other, learn from each other, and 
impact the platforms they use’ (Whiting et al., 2017:1910), both critical scholars and external 
pro-worker stakeholders supported platform workers to develop ‘emancipative’ software 
infrastructures (e.g. Irani & Silberman, 2013, Silberman & Harmon, 2017). Examples of such 
‘activist technologies’ (Irani and Silberman, 2013) are Turkopticon, at third party platform 
allowing workers to give feedback on their customers to help other users to avoid problematic 
jobs or recommend superior ones, or FairCrowd.work, where platform workers can evaluate 
apps they work for (Johnston & Land-Kazlauskas, 2018:9). This new ‘systemic’ structures for 
coordination have been developed to make ‘worker-employer relations visible […], provoke 
ethical and political debate’ (Irani & Silberman, 2013:2), study workers’ experiences (e.g. 
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Gadiraju et al., 2017a, b; Lease et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2014; 2016; Raval & Dourish 2016), 
and articulate criteria for desirable platform work (e.g. Kittur et al., 2013; LaPlante & 
Silberman 2015; Sarasua & Thimm, 2014, Harmon & Silberman, 2018). From a theoretical 
perspective on power, these efforts to change the systemic configuration of power in platform 
arrangements can have significant effect on episodic power in platform arrangements. In line 
with Whiting (2017b), this mechanism as aims at establishing spaces for counter-discourse 
and the establishment of counter-publics off-platform, meaning outside the digital 
infrastructures provided by platform operators themselves.  
In addition to novel systemic structures that aim towards decreasing power imbalances in 
existing for-profit platform arrangements, research has also highlighted efforts to replace for-
profit platform infrastructures with non-profit alternatives. For instance, various contributions 
have discussed the prospects of ‘platform cooperatives’ (e.g. Davis, 2016), an alternative 
model of organising internet-based on-demand services, which ‘embraces technology but 
wants to put it to work with a different ownership model, adhering to democratic values, so as 
to crack the broken system of the on-demand economy that only benefits a few’ (Scholz, 
2017:14). In scholarly debate, the potential of platform cooperatives is grounded on the 
insight that  
‘the market orientation and organization of sharing economy platforms—as well as whether exchanges 
are monetized or nonmonetized—are critical characteristics shaping these platforms and their potential 
to provide truly alternative economic arrangements’ (Schor, 2014). 
Thus, research addressing the ‘sharing economy between commons and commodification’ 
(Dobusch, 2017) has focused on the possibilities and challenges of such cooperative platform 
models. In the view of some scholars such cooperative platform models bare the potential to 
provide more local and community-based, more democratic and people-oriented, and 
environmentally more sustainable alternatives (e.g. Davis, 2015) to its for-profit counterparts 
(Ettlinger, 2018). Consequently, pioneering efforts to establish such alternative arrangements 
have been documented recently. For instance, scholars have acknowledged that 
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(t)he taxi industry (…) has given rise to a number of new cooperative firms in recent years. In Denver, 
Colorado, Union Taxi Cooperative is driver-owned and has built an app that provides passengers   with 
the option to request, monitor, and rate rides in Denver (Union Taxi Cooperative, 2017), similar to   
major ride hail companies. Cooperative membership has created a unified group where workers can   
leverage their membership numbers and power as local business owners to influence local regulations   
governing such issues as meter rates, traffic rules and transportation planning. When workers are 
included in the platform development, they can build platforms that promote their own interests. Rather 
than corporations taking a fee for maintaining the site and connecting workers with a gig, many 
platform cooperatives minimize the cost to workers by removing the intermediary’ (Johnston & Land-
Kazlauskas, 2018:18). 
Beside the ride-hailing sector, similar models have emerged in digital on-demand work based 
on activist technologies such as Daemo, a self-governed crowdsourcing marketplace 
established to improve the work quality of platform users and provide a technological 
foundation allowing for a ‘open-governance model to achieve equitable representation’ 
(Gaikwad et al. 2015:101). 
Synopsis & Discussion: Power-Related Processes in On-Demand Platform Arrangement 
Through the Lens of ‘Faces’ of Power 
The overview on systemic and episodic power ‘by’ and ‘against’ platforms above allows to 
compile a synopsis of the political dynamics between platforms and stakeholders in the field 
of digital for-profit platform work. Table 6 below provides a condensed overview on the key 
findings that have transpired from the investigation of literature based on the taxonomy of 
‘sites’ (power ‘by’ and power ‘against’ platforms) and ‘faces of power’ (coercion, 
manipulation, domination and subjectification) I will subsequently relate these key findings to 
seminal scholarship on power in organisation and management theory.  
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Table 6 Condensed Overview on Systemic and Episodic Power in Platform Work Arrangements 
 
Analytic 
dimension 
Power ‘by’ platforms Power ‘against’ platforms 
 
Systemic  
face of power 
 
‘Domination’ & 
‘Subjectification’ 
 
Embedded in socio-
normative & socio-
technical structures 
of platforms & 
platform 
environments/ 
institutional 
ecosystems. 
Domination:  
- Cornerstone: Algorithmic management assembling 
diversified mechanisms. 
- Algorithmic bureaucracy: pre-defined performance 
programs & terms of condition (e.g. used to disclaim 
warranties, restrict liability). 
- Establishment of user evaluation systems as disciplinary 
tool. Making platform reputation non-transferable 
across platforms to curtail workers mobility power. 
- Setup of communication channels to create information 
asymmetries, keep customers & workers ‘at arm’s 
length’ & create a ‘black box’ pre-emptively curtailing 
users understanding of platform influence mechanisms 
& distance & alienate users. 
- Dataveillance: continuous surveillance of user behavior. 
- Specific workforce management & ‘employment 
relations’ approach to utilise gaps in institutional 
relations systems to bolster platform efficiency. 
 
 
Subjectivation:  
- Utilisation of discourse: Rhetoric maneuvers based on 
discourses of ‘entrepreneurship’ & ‘sharing’ to 
influence identities, legitimise business models towards 
workers, customers, shareholders, the public, & prevent 
labour legislation reforms.  
Domination:  
- Workers’ & external stakeholders’ attempts to 
establish supplementary digital structures (e.g. 
Turkopticon, WeAreDynamo) to alter systemic 
power imbalances and provide opportunities for 
worker agency in existing arrangement (e.g. by 
decreasing systemic information asymmetries & 
providing spaces for collaborative mobilisation). 
- Platform cooperatives: Organising internet-
based on-demand service provision beyond for-
profit platform providers to provide 
‘emancipative’ digital structures (based. e.g. on 
activist technology such as Daemo)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjectivation:  
- Articulation of new ideologies to change 
arrangements in existing platform arrangements 
based on self-organised groups & activist 
technologies 
- Discourse-based politicking & establishment of 
counter-discourses geared towards overcoming 
alienation, bolstering solidarisation & 
establishing counter-publics. 
 
Episodic  
face of power 
 
‘Coercion’ & 
‘Manipulation’ 
 
Utilised in 
processes & 
interaction in & 
around platform 
settings. 
 
Coercion: 
- Compared to traditional corporations: minor role of 
direct managerial supervision. 
- Direct supervision ‘outsourced’ customers which can 
exercise a certain degree of coercive power based on 
evaluation mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
Coercion: 
- Individual use of mobility power.  
- Concerted strike actions based on self-organised 
communication.  
- Individual & collective attempts to change 
legislation (e.g. concerning worker classification 
& reputation transferability) to enforce systemic 
transformation. 
Manipulation: 
- Emphasis of diversified non-coercive instruments to 
prevent classification of workers as employees. 
- Manipulation mediated by technological ‘actants’. 
- Provision of selective information. 
- Manipulation of match-making (e.g. by dynamic 
pricing). 
- Rhetoric and behavioural invocations based on 
discursive sense-making, impression management, 
nudges & gamification. 
 
Manipulation: 
- Individual coping strategies (e.g. strategic 
online self-presentation & signalling) & 
workarounds based on tacit knowledge & 
experience. 
- Collective coalition-building & concerted action 
actions to manipulate pricing, induce pressure 
on platforms & mobilise public support. 
- Surrogate representation (e.g. Union 
campaigning for worker protective regulation). 
 
Source: Own compilation.
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Concerning episodic power, I found that traditional mechanisms related to the exercise of 
coercive power such direct managerial supervision as  play a minor role in the core productive 
relations of platform arrangement compared to traditional Weberian bureaucracies (Weber, 
1947) and industrial organisation characterised by Fordist process management; bureaucratic 
control; Taylorist management; and relatively stable contract-based regular employment 
relations within the nexus of the ‘Coasian’ firm (e.g. Davis, 2016a, b; Kalleberg, 2011). While 
most conventional industrial firms during the 20th century substantially relied on this direct 
mobilisation of power based on personal oversight and formal authority, platform-based 
business model are built upon on a combination of algorithm-based systemic power and 
domination and the outsourcing of direct supervision on customers which can exercise a 
certain degree of coercive power at the episodic level. However, these algorithmic 
management systems also strongly rely on various efforts related to manipulation, domination 
and subjectivation which influence stakeholders in a more indirect way based on rating and 
evaluation mechanisms. The absence of direct coercion appears as a pre-condition for the 
platform business model in general. Interestingly, these alternative ways to ensure work 
coordination based on a stronger emphasis of non-coercive instruments in the ’diversified 
portfolio’ of platform influence mechanisms prevents the re-classification of platform workers 
as employees (Rogers, 2015). As the competitive advantage of commercial platform work is 
substantially rooted in their legal freelance subcontractor workforce management approach, 
the utilisation of traditional mechanism of coercion would thus seriously endanger platforms’ 
general business approach.   
On the other hand, workers’ ability to engage in the exercise of coercive power on the 
episodic level are limited to sporadic strike actions.  Focusing on external stakeholder 
relations I described platform attempt to mobilise their users for episodes of political 
campaigning as a novel form of power exercise that resembles findings on socio-political 
studies on organisations where powerful actors, in this case platform providers, use accessible 
resources and systemic standing conditions, in this case platforms’ ability  to use in-app 
information channels for rhetoric-based  political mobilisation, to ultimately fend off 
unwanted environmental pressures (Lamberg & Pajunen, 2005). On the other hand, workers 
self-organised ‘grass-root campaigning’, often backed up by unions and activist researchers, 
have shown to mobilise certain resources in order to pressurise for favourable modifications in 
platform regimes in episodes of resistance based on off-platform systemic structures for 
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communication and coordination.  
Beyond coercive mechanisms of power, this review unpacked various strategies by which 
platforms engage in manipulation including platforms’ interventions in match-making, the 
purposeful setup and continuous refinement of incentive structures, the provision of selective 
information, in-app nudges, and in-app rhetoric manoeuvres. Using these measures, platform 
providers attempt to ensure that platform processes proceed within desired boundaries and 
with desired economic outcomes.  
This portfolio of subtle influence mechanisms includes various elements that resemble power-
related processes of manipulation well-known from OMT power scholarship such as issue-
framing (e.g. Dutton & Ashford, 1993), discursive sense-making and impression management 
(e.g. Maitlis, 2004) and exercising power in indirect ways based on the provision of selective 
information (Aplin & Hegarty,1980) used to shape processes and outcomes in the tripartite 
relationship between platforms customers and platform providers. However, the 
implementation, impact, and consequences of platform manipulation features some distinctive 
characteristics compared to similar mechanisms in ideal-typically forms of conventional 
organisations. Three aspects seem important in this respect. First, the bulk of the described 
measures utilised by platform providers are inscribed in algorithmic mechanisms. Thereby, 
yet algorithms are established by interest driven human actors, manipulation is increasingly 
exercised mediated by technological ‘actants’10 in episodic interactions. Second, and related 
to the former point, episodic political processes between key stakeholders in platform 
arrangements are increasingly taking space in the digital sphere. While direct human 
interaction ‘at the shop-floor’ of plays a crucial role to understand episodic micropolitics in 
socio-political scholarship investigating conventional organisational settings (see e.g. Becker-
Ritterspach et al. 2016) a stronger focus on the role of virtual power games in inter-
organisational networks (e.g. Janneck & Staar, 2010) seem crucial to understand the power 
dynamics in platform arrangements. Third, based on their specific systemic setup, platforms 
can keep both customers and workers ‘at arm’s length’ (Cherry, 2016) from the platform core 
processes, creating both a black box where interference is pre-emptively prevented by 
distancing and alienating workers. This hinders the emergence of solidarisation and thus the 
emergence of possible counter-power at the ‘digital shop-floor’ of platforms. – a mechanism 
                                                 
10 Following Latour (1997) meaning non-human entities that act or to which activity is granted by others and 
which thus can be a source of an action thereby influencing other actors or other actants in interactive systems. 
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that strongly resembles classic investigations episodic politicking strategies in tripartite 
relationships such as the concept of ‘divide et impera’ (‘divide and rule’, Simmel, 1908), 
meaning a strategy geared towards ‘breaking up’ or avoiding the concentration of power held 
by specific actors or groups by dividing and isolating them from each other to hold these 
stakeholders in a powerless position in relation to the key actor implementing the strategy. 
Against this background, workers’ efforts to engage in manipulation ‘against’ platforms can 
be interpreted as a reaction to counter existing in-app regimes. Some interesting forms of 
manipulation by affected stakeholders can be found in case of gig workers: Based on tacit 
knowledge and experience with algorithmic workplace control, workers develop coping 
strategies and workarounds to improve their work situations. Based on self-organised 
communication this also includes concerted action and innovative strike actions in order to 
manipulate pricing, induce pressure on platforms and mobilise public support. These political 
activities are often supported by unions and other external stakeholders and resemble 
strategies known from power scholarship related to organisational influence tactics such as 
coalitions-building and developing bases of support (for an overview see Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2016a, b) as well as the manipulation of political climate e.g. Böhm et al., 
2008) and the creation of links with external institutions (e.g. Palazzo & Richter, 2005). 
To understand the outlined process of episodic powers in the on-demand platform settings, the 
specific setup of systemic power is crucial as the foundation for platform efficiency is rooted 
in mechanisms of domination and subjectivation inscribed in the socio-technical structures of 
platforms. The cornerstone platform domination consists of an elaborated system of 
algorithmic management which assembles novel ‘technologies of production and discipline’ 
(Clegg, 1989) such as algorithm-based bureaucracy determining pre-defined performance 
programs and terms of condition, customer evaluation mechanisms and continuous data 
collection enabling close surveillance of user behaviour. Based on algorithmic management 
platforms can thus implement a system of algorithmic domination. This provides an example 
how the development of new disciplinary technologies already described in other 
organisational contexts (e.g. Oakes et al., 1998) can provide the foundation of highly effective 
managerial regimes. 
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Although these practices continue to be widespread, the domination through platform regimes 
is challenged workers and external stakeholders via efforts to establish supplementary, 
emancipative digital structures. In the case of supplementary online platforms such as 
Turkopticon, the establishment of such structures aims at altering power imbalances in 
existing platform arrangements by providing a systemic foundation for solidarisation, 
increasing worker agency, decreasing systemic information asymmetries and providing spaces 
for collaborative mobilisation in order to increase workers’ episodic agency. In contrast, 
efforts to establish collaborative platforms is geared towards organising internet-based on-
demand service provision beyond the sometimes-oppressive regimes of for-profit platform 
providers. Here, the platform economy provides examples for cases where social movements 
attempt to create new organisational arrangement that resemble similar projects in 
conventional forms of organisation (e.g. Hensman, 2003, Contu, 2018). As novel web-
technology combined with the ‘lean’ business model of platform-based service provision 
allow to launch such structures with comparatively low cost and limited requirements. 
Interestingly, this could bolster the emergence of further alternative arrangements in the future 
where, based on the utilisation of algorithmic management techniques in a less problematic 
manner, more ‘emancipative’ arrangements could be established. As noted by Davis (2015) 
‘technology is not destiny: platforms are highly malleable, and there is clearly room for non-
corporate alternatives’ (ibid.:25). Obviously, this represents an interesting new option for low-
power actors to tackle labour issues in existing for-profit setting. While hardly imaginable in 
conventional industries, for instance due to higher resource requirements, the political strategy 
of ‘simply replacing’ existing commercial organisational structures with non-profit substitutes 
seems to be a realistic alternative in case of certain platform-based service sector business 
models. 
The analysis of platforms scholarship also illustrates the importance of rhetoric and discursive 
mechanisms that relate to the concept of subjectivation. The analysis highlights the significant 
importance of rhetoric manoeuvres by which platforms strive to influence workers, customers, 
and external stakeholder based on discourses of ‘sharing’ (e.g. Belk, 2014; Cockayne, 2016) 
where platforms portray themselves as innovative proponents of emancipative, entrepreneurial 
ventures, and pioneers in changing ancient economic regimes. They do so, to legitimise 
company conduct, to mobilise the support of customer, and to avoid unfavourable legislation. 
Based on seminal contributions from socio-political scholars in OMT, this can be interpreted 
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as efforts to carefully manage companies’ media image (Carty, 2002), shape new discourses 
(Spicer & Sewell, 2010), and influence the ideological and political climate (e.g. Böhm et al., 
2008; Vaara & Tienari, 2011) as well as law-making and regulatory processes (Kerr & 
Robinson, 2012). Similarly, platforms frame workers as freelance, entrepreneurial business 
partners rather than employees in order to mask problematic working conditions and prompt 
claims for protective regulation and social benefits associated with regular employment. 
These efforts feature similarities to processes described in other company settings where 
powerful key actors strive to influence stakeholders’ social and professional identities (Hardy 
& Phillips, 1999; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) and foster the alignment of these 
‘constructed selves’ with their organisation (Knights & McCabe, 1997). On the other hand, 
affected platform workers and other stakeholders have not remained silent in light of these 
rhetoric-based invocations. Self-organised groups of workers, union representatives, and 
critical scholars have engaged in efforts related to subjectivation such as counter-speech, 
efforts to shaping collective identities (e.g., Townley, 1993) and the articulation of new 
ideologies to change arrangements in existing platform arrangements. These attempts 
resemble efforts to articulate new ideologies in order to change arrangements in existing 
industries described by OMT scholar in conventional setting (e.g. Van Bommel & Spicer, 
2011). These ‘discursive struggles’ (e.g. Erkama, 2010; Koveshnikov et al. 2017) often take 
place within or build upon the digital nexus of the internet in case of platform-based work 
arrangements. The degree to which these processes are based on the amalgamation of 
technology-based novel mechanisms with distinct forms of discourse-based politicking 
strategies certainly exceeds the degree to which this is the case in conventional organisational 
settings due to the specific characteristics of platform-based organisational arrangements (e.g. 
Allen-Anderson, 2017). 
Chapter 3 
85  
Summary and Contribution  
The review at hand contributes to existing research by providing an integrated review of 
various power related phenomena in the platform-mediated on-demand work. Essentially, 
platforms’ ability to exercise of power stem from intertwined elements of technology-based, 
discursive mechanisms, which provide the foundation of systemic power inscribed in platform 
arrangements. Against this background, direct supervision and control typified as coercive 
episodic power (e.g., Fleming & Spicer, 2014) is ‘outsourced‘ by customer-involvement based 
on algorithmic evaluation mechanisms replacing managerial supervision. Similarly, the 
technological foundation of platforms allows to establish mechanisms of manipulation such as 
nudges and rhetoric invocations. The cornerstone of platform domination can be seen in 
algorithmic bureaucracy predefining rules of membership, process patterns, and information 
flows. The efficiency of this management approach is bolstered by systemic structures 
allowing for technology-based ‘dataveillance’. Similarly, the systemic setup of platforms 
enables political manoeuvres by which platforms exercise episodic power. Platforms’ episodic 
tactics to steer daily processes of value creation in this respect include the creation and 
utilisation of information asymmetries based on the purposeful setup of information channels 
and influencing episodic match-making and exchange processes based on specific structures. 
Additionally, societal narratives and norms such as neoliberal values and the sharing economy 
discourse provide the ground for episodic manoeuvres of subjectivation and manipulation, e.g. 
by addressing workers as entrepreneurs and business partners rather than employees.  
These narratives are also used to legitimise platforms business models towards customers, 
shareholders, the public, and political regulators in order to prevent reforms that would 
decrease platforms’ economic efficiency. Consequently, institutional environments often 
bolster platforms business models attempts for ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Shapiro, 2017) as ‘gaps 
and cracks’ in national employment legislation allow platforms to classify workers as 
freelance subcontractors and, thus, support platforms’ economic efficiency while, at the same 
time, exclude platform workers from social protection, codetermination and interest 
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articulation11. 
Regarding the reactions of affected workers and other stakeholders facing the novel 
arrangements of platform-based work organization and the corresponding platform policies, 
research highlights both individual and collective activities by which workers and other 
stakeholders attempt to safeguard their interests and resist at the episodic level. Concerning 
individual coping strategies, workers are found to engage in self-protective behaviour, 
strategic online self-presentation and signalling to achieve more favourable outcomes of their 
work activates. Additionally, in some segments of on-demand economy workers use a certain 
degree of mobility power resulting from platforms’ low entry- and exit-barriers.  
                                                 
11 Until now, the basic workforce approach of formally classifying platform workers as freelance employees, and 
to thus bypassing protective regulations and avoiding fixed personnel costs, has been applicable for most 
platform companies in most countries’ regulatory contexts (e.g. Adam, 2017; Cherry, 2016; D’Cruz & Noronha, 
2018; Drahokoupil & Piasna, 2017, 2019; Fabo et al., 2017; Graham et al., 2017; Vandaele, 2018; Wentrup et al., 
2019). However, legal struggles about worker classification continue in various markets where platforms operate, 
and recent court decisions indicate that future modifications of local labour regulations in light of the emergence 
of platform-based business models might curtail this policy, as some lawmakers have started to doubt platforms’ 
common self-portrayal as ‘two-sided marketplaces’ or ‘mere service providers. For instance, Anderson (2016) 
has reported on a lawsuit brought by Uber and Lyft drivers attempting to be classified as employees in the US. 
Uber’s initial request to dismiss the case was denied by US District Court Judge Edward Chen, who made the 
‘unusual move’ (ibid.) to cite Foucault in his official statement. He emphasised that ‘Uber drivers...are monitored 
by Uber customers…during each and every ride they give, and Uber’s application data can similarly be used to 
constantly monitor certain aspects of a driver’s behavior. This level of monitoring, where drivers are potentially 
observable at all times, arguably gives Uber a tremendous amount of control over the “manner and means” of its 
drivers’ performance. Cf. Michel Foucalt [sic], Discipline and Punish .(a “state of conscious and permanent 
visibility [] assures the automatic functioning of power)’. Similarly, commentators have associated Deliveroos’ 
recent withdrawal from the German market with managerial concerns about local labour law (see e.g. Link, 
2019).  
This highlights the role of the national business systems (e.g. Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998) institutional 
ecosystems (e.g. Meijerink & Keegan, 2019), and industrial regulation systems in which platforms operate. From 
a socio-political perspective, changing legislation might lead to significant future transformations in the socio-
technical relations among stakeholders in platform-based work arrangements. Future changes in legal 
environments might enable or restrict how certain platform business strategies can be applied. Reforms in 
industrial relations regulations regarding, for example, gig workers’ legal employment status, minimum wages, 
and rights and obligations in relation to collective bargaining might provide workers with more elaborated power 
resources and ‘robust tool-kits’ (Williams & Geppert, 2011) to safeguard their interests (e.g. De Stefano, 2015). 
While not the key focus of this review, several academic contributions point to the impact of different 
institutional environments in which platforms operate (e.g. Uzunca et al., 2018; Wright et al., 2017). Future 
comparative studies could depart from these findings and, based on socio-political concepts, provide a more 
systematic and clear-cut picture of how different regulative, socio-economic, and normative environments affect 
the institutionalisation of power in platform work settings and the resulting labour conditions. An important 
question in this context is how power relations in more problematic and less problematic platform-based work 
arrangements systematically differ due to heterogeneous national business systems (Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998), 
institutional ecosystems (Meijerink & Keegan, 2019), and industrial regulation systems.  
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Moreover, workers manipulate algorithmic process coordination by developing ‘workarounds’ 
based on their knowledge about algorithmic mechanism derived from their working 
experience. In addition, research also points to collaborative forms of episodic action which 
build upon the establishment of complementary systemic structures such as self-organised 
‘off-app’ digital communication networks and platforms geared towards overcoming 
alienation, bolstering solidarisation and establishing counter-publics to ultimately increase 
worker agency, decrease systemic information asymmetries, provide spaces for collaborative 
mobilisation and provide platforms for coalition-building with external third-party 
stakeholders. These activist networks and platforms provide workers with opportunities for 
collaborative forms of episodic resistance, such as algorithm manipulation and ‘surge 
pumping’. Beyond this both workers and external stakeholders engage in activities geared 
towards altering or even replacing the, sometimes oppressive, systemic arrangements 
established by commercial on-demand service platforms, e.g. by legal strategising in order to 
force platforms to alter these structures in in a way favouring workers or providing alternative, 
cooperative platform structures that bare the potential to provide more ‘local emancipative 
alternatives to organise platform-mediated service provision.  
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Outlook and Avenues for Further Research 
Based on these key findings, the review provides scholars of power theory overview of the 
way power-related phenomena addressed within the context of platform work scholarship. 
This is highly important as the analysis illustrates that power is a crucial aspect to understand 
platform-based organisation, which however, is not fully conceptualised in existent platform 
research. Consequently, further analysis based on power theory scholarship seem to be vital to 
theoretical progress within this emerging field of inquiry. Similarly, the empirical field of 
platform-based organisation can inform further development of power theory. Based on the 
review at hand I propose four promising fields of future research: 
First, future research should focus the study of processes and permutations of power 
configurations in platform settings. While the paper at hand provides an initial understanding 
of how different sites and faces of power manifest in platform settings, existent platform 
research hitherto lacks nuanced analytic frameworks for longitudinal investigations studying 
how power relations in platform settings evolve over time, how they get stabilised, or when 
and how the relative configuration of power between stakeholders in platform settings 
permute.  While existent studies provide some dense descriptive analyses of change processes 
in platform settings, usually based on single case observations such a framework could 
provide an analytical blueprint to compare these cases and shed light on the prerequisites, 
pathways, and patterns of change of power relations in specific settings. Building upon the 
findings gathered in this review, such an analytical template could also guide comparative 
analyses of power in heterogeneous gig work settings which are hitherto scare. It could be 
developed based on power theory. Particularly, Clegg’s model of ‘Circuits of Power’ seems 
promising here. This framework is geared towards tracing the ‘explicit mechanism for (…) 
the exercise of power” (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010) as the framework conceptualises in detail 
how systemic power embedded in relatively durable societal and organisational structures 
affects episodic power by providing standing conditions of episodic power and processes. The 
framework thus ‘allows researchers to identify and understand both how power shifts across 
actor networks and how power generates such networks’ (Oliveira & Clegg, 2016:426). 
Building upon the initial insights gathered here, a circuits of power-based framework could 
thus capture how actors use their agentic power in certain episodes to either alter or 
consolidate existing configurations of systemic power – for instance in cases where powerful 
actors strategise to solidify and enlarge dominance or sequences of power-related episodic 
Chapter 3 
89  
processes where low-power actors such as worker collectives attempt to gain access to new 
power sources in order to widen their room for agency in future episodes to challenge existent 
relations. This could help to provide a more clear-cut understanding of both inertia and 
dynamics of power in the platform settings. Similarly, it could inform systematic longitudinal 
studies on the permutations of power in related settings. 
Second, power theory can benefit from platform research since the field provides the 
opportunity to investigate innovative forms of mobilisation both by and against platforms, in 
cases where episodic processes of power such as public campaigning or coordinated strike 
action are organised based on novel technological structures. As reported by Collier et al. 
(2018) and others (e.g. Berg, 2015; Curchod, 2019), platforms have used their basic 
infrastructure for public campaigning against unfavourable legislation: 
The app provides both a list of drivers and customers and an efficient way of communicating with 
them. It has been a powerful tool in mobilizing customers and drivers to advocate for Uber’s position 
on regulatory matters by merely clicking a link. For instance, in New York and Austin, Uber presented 
a new “view” of its app, designed to target officials who had proposed vehicle caps and fingerprinting, 
respectively. When customers opened the app, a pop-up message appeared, asserting that New York 
City Mayor Bill De Blasio and Councilwoman Ann Kitchen were proposing regulations that would 
make it impossible for Uber to operate. Customers were then provided a link to register their 
opposition to the regulations. (Collier, 2018:11-12) 
This ‘clicktivism’ mobilising users to engage in political interest articulation on behalf of 
platforms is based on the specific IT-mediated relationship of platforms and users that allow 
providers to directly access customers far easier than in conventional company-customer 
relations (Culpepper & Thelen, 2019). Based on this systemic setup, platforms can influence 
political processes and the way political issues are presented to users, for instance based on 
techniques such as selective information and issue framing. Combined with in-app, one-click 
response options which presumably increase the likelihood to get users to mobilise users to 
vote according to platforms’ interests. Hence, further studies should play closer attention to 
how effective platforms are able to generate political user support based on their established 
IT-structures.  
On the other hand, I pointed to innovative individual and collective strategies and 
workarounds used by platform workers to improve their income and work quality or to 
undergo platform surveillance based on individual and collective action such as collective 
logouts. However, it is indicated that these episodic manoeuvres trigger strategic responses. 
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For instance, Uber drivers were found to use so-called ‘fake-GPS’ applications providing the 
platform with false information about their location in order to increase their chance to 
become assigned to profitable rides (e.g. Codagnone 2016; Martin et al., 2016; Lee et al., 
2015; Shapiro, 2017). However, the company has reacted when these practices came to light 
and added new app-features to detect these applications and prevent the app from operating 
while such software is running on drivers’ devices (JC, 2017). Similarly, recent reports in the 
UK Guardian point to similar dynamics in the on-demand economy, drawing parallels to 
historical cases of workplace resistance: 
 
 ‘Organised resistance by digitally outsourced workers has erupted repeatedly on the streets of major 
cities in recent years, usually beginning in the back-alley spots where delivery riders are encouraged by 
their apps to congregate and then fanning out rapidly through WhatsApp networks, word of mouth and 
some technological trickery. In 2016, for example, an announcement by Deliveroo that it would soon 
be unilaterally altering its rider payment structure prompted a six-day “strike” in which riders acted en 
masse to make themselves unavailable for orders. Colleagues from Deliveroo’s rivals, Uber Eats, 
swiftly followed suit, and began taking advantage of a promotional offer within the app that granted 
new customers £5 off their first order. By repeatedly creating new accounts and ordering low-value 
meals to be delivered to the picket line, the strikers amassed both a mountain of free food at Uber’s 
expense and a steady stream of fellow riders, who would turn up with the order only to be met by a sea 
of radicalised peers cheering their arrival and chanting “Log out, log out!” In the words of one 
Deliveroo rider, the very technology that was designed to control workers was now being turned 
against their managers, allowing riders to “occupy the system in a way”. Not unlike the assembly line 
of the last century, and the auto strikes in Flint that subverted it, a tool engineered for capital was being 
hacked by the labour force’ Shenker, 2019. 
 
Although these political dynamics require further investigation, they have so far not been 
focused systematically in existent research. In my view, this is unfortunate since further 
research geared towards conceptualising such patterns of action and reaction in subsequent 
episodes of micro-political game-playing (e.g. Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2009; Geppert et al., 
2015) in platform-based arrangements could provide valuable insights on novel forms of 
socio-political struggles in technology-based organisational arrangements. Such studies could, 
for instance,  build upon the existent body of research on processual dynamics of power in 
organisational settings (e.g. Buchanan & Badham, 2008; Clegg et al. 2006; Thomas, a, b et al., 
2011; ) and concepts and insights on politicking and issue selling in organisations (e.g. Allen 
et al. 1979; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a, b; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2011, 2016; 
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Janneck & Staar, 2010). Similarly, power theory can help to provide a conceptual template for 
such analyses which could, for instance, be provided by building upon the circuits of power-
based analytic framework I outlined above. Such analyses could also provide opportunities for 
more interdisciplinary investigations e.g. by aligning concepts from socio-political scholarship 
with insights from studies on e-democracy (e.g. Kneuer, 2016) and social movement theory 
(e.g., Zajak, 2013; Zajak et al., 2018). Beyond the analysis of power dynamics, such 
investigations could provide deeper insights into the societal impact of platform politics, for 
example, regarding the extent to which new forms of mobilisation can provide blueprints for 
employee voice within and beyond the boundaries of the sharing economy or assess the 
efficiency and impact platforms’ involvement of users in political campaigning. 
Third, research on platforms could benefit from a stronger consideration of discursive 
perspectives on power in business and organisation studies (e.g. Vaara 2003, Vaara & Tienari, 
2008; Vaara et al. 2010) as well as further empirical studies of platforms could provide the 
foundation for enhancing discursive perspectives in socio-political scholarship. The role of 
platform rhetoric and discursive manoeuvres is made relevant in various contributions within 
the field of platform scholarship. In public communication platforms utilise discursive 
manoeuvres to legitimise and promote their business models toward customers, the broader 
public, as well as politicians and regulators deciding on worker classification. Company 
rhetoric is extensively used as mechanism of subjectivation, for instance when platforms 
strive to motivate workers and attempt to construct entrepreneurial identities by ‘affective 
framing’ (Allen-Anderson, 2017) based on ‘in-app’ messages. Yet these manoeuvres are well-
documented in platform research, we hitherto lack systematic and representative studies 
comparing platform rhetoric with those of conventional for-profit ventures which have been 
studied e.g. in the field of discursive studies on multinational corporations (see Becker-
Ritterspach et al. 2016 for an overview). A beginning point for such investigations could be to 
identify types of discursive micropolitical manoeuvres (e.g. drawing upon Clark & Geppert, 
2011; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara & Moni, 2010, Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2016b) 
and investigate larger media samples using the resulting taxonomy as a framework for 
comparison. These could help to inform ongoing ‘what is new after all’-discussions 
underlying much of current research in the emerging field. Moreover, due to the newness of 
platform business models regarding at least their technological foundations, the amalgamation 
of for-profit shareholder value and non-profit sharing discourse (e.g. Belk, 2014; Cockayne, 
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2016; Fleming, 2017), and the fact that successful self-portrayal seems crucial to platforms to 
immunise against regulatory threats related to worker classification, mechanisms and patterns 
of discursive sense-making might significantly differ from those known e.g. from MNCs 
concerning their importance, contents and patterns require further attention. 
Similarly, the role, patterns and impact of counter-discourses might provide fertile grounds for 
further studies of discursive power. Compared to discursive manoeuvres by platforms, 
analyses of counter-discourse by workers, unions, and other critical stakeholders are 
comparatively sparse. Although discourse-based resistance and mobilisation is touched upon 
in some contributions (e.g. Acquier et al., 2017), we lack deeper knowledge regarding which 
types of arguments are made in which settings by which stakeholders as well as how, when, 
and why certain counter-discourses are more or less successful. Related to this, the empirical 
field of commercial platform arrangements seems fruitful for studying the dynamics of 
discursive struggles due to the ongoing and vivid controversies about these companies in 
public and academia. This coexistence of enthusiastic approval and harsh and harsh critic as 
well as the constant efforts of platforms to react to related accusations could also be valuable 
to provide empirical ground for studies geared towards providing a more clear-cut 
understanding of defensive rhetorical strategies by platforms. Such investigations might 
benefit from seminal contributions on management use of concrete language in shareholder 
communication (Pan et al., 2018), rhetoric ‘tools for legitimacy’ (e.g., Barros, 2014) and 
research on managerial practices of public apologies (e.g. Hargie & Stapleton, 2010). This 
might be promising due to the newness of the platform work whose emergence began during 
the early 2010s as consequently, a plethora of rich data is easily accessible which could be 
used to study the emergence and permutation of these discursive strategies using a 
longitudinal perspective in order to gain deeper knowledge regarding how different rhetoric 
arguments are introduced, altered, and contested by actors in emerging organisational fields. 
Finally, scholarship could benefit from a stronger consideration of techniques of manipulation 
which are based on the technology-embedded nudging and gamification. Platform studies 
indicate the widespread use of these subtle techniques which are based on insights from 
behavioural science (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, Kahneman & Egan, 2011) to influence 
workers behaviour (e.g. Calo & Rosenblat, 2017; Cherry, 2012; Leismeister & Blohm, 2013; 
Schmidt, 2016; Yang et al., 2018). Further studies focusing on this behavioural component of 
manipulation in platform settings might provide opportunities to refine actor 
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conceptualisations in organisational power theory. In the last decades, the field has 
significantly progressed beyond simplistic homo economics-based conceptualisations of 
actors in organisational settings (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014) by highlighting e.g. the role 
of identity, social relations, organisational culture, and discourses (e.g. Morgan & Sturdy, 
2000; Vaara & Tienari, 2011; Vaara et al, 2005). However, the role of mechanisms which 
influence actors in organisational settings and employment relations based on subconscious 
techniques rooted in fundamental physical and cognitive mechanisms has not been 
systematically included in conceptualisations of actors in theoretical concepts of power in 
organisations up to date. A stronger focus on such mechanisms based on insights from 
platform scholarship could help to complement existing insights on the mechanisms by which 
systemic power configurations affect episodic processes in organisations. This seems to be 
important since platform settings viewed as ‘frontrunner management domain in employing 
gamification’ (Morschheuseret al., 2018:1) continue to gain importance in various sectors and, 
bolstered by continued digitalisation, and consequently, the management practices and 
influence mechanisms applied in these settings increasingly also provide blueprints for other 
organisations beyond the boundaries of the sharing economy (Aziz et al. 2017; Hamari et al., 
2014; Koivisto & Hamari, 2019).
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Chapter 4 
 
A ‘Circuits of Power’-Based Perspective on Algorithmic 
Management and Labour in the Gig Economy 
 
Abstract 
Contributions to digital business so far provide mainly descriptive and hardly systematic 
analyses when it comes to the study of power-related phenomena within the gig economy. 
We particularly lack systematic, integrative studies which focus on interdependencies of 
power relations, labour conditions and business model efficiency based on robust theoretical 
approaches which capture meso-level structures and micro-level dynamics of power 
simultaneously. Our conceptually oriented paper addresses this gap by investigating power 
relations in platform arrangements, based on the framework of ‘circuits of power’. We use 
the case of the ridesharing platform Uber, which has caused controversial debates in and 
beyond academia to illustrate how framework, combined with concepts from labour process 
theory, behavioural economics and micro-politics, can be applied for a systematic analysis of 
the diversified portfolio of power-related control and influence mechanisms that are 
embedded in platforms’ software infrastructures. Departing from this, we examine how our 
approach can inform future research beyond Uber focused on assessing specific forms of 
management, organization and work in the gig economy. Our discussion concentrates on a) 
the classification and comparison of heterogeneous forms of gig work; b) the assessment of 
labour-related problems; and c) power-related organizational dynamics or inertia in such 
settings. The latter point is related to the central question of why employee voice and 
resistance are rare in certain gig-work arrangements. 
Keywords: Uber, gig economy, circuits of power, algorithmic management, organizational 
control, labour conditions 
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Introduction 
Gig-work platforms present a specific type of digital business model that is based on online 
software applications to coordinate operations. Platforms build lean (Heiland, 2018) 
software-based organizational architectures to support semi-automated ‘algorithmic 
management’ (Lee et al., 2015) ‘driven by algorithms’ and ‘fuelled by data’ (Van Dijck, 
2016). A characteristic of these models is the provision of on-demand services in the absence 
of conventional employment relations. Services are provided by ‘gig workers’, who are 
formally classified as independent contractors or micro-entrepreneurs (e.g. Kuhn & Maleki, 
2017, Risak & Warter, 2015;). The work relationships are market-mediated (e.g. Kalleberg, 
2011; Wood et al., 2019a, b) and ‘account membership’ replaces a conventional employment 
contract (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018)12. 
Uber and Lyft (ridesharing), Foodora and Deliveroo (food delivery) and Postmates (courier 
services) present a specific type of platform enterprises. They provide on-demand services 
that require local execution. Academic and public discussion about these platforms is 
controversial. Although these platforms can provide high autonomy (Schmidt, 2016) and 
income opportunities for marginalized worker populations due to low entry barriers (e.g. 
Rosenblat & Calo, 2017), Uber and the other platforms have received substantial criticism. 
They are accused of offering ‘precarious working-class jobs’ (Scholz, 2013:1; Schor et al., 
2015) as their freelance subcontracting approach bypasses the protective labour regulation 
and obligations that are associated with regular employment. This contributes to a ‘severe 
commodification of contingent workers’ (ibid.). Thus, this business approach is considered 
problematic for the well-being of ‘gig workers’ (e.g. Bajwa et al., 2018a) and research 
indicates low levels of mutual trust between workers and platform providers due to the 
delicate labour conditions (Wentrup et al., 2019). Whilst problematic for workers, this 
workforce management approach is considered beneficial for platform providers as it allows 
for the externalization of costs and risks which would occur in the context of regular 
employment. Hence, the ‘strategic legal misclassification’ of gig workers as freelance 
‘business partners’ rather than employees is seen as crucial building block for the economic 
                                                 
12 There is a vivid and interesting debate about the classification of gig workers, in terms of their legal and 
theoretical status as employees versus independent subcontractors (see e.g. Felstiner, 2011; Kuhn & Maleki, 
2017; Capelli & Keller, 2013, Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018; De Stefano, 2015). To date, Uber workers remain 
legally classified as independent subcontractors. However, research suggests that in various ways, Uber gig 
workers strongly resemble employees. 
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success of these platforms (e.g. Srnicek, 2017). 
Researchers have related labour issues and these efficiency-seeking strategies to specific 
power relations between platform providers and gig workers. For instance, the ability of 
platforms to unilaterally set the formal terms and conditions of account membership and to 
prescribe processes by designing platform software infrastructure is described as an 
‘asymmetric order’ based on ‘algorithmic bureaucracy’ (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018). 
Similarly, Wood et al. (2019a) examine the ‘weak structural power’ of digital workers. 
Power asymmetry is seen as an ‘outcome of platform-based rating and ranking systems’ 
(ibid.:15) enabling high levels of control. It has been linked to problematic labour conditions, 
such as ‘overwork, sleep deprivation and exhaustion’ (ibid.). Rosenblat and Stark’s study on 
‘algorithmic control’ at Uber (2016) draw attention to various related mechanisms embedded 
in the platform’s organizational setup. These features are ‘fundamental to its ability to 
structure control over its workers’ (ibid.:3758). Thus, the study of power relations in gig-
work settings seems important to understand how specific management strategies of 
platforms relate to labour conditions in the emerging digital economy. 
In line with this, issues of power and labour underlie many contributions to the field of digital 
labour with existent studies highlighting the role of standing conditions and organizational 
structures which influence power relations in the context of platforms at the meso-level of 
organizations as well as the situation of gig workers and how their work processes are 
controlled at the micro-level, based on the exercise of power (e.g. Aloisi, 2015; Bauer & 
Gegenhuber, 2015; Fieseler et al., 2017 , 2017; Gillespie, 2014; Harmon & Silberman, 2018; 
Malin & Chandler, 2016; Nachtwey & Staab, 2016; Schor, 2017; West, 2019). However, we 
hitherto lack a holistic theoretical framework of power in the gig economy to integrate these 
findings and capture how case-specific meso-level conditions, such as organizational 
structures, affect organizational interactions and work processes. Such a systematic and 
integrative framework seems necessary to understand how specific power configurations 
emerge, become stabilized or change, and how they relate to more-or-less problematic 
working conditions in various gig-work settings. This conceptualization would introduce a 
theoretically elaborate foundation for studies of power to gig-work scholarship. It would also 
help to draw clear lines between ‘the good, the bad, and the ugly’ in the gig economy vividly 
discussed in recent academic debates (e.g. Kalleberg & Dunn, 2016; Davis, 2015, 2016). 
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To provide such a conceptual foundation, we propose to apply key ideas of the ‘circuits of 
power’ approach (Clegg, 1989) to the study of management, organization and work 
arrangements in platform businesses. To do so, our paper is structured as follows: Departing 
from an introduction of the circuits of power framework (section 2), we illustrate how power 
relations in platform businesses can be studied based on Clegg’s approach, drawing on the 
case of the U.S ridesharing provider Uber to illustrate our argument (section 3). Next, we 
discuss our contribution to power theory and gig-work scholarship (section 4) and finally 
reflect on how our study can inform further research (section 5). 
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The Circuits of Power Approach 
The circuits of power approach (Clegg 1989; Clegg, et al., 2006) is an established theoretical 
framework that provides a flexible ‘power compass’ (Mumby, 2004) to ‘explain the relative 
capacity of various actors to influence organizational relations’ (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015, 
Figure 1). The framework has informed research in diverse contexts, ranging from analyses 
of power in historic and contemporary societies (Clegg, 1989) to contributions on identity 
regulation in organizations (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002), organizational information systems 
(Silva & Blackhouse, 2003), and power relations in multinational corporations (e.g. 
Mezihorak, 2018; Pedraza-Acosta & Mouritsen, 2018; Vaara et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 2. Framework of Circuits of Power 
 
Source: Own compilation based on Clegg & Oliveira, 2015:444. 
 
Clegg’s analysis of power emphasizes the disciplinary and restrictive effects of power as well 
as its facilitative effects as core force keeping systems of organized coordinated action 
coherent (Clegg, 2006)13. Power is understood as a relational and generic phenomenon seen 
                                                 
13 This conceptualization of organizations as ‘partial organizations’ (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011) stresses the 
‘interactive’ constitution of organizations and thus highlights the existence of patterns of repeated, coordinated 
cooperation instead of formal structures boundaries as key characteristic defining what an organization is. 
Accordingly, we viewed platform businesses or ‘platform arrangements’ as such a ‘partial organization’. These 
Chapter 4 
99  
as medium and capacity of actors that facilitates the emergence of relatively stable patterns of 
social relations and coordinated, goal-attaining interaction. The framework integrates micro-, 
meso-, and macro-level analytical perspectives based on the idea that power, ‘like electricity 
[,] circulates through social relations, working practices, and techniques of discipline’ 
(Blackhouse et al., 2006:415) in any organizational arrangement. Accordingly, three 
interrelated circuits of power are distinguished: 
 
1. The circuit of episodic power captures episodes at the organizational micro-level of 
processes, including the exercise of power in conflictual situations. It also includes 
‘business-as usual’ interactions, echoing notions of ‘causal power’ (e.g. Weber, 1921; 
Dahl, 1957). In ongoing interactions, agencies, i.e. individual or collective actors such as 
managers or workers, interact within established socio-technical relations by using means 
and power resources (e.g. access to information, networks, knowledge) available to them 
when pursuing their interests. These power-related processes at the episodic micro-level 
of organizations are embedded in social meso- and macro-structures. To understand the 
constitution of these standing conditions, Clegg – drawing mainly on Foucault (1977, 
1980), Parsons (1951), and Callon (1986) – relates them to two additional ‘structural 
circuits of power’ (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015) which analytically capture the conditional 
environment of episodic processes. 
2. The circuit of system integration captures material conditions in organizational settings, 
which consist of techniques of production and discipline, such as […] machinery, 
information systems, organizational structures and […] processes’ (Clegg et al. 2018:9). 
These ‘structures of domination’ (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 2014) enable certain 
powerful actors to implement mechanisms of surveillance, discipline and control, 
evaluation and incentives, all of which affect episodic processes and the power resources 
of other agencies.  
3. The circuit of social integration ‘captures prevailing rules of practice shaping actors’ 
dispositions to behave in certain ways’ (Clegg et al., 2018:9). This circuit includes the 
immaterial aspects of organizational arrangements, such as formal and informal rules of 
meaning and membership. In line with Foucauldian and neo-institutionalist scholarship 
                                                                                                                                                             
organizational systems of coordinated action are influenced by internal and external stakeholders who possess 
varying degrees of power. 
Chapter 4 
100  
(e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; Meyer & Rowan, 1991), these ‘rules of the game’ (Geppert & 
Dörrenbächer, 2014) provide organizational decision-makers with dispositional power. 
This allows them to prescribe and legitimize processes and templates and to assign 
specific roles, rights, and responsibilities to the various agencies. 
Both facilitative and dispositional power rooted in the circuit of social and systemic 
integration together become ‘institutionalized’14 and are inscribed in obligatory passage 
points. Clegg uses this concept – derived from actor-network theory – to draw attention to the 
‘nodal points’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1997, 2005) of organizational power, where structural 
and episodic power intersect. Obligatory passage points institutionalize the rhetorical and 
material ‘devices […] channelling and framing the “conduct of conduct” (Dean, 2013) in 
specific situation[s]’ (Clegg et al., 2018:10). The concept of obligatory passage points is thus 
crucial for analysing interdependencies, intersections and dialectics at the micro-level, as 
well as episodic processes with the structural configuration of power at the organizational 
meso-level. 
                                                 
14 We use the term ‘institutionalization’ in this sense of an existing and relatively stable organizational ‘status 
quo’. We do not imply ‘taken-for-grantedness’ in the sense of ‘institutionalization’ in the tradition of Berger & 
Luckmann (1991). Instead, we stress that ‘negotiated orders’ (Strauss, Schatzman, Ehrlich, Bucher, & Sabshin, 
1963) within an organization, once established, tend towards persistence and inertia to a certain degree 
(notwithstanding that this ‘status quo’ might of course become subject to modification well as the can still be 
questioned and challenged in various ways, i.e. by interest-driven stakeholder campaigning). 
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Platform Businesses and Gig Work from a Circuits of Power Perspective 
Next, we turn to the illustrative case study of Uber, where the circuits of power approach is 
applied to gain insight into how the power relations of a platform business are constituted, 
and the effects of those relations on the labour conditions of gig workers. Uber has gained 
particular public and academic attention. The company is often used as an ‘iconic’ example 
to illustrate, on the one hand, the economic success and potential of platform businesses, and 
on the other hand the ‘problematic’ aspects (De Stefano, 2015) of certain gig-economy 
business models for the affected gig workers. In our view, this makes Uber a suitable case for 
analysing the power relations in platform arrangements. Based on seminal contributions on 
Uber in its home country, we will especially point to intersections of episodic and structural 
power relations and illustrate both their facilitative and restrictive character. We propose the 
following ‘heuristic template’ (Table 7) which will guide our analysis: 
First, we examine Uber’s initial ‘socio-political setup’ (standing conditions) in terms of 
actors, interests, scope of agency and the technologies of production and discipline. These 
provide grounds for the establishment of a distinct setup of power-related control and 
influence mechanisms inscribed in the platform’s algorithmic management approach.  
Second, we analyse specific control and influence mechanisms at Uber, which we 
conceptualize as a distinct setup of obligatory passage points.  
Third, we illustrate how these mechanisms ‘top-down’ constitute processes, interactions, and 
episodes of power – that is, how they influence day-to-day organizing processes at the 
platform business. We also examine both their facilitative effects, in terms of business-model 
efficiency, and their restrictive effects in terms of labour conditions.  
Fourth, we link the circuits of power approach with ideas of micro-political scholars to 
demonstrate how these control-and-influence mechanisms curtail gig workers power thus 
limiting their opportunities for voice, bargaining and resistance. We also demonstrate how 
this specific power-related processes in the ‘problematic case’ of Uber thereby tends to reify 
and stabilize initial power asymmetries between providers and workers at a structural level.  
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Table 7. Heuristic Template to Study Platform Power Relations Based on the Circuits of Power Approach 
 
Analytic Dimension/  
Step of analysis 
Relevant sub-concepts derived 
from Circuits of Power  
 
Guiding questions for the study of gig-work 
arrangements  
Standing/initial conditions for 
‘socio-political setup’ of focal 
platform 
 
Section: 
‘Uber’s Socio-Political Setup’ 
Key actors and agencies, 
interest of key agencies, 
technologies of production 
and discipline.  
Which are the key agencies? What are the 
interests of key actors and agencies? (e.g. 
platform providers and gig workers). How do 
the interests of key agencies and actors 
differ? Which technologies of production and 
discipline are available to key agencies to set 
up platforms’ software-based obligatory 
passage points? Which actors control the 
setup of software-based obligatory passage 
points, and to what extent? 
 
Control and influence 
mechanisms institutionalized in 
platforms’ software 
infrastructure  
 
Section: 
‘Control and Influence 
Mechanisms’ 
 
 
Software-based obligatory 
passage points. 
Which control-and-influence mechanisms are 
utilized by key agencies (e.g. platform 
providers) to steer episodic processes of 
production and service provision? 
Top-down perspective: Effects on 
process management and 
business model efficiency 
 
Section: 
‘Labour- and Efficiency-Related 
Outcomes’ 
 
Impact of mechanisms 
embedded in software-based 
obligatory passage points on 
episodic circuit of power, 
focusing on the facilitative 
facet or effects of power. 
 
How does the specific mechanisms used for 
software-based work and process 
organization in focal case contribute to the 
business model efficiency of the platform?  
Top-down perspective: Labour-
related outcomes, effects on 
working conditions  
 
Section: 
‘Labour- and Efficiency-Related 
Outcomes’ 
 
Impact of software-based 
obligatory passage points on 
episodic circuit of power, 
focusing on the restrictive, 
disciplinary and punitive 
facet or effects of power. 
 
How does the specific mechanisms used for 
software-based work and process 
organization in focal case affect work quality 
and labour conditions? 
 
 
Bottom-up perspective: 
Micro-political Implications and 
outcomes for structural power 
relations  
 
Section 
‘Micro-Political Implications and 
Outcomes on Structural Power’ 
 
‘Transformative’ vs. 
‘reproductive’ outcomes of 
episodic processes that affect 
structural circuits of power. 
How does the specific approach of software-
based work organization in focal case affect 
structural power relations between key 
agencies (e.g. platform providers and gig 
workers) in continuous interaction (e.g. by 
reifying or altering existent power 
asymmetries)? 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
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Uber’s Socio-Political Setup  
Investigating Uber based on this heuristic template, platform providers15 and drivers16 
present the key agencies, each pursuing specific interests. The interests of platform providers 
and drivers only partially match (Calo & Rosenblat, 2016; Nachtwey & Staab, 2015).17 A 
core interest of gig workers is finding decently paid work with a predictable and steady 
income, transparent pay rates, and opportunities for self-determined and flexible working 
hours. In contrast, Uber’s key objective as a for-profit enterprise is focused on generating 
profits based on lean, semi-automated management and its app-based subcontracting 
approach (Srnicek, 2017; Scholz, 2017). For Uber, efficient operations rely on managing the 
fluctuations in demand and supply (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018) to pursue its economic 
objectives. Its software infrastructure, which allows for semi-automated process 
coordination, is the core technology utilized by the platform to pursue this aim. Hence, Uber 
– like other platforms – implements mechanisms of managerial control in its application, 
thereby ‘inscribing rules into the technology, so that only rule-conforming processes allow 
for successful user activities’ (ibid.:14). In this kind of platform-based work organization, 
software devices can be conceptualized as the core obligatory passage points; they are a 
technology-based ‘conduit through which traffic must necessarily pass’ (Clegg, 1989:206). 
The shape of power relations in platform business models is thus fundamentally influenced 
by the way power-related mechanisms are established in these software-based conduits. 
                                                 
15 Research indicates distinct power-related processes and conflicts between different actors (or groups of 
actors) within the core of the platform, which is organized as a conventional Coasian enterprise (Davis, 2016) 
based on contracts. Research also indicated problematic labour conditions, echoing studies on problematic work 
among highly qualified workers such as software developers. These cases provide a fruitful field for critical 
scholarship. However, we do not focus on this aspect as the issues appear quite different. In addition, interaction 
between gig workers and Uber is almost entirely app-based (Nachtwey & Staab, 2015), thus making Uber 
appear as a ‘black box’ to the workers. Hence, a detailed analysis would not contribute to the purpose of this 
paper. 
16 We focus on power relations between platform providers and gig workers and the resulting labour conditions; 
hence, we mainly concentrate on these two stakeholders in our discussion. 
17 Similar to all capital-labour relations, some overlap occurs between consent and conflict (see e.g. Burawoy, 
1979). However, the power-related processes we study here genuinely relate to structural conflicts between 
platform providers and gig workers. Thus, we focus on the divergence in interests between platforms and gig 
workers in the remainder of our paper. 
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In the case of Uber, the ability of various actors to control obligatory passage points differs 
markedly. While gig workers’ influence is limited or lacking, Uber possesses far-reaching 
competences to design the platform’s app-based infrastructure ‘from scratch’ (e.g. Calo & 
Rosenblat, 2017; Davis, 2015). This power results from the legal setup, ownership structure 
and governance model of the company. Uber draws on vast user-generated and process data, 
such as GPS-based information about drivers’ speeds, breaks, log-in and log-out-patterns, 
ride acceptance rates, reactions to pop-ups and internal messages, and rider evaluation 
systems. This privileged access to masses of data ‘create[s] an extensive reservoir for quasi-
panoptic observations’ (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018:10). In terms of circuits of power, this 
exclusive access to data, together with far-reaching competencies to design software 
infrastructure, provides a core technique for production and discipline that is fundamental to 
Uber’s operations. 
Control and Influence Mechanisms 
Next, we examine various control-and-influence mechanisms implemented in software-based 
obligatory passage points. We illustrate how these mechanisms influence the behaviour of 
Uber drivers and control their work arrangements and processes. In our illustrative case 
discussion, we also refer to findings from research in work and organizational sociology, 
labour process theory, and behavioural economics. We thus further develop the circuits of 
power approach and the discussion about the role of obligatory passage points. Moreover, the 
approach had not yet been applied to the study of new organizational forms like platform 
businesses, and new work arrangements like gig work. In case of Uber, five important groups 
of mechanisms can be distinguished as described below. 
First, the fundamental shape of value-creating processes at Uber can be described as a regime 
of ‘algorithmic bureaucracy’, in which 
Comparable to traditional bureaucracies, activities (…) resemble predefined ‘performance programs’ 
(March and Simon, 1958) or ‘conditional programs’ (see Luhmann, 2000) performing (.) simple 
bureaucratic if-A-then-do-B rules. Thus, very similar to regular formal organizations (Mintzberg, 
1979), [platform] marketplaces standardize processes by bureaucratic routines to effectively cope with 
the vast uncertainty and the manifold alternatives of possible user activities. (Kirchner & Schüßler, 
2018:10).  
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While processes and performance programs are set this way by the design of the software, 
the rules of membership are set by platform providers in ‘click-through’ agreements. These 
are binding formal guidelines that define the fundamental shape of ‘account membership’ 
(ibid.) resembling mechanisms of bureaucratic control known from labour process theory 
(e.g. Child 1984) which – in contrast to ‘conventional’, non-digitalised, organizations - are 
embedded almost entirely in software infrastructure in case of platform businesses. 
Second, Uber and other platforms implement user evaluation systems that allow customers 
(riders in this case) to rate gig workers’ (drivers’) performance. Yet drivers have almost no 
direct contact with members of Uber’s management as the app-based approach to work and 
process organization keeps management almost invisible to drivers the existence of such 
evaluation systems introduces an element of ‘direct control’ and ‘output control’ (Burawoy, 
1979; Child, 1984; Edwards, 1981) to the gig-work process. By Uber ‘outsourcing’ 
managerial tasks in this manner, it empowers customers ‘to act as middle managers over 
drivers, whose ratings directly impact their employment eligibility (Fuller & Smith, 1991; 
Stark & Levy, 2015)’ (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016:3772). The mechanisms used are quite 
similar to those described in debates on ‘control by customers’ in the works of labour process 
scholars (Taylor, Mulvey, Hyman, & Bain, 2002). 
Third, platforms such as Uber apply various forms of ‘market manipulation’ (Kirchner & 
Schüßler, 2018) such as dynamic pricing systems. These systems are referred to as ‘surge-
pricing’ as they ensure service coverage in case of temporal and spatial mismatches between 
demand and supply (Nachtwey & Staab, 2015). In line with Taylorist logic regarding 
monetary incentives (e.g. Littler, 1978), drivers are informed by push-up notifications when 
the demand is high or is expected to be high soon, and payment rates during times of high 
demand are temporarily increased (e.g. Rosenblat & Stark, 2016; Shapiro, 2017). This kind 
of notifications are sent to drivers regardless of whether they are logged-in or offline. 
Fourth, Uber’s software setup designs internal communication and leverages selective 
information in a purposeful manner to influence the drivers’ behaviour. These mechanisms 
are discussed as ‘info-normative control’ in labour process perspectives on platform work 
(Gandini, 2018). Communication with drivers is almost entirely app-based and is 
unidirectionally top-down. Uber intensively uses pop-ups, push notifications, and email 
alerts, which provide drivers with selective information focused on motivating them to act 
according to the platform’s requirements. For example, they are urged to keep on driving 
when the demand is high (e.g. Rosenblat, 2018). In contrast, drivers’ access to information 
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and their ability to communicate with the platform providers is limited (ibid.). Uber 
purposefully uses information asymmetry to expose, hide and circulate certain information to 
induce the desired behaviour among drivers (i.e. Scheiber, 2017). For instance, Uber’s app 
hides information about a passenger’s destination before the driver accepts a certain ride, to 
ensure that unfavourable ride requests – such as rides that lead drivers into remote areas with 
sparse demands for further rides – are covered (ibid.). The top-down communication also 
includes rhetoric manoeuvres that seem to supplement and enhance surge-based incentives. 
An example reported by Rosenblat and Stark (2016) are push-notifications reading ‘Are you 
sure you want to go offline? Demand is very high in your area. Make more money, don’t stop 
now!’ (ibid.:3768). Reports quote a veteran Uber driver who stated: ‘It was all day long, 
every day – texts, emails, pop-ups: “Hey, the morning rush has started. Get to this area, that’s 
where demand is biggest”’ (Scheiber, 2017:5). There indicates the extensive use of such 
invocations that can be conceptualized as ‘inspirational appeals’ (i.e. Yukl & Tracey, 1992) 
from a micro-political perspective. 
Fifth, research highlights forms of control used by Uber and similar platform businesses, 
which can be conceptualized as ‘nudges’ from a behavioural economics perspective (e.g. 
Kahneman & Egan, 2011, Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). By embedding automatized nudges in 
software infrastructure, Uber creates ‘persuasive technologies’ (Berdichevsky & 
Neuenschwander, 1999). These technological devices ‘persuasive in themselves’ (ibid.) have 
proven to effectively influence users by triggering cognitive biases and social influence in a 
non-coercive way (e.g. Fogg, 2002; Nye, 2014). In addition to the mechanisms described 
above, such as dynamic pricing and selective information, studies have identified a range of 
such ‘persuasive’ mechanisms that are subtle and ‘hidden from view’ in case of Uber 
(Calo/Rosenblat, 2017). For instance, drivers can set target incomes in the app. After target-
setting, the app visualizes the driver’s progress and continuously encourages him or her to 
reach the goal. In a similar vein, research points to various elements of gamification such as 
gratification badges and other ‘non-cash-rewards’ (Scheiber 2017). These practices are 
geared towards influencing behaviour by triggering user motivation through elements known 
from game design (Leismeister & Blohm, 2013). Examples include high ride-acceptance 
rates, good customer ratings, and availability at short notice. 
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To sum up, the various groups of mechanisms together form a ‘diversified portfolio’ of 
control and influence measures that are embedded in Uber’s obligatory passage points. We 
subsequently analyse the effect of these mechanisms on both business efficiency and labour 
conditions at Uber.  
Labour- and Efficiency-Related Outcomes  
The circuits of power approach emphasises both the facilitative and the restrictive or 
disciplinary effects of power in and around organizational settings. In this section, we show 
how the five groups of mechanisms discussed above both facilitate economic efficiency and 
affect drivers’ labour conditions. 
First, algorithmic bureaucracy can be seen as the cornerstone of Uber’s approach to process 
coordination. This aspect structures the power relations between drivers, riders and platform 
providers by ‘facilitat[ing] the semi-automated management of large, disaggregated 
workforces’ (Rosenblat 2017:256) and provides the basis for the platform’s ‘disciplinary 
regimes’ (Kirven, 2018). It enables platform providers to sanction users through exclusion 
from the platform in case of misbehaviour; it also enforces discipline in accordance with 
predefined rules and process patterns. This approach is coupled with Uber’s business-model 
efficiency and provides the platform with flexibility to react to market contingencies. Uber 
can unilaterally alter the conditions and formal rules of membership according to its goals, 
which are mainly economic, while leaving gig workers with little opportunity for ‘voice’ 
when conditions are changed in ways that do not favour them (e.g. Aloisi, 2015; De Stefano, 
2015). An example is events for which Uber decided to lower its fares and the drivers’ only 
opportunity to continue working was to agree to these changes during their next login (e.g. 
Scheiber, 2017). While favourable for the platform provider, such practices decrease the 
income predictability for workers. 
Second, the user evaluation systems used by platforms to obtain cost-efficient, semi-
automated process controls also entail both facilitative and disciplinary effects. In case of 
Uber, riders can rate drivers based on a five-star metric after ride completion. For drivers, 
these ratings can have severe consequences: when their average rating drops below 4.7 for a 
certain period, drivers are excluded from the app.18 Drivers thus rely heavily on favourable 
user evaluations. Coupled with job insecurity, this dependence is associated with 
                                                 
18 For a detailed description of Uber’s user evaluation mechanism, see for example Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas & 
Hwang, 2017. 
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psychological pressure, identity issues and other negative aspects discussed in studies on 
emotional labour (Gandini, 2018). This also highlights the problem of power asymmetry 
between the platform management and drivers. The rating criteria are centrally set, with no 
input from drivers. Thus, the ratings by riders can be highly subjective and at times may 
involve irrational, emotional, and biased judgements. In line with this, research indicates that 
gender- and race-based discrimination can occur (Rosenblat, Levy, Barocas & Hwang, 2017). 
These issues are highly problematic because software-based evaluation systems one-sidedly 
discriminate against drivers, who have limited opportunities to defend themselves in cases of 
unjustified poor ratings (ibid.). 
Third, measures of market manipulation by dynamic pricing also one-sidedly favour the 
business-model efficiency of Uber and similar platforms (e.g. Nachtwey & Staab, 2015; 
Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018). However, while this ‘control lever’ (Gurvich et al., 2016) 
superficially appears to provide opportunities for additional income for gig workers, research 
points to problematic side effects. For instance, Shapiro (2017) reports that surges during 
short-term spikes in demand, accompanied by push notifications sent to offline drivers – 
referred to as ‘bat signal’ in the company lingo – often lead to numerous driver log-ins. Mike, 
one of Shapiro’s interviewees, discussed the adverse consequences of this practice: ‘If you 
send out a bat signal, that’s fifty people that are going to sign on (.) within a few minutes, and 
then the work just gets scattered’ (ibid.:11). Dynamic pricing, an influence tactic used by 
Uber and other on-demand platforms to alter incentives for gig workers, can thus have 
adverse effects. It can create a temporary oversupply, leading to a reduced prospect of being 
assigned to rides (Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Due to its lack of reliability, transparency, and 
predictability for drivers, this kind of market manipulation has been criticized by journalists, 
drivers and researchers (e.g. Scheiber, 2017; Shapiro, 2017). 
Fourth, the use of information asymmetry by selective internal communication, such as the 
policy of blind ride acceptance to ensure the coverage of less desirable rides, similarly 
ensures efficient platform operations. However, this policy hampers drivers’ ability to make 
informed cost-benefit calculations when deciding whether to accept a ride request (e.g. Calo 
& Rosenblat, 2017; Shapiro, 2017). Thus, although working for Uber appears to provide a 
high degree of autonomy for drivers, enforced blind passenger acceptance combined with 
surge-pricing and centrally set rules illustrate ‘how little control Uber drivers have over 
critical aspects of their work and how much control Uber has over the labour of its users’ 
(Rosenblat &Stark, 2016:3672). Similarly, while the facilitative effect of rhetorical 
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manoeuvres for Uber is straightforward, these practices also have curtailing effects on the 
informed and rational entrepreneurial decision-making of drivers. Essentially this decreases 
their income security and predictability. 
 
Finally, elements of nudging and gamification seem to be highly effective mechanisms in 
Uber’s portfolio of control-and-influence mechanisms. In line with scholarship on ethical 
issues of gamification (Kim & Werbach, 2016), critics highlight that gamification that 
rewards ‘useless’ or imaginary gratification (Schmidt, 2016) can serve a manipulative 
purpose. Some researchers have even dubbed software-based gamification in a business 
context as ‘exploitationware’ because these practices ‘replace real incentives with ﬁctional 
ones’ (Bogost, 2011, 2013). In addition to the ethical issues of such practices, they negatively 
affect people’s income predictability and working conditions. A recent article in New York 
Times discussed these aspects: 
‘Uber […] is engaged in an extraordinary behind-the-scenes experiment in behavioral science to 
manipulate [drivers] in the service of its corporate growth … using psychological inducements and 
other techniques … to influence when, where and how long drivers work. [Methods include] video 
game techniques, graphics and noncash rewards of little value that can prod drivers into working 
longer and harder – and sometimes at hours and locations that are less lucrative for them (Scheiber 
2017:1-2). 
To sum up, the effects of the mechanisms explained above, which are embedded in the 
organization’s obligatory passage points affect the episodic level of organizational 
interaction. The influence derives from a mixture of bureaucratic, incentive-based, discursive 
and psychological elements. Top-down, these mechanisms thus appear as narrow efficiency-
seeking political tactics of platform management to influence drivers’ behaviour. 
Simultaneously, this ‘diversified portfolio’ of control and influence mechanisms comes along 
with negative outcomes for gig workers’ labour conditions. 
Micro-Political Implications and Outcomes on Structural Power 
After having provided insight on the facilitative and restrictive effects of Uber’s software-
based control mechanisms, we focus here on the structural outcomes of these practices. In the 
course of continuous organizational interaction, ‘actors seek to maintain, gain or deny 
strategic advantage by controlling or contesting the meaning and control of these obligatory 
passage points’ (Oliveira & Clegg, 2015). In addition, ‘control [of] obligatory passage points, 
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provides [agencies] … with the capacity to influence meaning and day-to-day interactions, 
and control work and resources’ (Hutchinson et al., 2010:35). With a focus on this ‘dialectic 
of structure and action’, the concept of obligatory passage points helps to explain why 
organizational settings such as Uber are characterized by rather persistent power 
configurations, whereas other platform settings have less inert power relations. Such more 
dynamic arrangements are likely to occur where low-power actors possess considerable room 
for agency. In contrast, more persistent arrangements can be expected in settings where 
powerful players, such as platform managers, possess far-reaching competences to channel 
episodic processes in ways that reproduce or increase their own power resources, while 
curtailing low-power actors’ resources and capacity to engage in micro-political activities. 
From this perspective, the initial setup of structural circuits of power in the case of Uber 
seems to support the emergence and persistence of asymmetric power relations. This is based 
on the mechanism discussed above by reifying the providers’ dominance while diminishing 
the workers’ power. These effects can be disentangled from a micro-political perspective by 
focusing on the outcomes of episodic processes, in terms of gig workers’ power resources, 
interests and social relations. 
First, as a result of Ubers’ algorithmic management approach, gig workers’ power resources 
are limited in several ways. The company imposes strict process patterns by algorithmic 
bureaucracy and account membership, combined with a specific subcontracting approach that 
legally classifies gig workers as independent contractors. Besides beneficial consequences for 
platforms providers and a range of negative consequences for gig workers’ labour conditions, 
these practices also impede gig workers’ access to ‘hard’ power resources and ‘robust tool-
kits’ (Williams & Geppert, 2011). Such missing resources include formal participation rights, 
guaranteed pay rates, and protective labour regulation which workers could use to safeguard 
their interests (i.e. De Stefano, 2015). 
Moreover, this setup restricts gig workers’ ability to engage in activities geared to the 
utilization of ‘soft’ power, as described in micro-political studies (e.g. Crozier & Friedberg, 
1979). Digital Taylorism and the ‘quasi-panoptic’ (Kirchner & Schüßler, 2018) possibilities 
of the platform management to monitor gig workers together with direct control through 
customer evaluation systems curtails the ability of Uber drivers to productively use ‘zones of 
uncertainty’ (ibid.) to enhance their power base. Traditional organizational arrangements 
provide low-power actors with room to utilize certain zones of uncertainty for micro-political 
activities. This point was demonstrated in studies such as that of Strauss et al. in their work 
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on the ‘negotiated order’ in hospitals (Strauss et al., 1963), Crozier’s study on technicians in 
tobacco factories (1964), and Barley’s study on technicians in hospitals (1986). In contrast, 
the possibility of Uber drivers to engage in micro-political activities remains rather limited, 
not least because of the impersonalized management practices and the absence of top and 
middle managers to engage in negotiations. 
Second, in line with behavioural economics and discursive approaches (see above), it is 
important to disentangle how some of the mechanisms outlined above affect gig workers’ 
decision-making. On an individual level, mechanisms related to nudging, rhetorical 
invocations and gamification steer episodic processes in a way that is likely to produce 
outcomes that reproduce (or enhance) existing power asymmetries. They also hinder the 
emergence of resistance that could challenge the existing work arrangements, because 
drivers’ informed decision-making is limited by these subtle influencing mechanisms (e.g. 
Scheiber, 2017). Related to this, Uber uses its access to information channels to legitimize its 
‘self-employment model by framing engagement as autonomous, self-determined 
“entrepreneurship”’ (ibid.). This ‘strategic sense-giving’ (e.g. Rouleau 2005) seems to be 
aimed at impeding the emergence of counter-discourses. Through the lens of the circuits of 
power model, these manoeuvres can be seen as an attempt by platform providers to influence 
actors’ rational calculations and choices (Shapiro, 2017). They embed rhetorical and 
emotional influencing mechanisms in technology-based obligatory passage points that are 
geared toward inducing the desired behaviour from drivers. Thus, in light of insights from 
behavioural economics and the social sciences, the way Uber uses rhetorical invocations, 
gamification and nudges can be conceptualized as specific techniques of production and 
discipline in terms of the circuits of power approach. 
Third, concerning socio-technical relations, mechanisms such as surge pricing notifications 
not only serve the company’s interests in growth and handling fluctuations in demand and 
supply, but also increase competition among drivers (e.g. Schor, 2018). Concerning lateral 
relations between gig workers, these policies can hinder solidarity as Uber’s management 
approach strongly controls the type and frequency of social interactions and human relations 
between drivers. Gig workers are thus seen as ‘atomized’ workers (e.g. Aloisi, 2015) with 
few or no direct encounters in their daily activities. This lack of frequent physical co-
presence is typical for many jobs in private transportation. However, Uber drivers have 
hardly any contact with co-drivers compared with – for example – ordinary taxi drivers, who 
usually know each other and chat by taxi radio while driving or waiting for customers. This 
Chapter 4 
112  
lack of episodic encounters at the professional level is thought to impede the emergence of 
collective action, solidarity and interest formation among Uber drivers. 
The socio-technical setup is also important in understanding why hierarchic interactions of 
drivers with management are unimportant in the Uber case. Such interactions are seen as 
opportunities for ‘politicking and issue-selling’ of low-power actors (Becker-Ritterspach et 
al., 2016; Palonen, 2003). We illustrated that the opportunities for gig workers to get in touch 
with platform providers are limited and are almost entirely software-based (e.g. Rosenblat, 
2018). This is seen as cost-efficient management but also prevents face-to-face interaction, 
which might otherwise provide room for voicing criticisms and developing personal relations 
with management.  
To sum up, the structure of obligatory passage points that is set up in the case of Uber seems 
to stabilize the platform’s asymmetric power relations. This affects the drivers’ power 
resources, decision-making processes and social relations. Gig workers have limited room for 
individual and collective political agency to resist working conditions or to develop effective 
forms of internal voice.  
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Summary and Contribution 
Based on the framework of circuits of power, we developed a template to systematically 
examine the various elements and power-related effects of algorithmic management (see 
Figure 3 and Table 8 in the appendix for a condensed overview). Thereby we also highlight 
the facilitative and punitive effects of the existent power relations in the case of Uber. 
Through legal and information-based power resources, Uber management is able to 
implement a diversified portfolio of techniques of production and discipline, ranging from 
bureaucratic rules and economic incentives to various efforts at strategic communication and 
nudges in its ‘persuasive’ software infrastructure. The implementation of these mechanisms 
of surveillance, discipline, control and incentives provides the conditions for coordinating 
value-creating processes at the episodic day-to-day level. By analysing aspects of power in 
daily interactions, we demonstrated that this setup of social and systemic integration is useful 
for steering processes efficiently. In addition, it serves to channel outcomes from repeated 
episodes of power in a way that reifies existing structural power configurations and power 
asymmetries, by limiting workers’ resources for micro-political activity. Hence, our analysis 
illustrates how the circuits of power-based perspective of gig work enables analysing how 
power relations are stabilized in specific gig-work settings. 
We also conceptualized how initial power asymmetries allow platform providers to set up 
mechanisms of control and influence that safeguard managerial objectives. These aims 
include cost-efficient and ‘just-in-time’ provision of services. At the same time, they provide 
grounds for unfavourable working conditions in problematic cases of gig work. Thus, we 
provide a theoretical conceptualization of descriptive findings from current gig-economy 
scholarship, arguing that ‘rhetorical invocations of digital technology and algorithms are used 
to structure asymmetric corporate relationships to labour, which favour the former’ 
(Rosenblat & Stark, 2016:3768). 
In our analysis of circuits of power in gig-work organizations, we also develop this approach 
further by drawing on concepts from labour process theory and behavioural economics. In 
doing so we specify how the concept of obligatory passage points can be refined for the study 
of digital work organizations. Until now, the meta-theoretical model of circuits of power has 
not been applied to power relations in platform arrangements. We conceptualize novel 
software-based mechanisms based on Clegg’s original model to illustrate how the model can 
be applied to this emergent form of business organization. We believe that this theoretical 
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elaboration provides a fruitful starting point for future research on power relations and labour 
conditions in digital business models. 
Moreover, our illustrative case study of Uber helps in understanding the role of subtle forms 
of influence exercised in certain gig-work settings, as a consequence of specific non-
contractual forms of employment within platform businesses. Conventional contractual 
models of employment in ‘Coasian organizations’ (Davis, 2016a, b) largely rely on 
formalized management and labour relations, formal rules, authority, and hierarchies. These 
features are based on contractual relations and fixed periodic income to handle the 
‘transformation problem’ (Braverman, 1974). By contrast, platforms have limited scope to 
use these conventional mechanisms. Although their freelance subcontractor approach is 
beneficial for cost-saving and provides high flexibility for platform organizers, a major 
disadvantage from the managerial perspective is the absence of formally legitimized 
authority. The intense use of nudges, gamification and rhetorical invocations seemingly aims 
at handling this control deficit; the technological setup of platform businesses uses these new 
forms of control and influence as ‘compensatory’ mechanisms. Thus, our findings contribute 
to recent debates discussing the potentials and boundaries of platform work (e.g. Kircher & 
Schüßler, 2018) by highlighting the role of these ‘compensatory’ mechanisms for the 
efficiency of platform-based organization. 
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Avenues for Future Research 
We applied the circuits of power approach to a systematic analysis of power relations at 
platform business organizations and gig-work arrangements. We believe that the heuristic 
template we introduced for this purpose can inform further development of organizational 
power theories. It is especially relevant to new organizational forms and work arrangements 
in the gig economy in the following ways. 
First, the heuristic analytical template we propose might help to systematize existing 
scholarship and integrate the findings from different camps of research regarding 
organizational power. As outlined, power is addressed implicitly or explicitly in various 
contributions to the field of gig-economy scholarship. Some researchers draw on 
heterogeneous theoretical foundations, sometimes in a rather descriptive manner. Our 
template might be useful to guide and structure comprehensive reviews on power in gig-work 
arrangements, by integrating the findings from these diverse studies in a systematic way 
based on a meta-theoretical framework. Similarly, our template could serve as framework to 
organize systematic case comparisons of power relations in different types of platform 
businesses and gig-work settings. 
Second (and related to the first point), future studies applying a circuits of power approach 
might contribute to ongoing debates on the broad heterogeneity of different forms of gig 
work (e.g. Davis, 2016a, b). Our paper concentrates on the problematic case of Uber, with a 
focus on the intertwined mechanisms of episodic and structural power and how they relate to 
the emergence of problematic labour conditions at the ‘dark side’ of the gig economy. We 
identified mechanisms of control and influence that have also been found in other platform 
arrangements (e.g. Ivanova et al., 2018). However, other contributions point to less 
problematic labour conditions in ‘high road companies’ that prove ‘relatively stable, good-
paying jobs.’ (Kalleberg & Dunn, 2016: 74). 
For instance, various conditions in the gig economy have been associated with agency, task 
and process related aspects. These include the qualification levels that are required and the 
job and task profiles, as well as the labour market position of workers (Kalleberg & Dunn, 
2016). Case-specific power configurations in these varying settings differ from those 
described in our case, because workers have higher status and power and more micro-
political scope for agency. 
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Similarly, Wood et al. (2019a) analysed the ways in which digital gig work can be – and is – 
monitored and controlled by management. Compared to our research, that study focused on 
workers who possessed more opportunities to bypass strict controls and surveillances due to 
characteristics inherent in the tasks and processes, which limited platform organizers’ ability 
to narrowly streamline episodic processes. For instance, key-logging and screenshot 
algorithms applied to monitor digital gig work in such settings can be outsmarted more easily 
than would be possible at Uber. The nature of tasks in these contrasting cases limits the 
ability of platform providers to engage in quasi-panoptic surveillance, thus providing larger 
zones of uncertainty to workers. This enables them to partially circumvent software-based 
control and surveillance, thereby giving them more autonomy in their work processes. 
Similarly, qualified jobs such as programming provide more room for ‘service 
differentiation’ compared with Uber work. Such setups provide workers with more 
opportunities to build up their individual power resources, for example by gaining reputation 
and symbolic capital based on positive user evaluations (Wood et al., 2019a, b). 
A comparison of the ways in which obligatory passage points are set up digitally in these 
different platforms should also consider the importance of different organizational and 
societal institutions. Although problematic labour conditions seem to be widespread among 
gig-work platforms, with a strict for-profit orientation based on shareholder-value logics, 
‘The eventual fate of this form of “micro-entrepreneurship” is uncertain’ (Davis, 2015:138). 
This is because the ‘Platforms are highly malleable, and there is clearly room for non-
corporate alternatives (ibid.). This also points to the role of heterogeneity in actor 
configurations and structural circuits of power that result from case-specific governance 
models as well as from different environmental influences related to heterogeneous national 
business systems (Whitley, 1999) and institutional ecosystems (Meijerink & Keegan, 
forthcoming) in which platform businesses operate. Alternative governance and ownership 
models might lead to socio-technical relations between key actors that fundamentally differ 
from those we studied. For instance, organizational settings of cooperatives or non-profit 
platforms would set up different initial power relations and interest configurations; this 
would presumably lead to the establishment of significantly different facilitative mechanisms 
in structural circuits of power. Similarly, varying institutional environments can enable or 
restrict the ways in which certain techniques of production and discipline can be enforced or 
contested in platform arrangements. For instance, Uber’s unilateral alteration of fare rates has 
led to lawsuits to improve the legislation that declares such practice illegal (Rosenblat, 2018). 
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In line with this, better industrial relation regulations for gig workers to improve their legal 
status as well as minimum wages and rights and obligations for collective bargaining, seem 
to be important to improve labour conditions. They have the potential to support micro-
political agencies and the building of ‘robust tool-kits’ (Williams & Geppert, 2011) for 
employee voice (e.g. De Stefano, 2015). 
Third, beyond the potential to inform systematic comparative studies, our approach based on 
circuits of power could provide a toolkit for studying the processes political formation and 
transformation of power and employment relations in certain gig-work arrangements, from a 
dynamic perspective. Our illustrative analysis draws on a case that is characterized by rather 
asymmetric power relations, which have proven to be relatively stable. However, the circuits-
of-power lens also provides potential for the study of organizational change. 
For instance, it could be used to shed more light on cases where successful episodes of 
resistance leading to improved labour conditions in gig-work arrangements occur. For 
example, 3F – a Danish trade union – recently signed the first far-reaching collective 
agreement in gig work worldwide with Hilfr.dk, a platform for private home-cleaning 
providing minimum hourly wages, contributions to pension savings, and holiday and sick pay 
to workers (hilfr.dk, lo.dk). A longitudinal, in-depth investigation based on circuits of power 
could analyse how such critical events alter the internal power configuration in such cases 
over time, for instance by capturing how the shift in socio-technical-relations and power 
resources presumably induced by such agreements might alter power relations between 
management and workers as well as the institutionalization of algorithmic management in the 
respective organizational settings on the long run. The study of such cases where existent 
platform arrangements undergo significant transformations could also help to specify the way 
exogenous environmental contingencies (e.g. changes in labour regulation) interact with 
structural circuits of power and translate to changing episodic power relations leading to 
shifts in platform power configurations. This might ultimately provide more detailed insight 
into the processes and pathways for organizational change in gig-work arrangements. 
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Overall, we think that future comparative and/or longitudinal studies based on circuits of 
power might help to provide a more systematic and clear-cut picture on the link of power 
configurations and labour conditions in heterogeneous gig work settings. In our view, some 
of the core questions to ask here are: 
1. how and why certain control mechanisms and obligatory passage points are set up in a 
specific way in different platform settings due to differing micro- meso- and macro-level 
conditions, 
2. how these varying practices of algorithmic management influence power relations 
between management and gig workers in different platform arrangements, and 
3. how and when different regulative, socio-economic and normative institutional influences 
might facilitate power structures more supportive to gig workers’ voice and micro-
political activities. 
This kind of research could ultimately contribute to the question of how problematic 
conditions in some contemporary digital business models might be overcome by providing 
elaborated blueprints of successful worker emancipation, which could be triggered both 
‘bottom-up’ by workforce resistance and ‘top-down’ by better regulation. This seems 
particularly important as ‘Uberization render[ing] the corporate employment relation 
increasingly dispensable’ (Davis, 2016:512) has gained momentum, oftentimes making 
‘(t)hings worse, at least from the perspective of labor’ (ibid.:511) and therefore posing urgent 
questions not only to academics but also policy-makers and practitioners of labour 
representation. 
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